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Summary
The World is rapidly undergoing a massive digital transformation where every human will have
no choice but to rely on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems.
At the same time, there are increasing numbers of malicious attackers who are ever trying to
compromise information systems for financial or political gain. Given the threat landscape and
its sophistication, the traditional approach of fortifying the castle will not provide sufficient
protection to the information systems. This formidable threat can only be restrained by a new
approach, which looks at both inwards and outwards for potential attacks. It is well established
that humans are the weakest link when it comes to information security controls although the
same humans are considered as the most valued assets. A trusted custodian with malicious
intent can inflict an enormous damage to critical information assets. Often these attacks go un-
noticed for a considerable period and will have caused irreversible damage to the organisation
by the time they are discovered.
In the recent past, there have been well publicised data compromises in the media which
have damaged the reputations of governments and organisations and in some cases endangered
human life. While some of these leaks can be classified as whistleblowing in the public interest,
they are very real examples of information compromises in the context of information security.
High profile leaks by Edward Snowden and Bradley (Chelsea) Manning, are perfect examples
of the potential damage from an insider. Furthermore, most malicious insider activities go
unnoticed or unpublicised as a damage control measure by the affected organisations. While
there is lots of research and investment going into insider threat prevention, these attacks are
on the rise at an alarming rate.
A comprehensive study of publicly available insider threat cases, academic literature, and
technical reports reveals the need for a multifaceted view of the problem. The insider threat
problem can no longer be treated only as a technical data driven problem but requires the
analysis of associated factors, a combination of technical and human behavioural aspects going
beyond the traditional technology driven approaches.
Furthermore, there is no universally agreed comprehensive feature set as the majority of the
1
proposed models are bounded into a single threat scenario or conducted on a specific system. In
order to overcome this limitation, this thesis introduces a precise user profile model integrating
insider threat related parameters from technical, behavioural, psychological, and organisational
paradigms. The proposed user profile model is a combination of: a comprehensive insider
threat detection and prediction feature set; a collection of various techniques for feature specific
user behaviour comparisons; and a framework for quantifying user behaviour as a numerical
value.
The unpredictability of malicious attackers and the complexity of malicious actions, neces-
sitates the careful analysis of network, system and user parameters correlated with the insider
threat problem. Also, unearthing the hidden evidence requires the analysis of an enormous
amount of data generated from heterogeneous input streams. This creates a high dimensional,
heterogeneous data analysis problem for distinguishing suspicious users from benign users.
This creates the need to identify an appropriate means for data representation and feature
extraction. Since traditional graph theory and new approaches in the field of complex networks
enable the means of representing high dimensional, heterogeneous data, the feasibility of the
use of graphs for data representation and feature extraction are investigated going beyond tra-
ditional data mining techniques.
Unattributed graphs are introduced to represent users’ device usage data, web access data,
and organisational hierarchy. A graph based feature extraction technique based on subgraphs
generated on different order of neighbourhoods are introduced. A graph based approach to
capture inter-user relationships using web access data is presented.
Various insider threat models proposed in the literature including intrusion detection based
approaches, system call based approaches, honeypot based approaches and stream mining ap-
proaches end up with high false positive rates. More recently machine learning approaches for
identifying suspicious users from normal users have increased. However, the application of
graph based anomaly detection techniques addressing the insider threat problem is relatively
rare in the academic literature as well as uncommon in the commercial world. Therefore, we fo-
cused our attention on graph based anomaly detection techniques for differentiating suspicious
users from the benign users.
This thesis introduces two distinct insider threat detection frameworks. The first is a hy-
brid insider threat detection framework based on graph theoretic feature extraction mechanism
and an unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm. The second is built on an attributed graph
clustering mechanism integrated with an outlier ranking mechanism.
Finally, a comprehensive theoretical and commercially viable framework for insider threat
mitigation integrating user profiling, threat detection, and threat detection is introduced.
Chapter 1
Introduction
In this new era of cyber threats, the level of sophistication of attacks has significantly increased
and the threats are harder to detect. As threats continue to evolve, it is necessary to move away
from the traditional way of defending the perimeter and trying to identify the threat. Thus we
need to expand the security perimeter with a 360 degree protection, both from outside the peri-
meter and from within the perimeter. It is well known that the humans are the weakest link in
cybersecurity, and hence they create the biggest information security risk for any organisation,
the insider threat. This well known but unknown real threat comes from the very people who
are the custodians of information assets. The reality is that an organisation’s biggest asset, its
personnel, can also be its biggest risk. This threat is hard to discover, as no one is fully aware
of what we are really looking for.
Data leaks by the most famous whistleblower of all time, Edward Snowden, and the biggest
data disclosure of classified and sensitive military and diplomatic documents by Bradley (Chelsea)
Manning are the high profile insider misuses that have been in the news over the last few years.
In reality, what is in the news is just the tip of the iceberg and with much more going on under
the radar, some threats are never ever being detected. Despite the fact that many academic re-
searchers have used their brain power to conceptualise this most difficult security threat using
mathematical models, cybersecurity experts have used their expertise to look at this problem
from a practical point of view, and commercial giants of security are racing to introduce market
leading solutions, insider threats continue to rise.
This thesis is a contribution to theoretical knowledge and obtains empirical results for mit-
igating this growing phenomenon of the subtle, smartest, hardest, and costliest information
security threat, the insider threat. This chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.1 describes
the significance of the insider threat problem. Section 1.2 presents the motivation behind this
research. Section 1.3 outlines the scope and the contributions of this thesis. Finally, section
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1.4 describes the structure of the thesis.
1.1 Significance of the Insider Threat Problem
The threat posed by malicious insiders compromising information assets is a very critical is-
sue to many nations, government bodies and private organisations. The rate and severity of
insider threats are increasing at an alarming rate, compromising the integrity, availability and
confidentiality of critical information assets [73] [136] [156]. Modern trends in enterprise com-
puting, the rise of social media, the cloud, mobility and the era of big data have all elevated the
threat landscape. Even though most organisations are aware of the significance of this sophist-
icated and patient attack, it is becoming clear that prevention needs to go beyond strict security
policies and traditional technical controls.
In a series of Data Breach Investigations Reports (DBIR) published by Verizon [152] [153]
[154] [155] [156], insider and privilege misuse has been identified as one of the major cyber
security threats faced by organisations worldwide. Based on the latest five reports from 2013 to
2017 the percentage of insider attacks among the total cyber security incidents investigated in
these reports varied as 14%, 18%, 21%, 16%, and 18%. The steady growth in the percentage of
incidents in the first couple of years, as well as the percentages of the last two years, confirms
that insider threats are still a major issue.
When we consider the different industries that were victims of insider threats, the healthcare
industry sits at the top regarding confirmed data breaches in the 2017 Verizon DBIR report
[156]. Furthermore, insiders are the predominant threat actors (68%) in the healthcare industry
when compared to the percentage of external attackers. IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index
2017 [73] also found that a greater proportion of insiders (71%) committed security breaches
compared to the lower proportion (29%) of outsiders in the healthcare industry. Interestingly it
was found that the motivation behind these malicious attackers was driven by not only financial
gain (28%) but also fun (24%) [156]. The compromise of a healthcare record of an innocent
patient could be life threatening. If this compromise comes from insiders who are within the
healthcare organisation, then there is an urgent requirement to prevent such misuses.
Based on the 2017 Verizon DBIR report [156] the public administration sector is the second
highest industry in terms of the number of confirmed data breaches. This report also found that
40% of the threat actors in the public administration sector were insiders [156]. Malicious
insiders in most of the breaches under this category were motivated by fun and curiosity. Fur-
thermore, trade secrets and personal information breaches were among the top data breach
activities committed by malicious insiders in the public administration sector.
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According to the IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2017 [73] the industry experi-
encing the highest number of information security attacks in 2016 was financial services. In-
terestingly, the data also reveals a greater percentage (58%) of insider attacks versus outside
attacks (42%) in financial services. In 2017 Verizon DBIR report [156] financial services was
the third industry when compared with the number of reported insider data breaches with only
6% insider involvement.
In addition to the above three industry sectors, the percentage of insider attacks in the
educational services also was about 30% as in 2017 Verizon DBIR report [156]. In the other
three major sectors considered (information and communications, manufacturing, and retail)
in the IBM X-Force report, the insider involvement is less than 10%. Nevertheless, given the
percentage of insiders involved in security breaches, all organisations in critical services are
victims of the insider threat. Furthermore, the lower percentages of insider involvement does
not imply the cost of the damage is lower than the cost of the damage caused by the external
attackers.
From the findings of the 2016 Cost of Insider Threat report [74] by Ponemon Institute, a
benchmark study of organisations in the United States, the total average cost of insider related
incidents was valued as US$4.3 million. According to the 2015 SANS survey [138], almost
one-fifth (19%) of respondents believe that the potential loss from an insider threat is more
than US$5 million. Another 15% valued such loss at US$1 to US$5 million. From the example
insider threat cases published in [29], the financial damages caused by reported insider theft
of intellectual property ranged from US$5,000 to US$1 billion. Similarly, the damages caused
as a result of insider fraud ranged from US$10,000 to US$48 million. There is, of course, the
unmeasurable cost of brand and reputation damage.
Many of the reported insider threat incidents are from the United States of America. How-
ever, from time to time, different organisations in countries other than the United States of
America, have been victims of insider attacks. The following are a few examples of insider
attacks that were in the news headlines over the last decade globally. All of the examples be-
low are taken from the set of world’s biggest data breaches available in [38]. Back in 2007, a
former contractor stole 9 million user records from a Japanese commercial printing company,
Dai Nippon. In 2008, an employee stole two multi media discs containing personal information
such as names, ages, social security numbers, email addresses, and cell phone numbers of 11.1
million customers of GS Caltex, one of the South Korea’s largest oil refineries. In 2010, the
United States of America faced the biggest classified data breach in history, wikileaks. In 2013,
an employee of Vodafone Germany stole 2 million customer information records threatening
the customer data privacy of the telecommunication giant in Germany. Theft of credit rating
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data of 20 million customers by an employee of Korea Credit Bureau was another major insider
attack faced by South Korea in late 2013. In addition to the above examples, the UK, Australia,
India, China, and France are several other countries who were victims of the insider threats
[29].
All of the above facts can be summarised into a single statement: all government and private
organisations worldwide, across all industries, are vulnerable to the most trusted stakeholders,
the ones who have the keys to the kingdom, the insiders. Consequently, the significance of
this most complex man-made information security threat forms the baseline for this thesis. We
believe that it is a problem of understanding what is the normal behaviour of trusted employees
in an organisation, what is not normal behaviour, what needs to be analysed, and how to protect
the enterprise from their biggest asset, these employees. The next section describes the major
motivational factors behind this thesis.
1.2 Motivation
Irrespective of the many commercial products available in the market for enterprise security
controls and security incident management, malicious insider threats create news headlines
again and again. Insider threats continue to rise causing huge, in some cases unrecoverable,
financial losses and reputation damages. There are a few factors behind the difficulty of the
insider threat problem, which enables malicious insiders to take advantage. It is hard to differ-
entiate malicious activity from benign activity as both of these activities are performed during
normal day-to-day operations using the available access privileges.
Based on the publicly available insider threat cases, academic literature, and technical re-
ports, it is evident that the insider threat can no longer be treated as a data driven problem. It
needs to be thought of as a combination of data, and a human behaviour driven problem. This
creates the need to go beyond technical capabilities to understand the unpredictable behaviour
of the trusted insider. This also necessitates the requirement of precisely characterising users’
behaviour.
Though there is no particular demographic profile for malicious insiders, there are common
characteristics among the three broad categories of insider threat, namely IT sabotage, theft of
intellectual property and IT fraud [29]. These features are based on the type of people involved,
the motivation for the attack, the capability for the attack, opportunity for the attack, the time
span, and the level of damage caused by the attack. Besides disgruntled workplace behaviour,
users tend to publicise their inside (in-office) experiences online [8]. Consequently, the first
steps for a proper insider threat mitigation strategy should be the analysis and identification
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of users’ behaviour by correlating many more insider threat related factors. Although a few
of the proposed models in the literature have tried to integrate many of these related aspects
together, still there is no agreed accurate profile model to characterise user behaviour. Thus we
focus on defining a precise user profile model integrating insider threat related parameters from
technical, behavioural, psychological and organisational aspects.
Insider threat detection and prediction is a battle between the organisations and their most
trusted stakeholders. Most interestingly these attacks are created by some of the smartest people
on earth. From the organisation’s point of view, they are the most trusted and knowledgeable
people and are considered a part of the enterprise assets. Since the malicious attackers commit
the malicious activity during the normal day to day operations, it is necessary to cover the
full visibility of the problem by analysing large amounts of related data. Finding evidence of
malicious activities from the enormous amount of data generated from various input streams is
similar to finding a needle in a haystack.
Traditional data mining techniques may not be the proper way of approaching this prob-
lem. First it is necessary to find the most appropriate means of data representation of the high
dimensional heterogeneous data associated with the insider threat problem. Also, the direct
analysis of associated data would not reveal the hidden evidence. Consequently we need to
think of effective methods for feature extraction as well. Since traditional graph theory or
the new approaches in the field of complex networks enable the representation of high dimen-
sional, heterogeneous data we were motivated to investigate graph based approaches for data
representation and feature extraction going beyond traditional approaches.
Initial insider threat detection and prediction models were adopted from the external threat
detection models. Also, many of the insider threat detection models focused on specific threat
scenarios or focused on a specific vulnerable systems. Many of the insider threat models pro-
posed in the literature based on external threat detection approaches ended up with high false
positive rates. The high false positive rates could be a result of not covering the entire landscape
of the problem.
Based on the nature of the insider threat problem, supervised anomaly detection techniques
that are based on existing rule sets which classify an activity as a suspicious event or a normal
event, cannot be applied to the insider threat problem. Consequently, malicious insider threat
detection models should be approached through unsupervised anomaly detection techniques.
In addition to the many different ways proposed for insider threat detection including in-
trusion detection based approaches, system call based approaches, honeypot based approaches,
and stream mining approaches, some recent research attempts have focused on machine learn-
ing approaches and graph based approaches. The majority of commercial insider threat solu-
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tions, which are usually coupled with security incident and event management solutions, are
also based on machine learning methods. The application of graph based anomaly detection
techniques is uncommon in the commercial world, and they are relatively absent from aca-
demic literature as well. Hence, we focused our attention on graph based anomaly detection
techniques for differentiating suspicious users from the benign users.
There are a few proprietary software tools available for detecting malicious insider threats.
These tools can accurately identify known attacks or specialised attacks on some systems.
However, they need to be proactive rather than reactive to minimise the harm caused by these
attacks. Hence there is an urgent requirement for predicting and proactively mitigating the
attack rather than taking reactive measures. This creates a requirement for automated insider
attack prediction which is missing in curent research. Consequently, we recognised the signi-
ficance of developing a comprehensive solution that integrates user profiling, threat detection,
and threat prevention.
The above are the major motivations which led us to develop the goals and objectives that
were successfully achieved at the end of this research as described in the next section.
1.3 Objectives and Contributions
The goal of this thesis is to develop mathematical models for insider threat detection and pre-
diction mainly using graph theoretic approaches by analysing a variety of data from technical,
behavioural, psychological, and organisational paradigms of the insider threat problem.
1.3.1 Objectives
The objectives of this thesis are the following:
• To precisely characterise users’ behaviour as a combination of technical, behavioural,
psychological, and organisational factors correlated with the insider threat problem by
analysing user, system, and network parameters.
• To investigate appropriate graph theoretic methods for representing high dimensional
heterogeneous data associated with the insider threat problem.
• To identify graph based approaches for feature extraction from the data generated from
heterogeneous information sources.
• To analyse graph theoretical approaches and unsupervised anomaly detection techniques
for malicious insider threat detection.
• To introduce a comprehensive theoretical insider threat detection and prediction frame-
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work excluding the prototyping of the proposed framework.
1.3.2 Contributions
The research contributions of this thesis are the following:
• A comprehensive insider threat detection and prediction feature set correlated with user,
system, and network parameters are introduced. Feature extraction techniques which
work by comparing users’ behaviour against three hierarchical levels are presented. Vari-
ous mechanisms for extracting time dependent and time independent features are intro-
duced.
• A hybrid user profile model, categorising the identified features into technical, behavi-
oural, psychological, and organisational aspects is proposed.
• A quantitative user profile score for characterising users’ behaviour is defined.
• Various types of graphs are introduced to represent users’ device usage data, web access
data, email communication data, and organisational hierarchy. Attributed graphs are
presented to represent inter-user relationships and associated user parameters.
• A graph theoretic approach based on user subgraphs is presented for device usage feature
extraction.
• A graph based approach to capture inter-user relationships based on users’ web access
records is presented.
• A hybrid insider threat detection framework, based on graph based feature extraction
techniques and statistical feature extraction techniques coupled with an unsupervised
anomaly detection algorithm is proposed.
• A graph based anomaly detection technique based on maximal clique property is intro-
duced to find users who are deviating from the normal web access patterns.
• An insider threat detection framework based on an attributed graph clustering method that
has not been widely used for insider threat detection is introduced. An enterprise wide
outlier ranking scheme based on subspace dimension, cluster dimension, and several
other global graph attributes is proposed.
• A comprehensive, commercially viable and theoretically sound insider threat prediction
and detection framework is presented.
One of the biggest challenges faced by all researchers in the insider threat domain is the
lack of availability of proper datasets and evaluation criteria. This applies to us as well. Con-
sequently, we used the publicly available insider threat datasets published by Computer Emer-
gency Response Team at Carnegie Mellon University (CERT @ CMU) [144] for this research.
All the evaluations were based on the available ground truth of the datasets. The main reason
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for using only the ground truth of the dataset is, as in some other fields, there is no agreed upon
state of the art model for insider threat detection and prediction.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is organised as follows. The previous sections of the the current chapter discussed
the significance of the insider threat problem, motivation, objectives and the contributions of
this thesis. This last section of the current chapter is dedicated to the description of the structure
of the thesis.
Chapter 2 provides the background and the related literature on the insider threat problem.
It includes the different definitions proposed for the terms malicious insider and the insider
threat and the discussion of the characteristics of the insider threat problem. Insider threat pre-
cursors and threat agents and a critical review of different insider threat detection approaches
proposed in the literature are also presented. Chapter 2 is also the reference point for the
relevant networks/graphs definitions, notations, and preliminaries as well as the preliminaries
on receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis. The chapter provides basic descrip-
tions of the datasets and the software used throughout this thesis. Additional literature specific
to each chapter is provided at the beginning of the respective chapter. Specific graph related
notations, definitions or theories are also presented in respective chapters where necessary.
Chapter 3 to chapter 6 are the main technical chapters that discuss the theoretical back-
ground and the empirical results.
Chapter 3 critically analyses the technical, behavioural, psychological, and organisational
factors correlated with the insider threat problem. A comprehensive insider threat detection
and prediction feature set is introduced as a result. A user profile score definition framework
is presented discussing the different graph based and statistical mechanisms used for time de-
pendent feature extraction and time independent feature extraction. For each of the time varying
parameters, a parameter specific threshold mechanism is proposed to compare the user beha-
viour at three hierarchical levels: (i) global, (ii) peer, and (iii) individual. A set of unusual
features for each user is derived, and the number of unusual features is mapped into a user
profile score value. Experimental results of the proposed user profile framework are presented
in the latter part of chapter 3.
Chapter 4 introduces a hybrid insider threat detection framework as a combination of a
graph based approach and an unsupervised anomaly detection technique. The proposed frame-
work utilises various kinds of data such as device access logs, removable media usage records,
file copying activity records, web access records, email communication logs and psychometric
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scores. We introduce the use of graph properties of ‘User Sub Graphs (USG)’ for unearthing
hidden behavioural patterns of device usage in different services. The proposed framework util-
ises the Isolation Forest algorithm, a state of the art unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm,
that stands out in effectively separating anomalous events from the rest of the event instances.
Chapter 5 presents graph based techniques used for extracting inter-user relationships from
web access records and email communication records. Two vertex similarity measures are used
to calculate vertex similarities of users and based on a chosen threshold the large size bipart-
ite graph is projected into a single mode inter-user relationship graph. We present a modified
algorithm for finding maximal cliques for finding malicious users. We also introduce the gener-
ation of inter-user relationship graphs using both email communication logs and the organisa-
tional hierarchy. Vertex attributes are used to represent features extracted from heterogeneous
sources converting the inter-user relationship graph into an attributed graph. Consequently in
the second part of chapter 5 we introduce the use of attributed graph anomaly detection tech-
niques for malicious user detection which has not been widely applied to the insider threat
problem thus far. The subspace and subgraph clustering, a twofold clustering mechanism on
attributed graphs are introduced in the context of the insider threat problem. We propose the use
of outlier ranking in subspaces of attributed clustering for ranking users based on the obtained
clusters. The proposed outlier ranking mechanism utilises three indicators which include sub-
space dimension, cluster dimension and the graph structure. The graph structure is extracted
using three node properties (i) vertex degree, (ii) eigenvector centrality and (iii) betweenness
centrality.
Chapter 6 proposes a comprehensive theoretical insider threat prediction and detection
framework by integrating the user profile model proposed in chapter 3 and the insider threat
detection models introduced in chapters 4 and 5. It also includes a comprehensive review
on insider threat detection and prediction frameworks proposed in the academic literature and
market leading insider threat detection solutions.
Finally, chapter 7 summarises the main contributions of this thesis and discusses some
interesting avenues for future research.
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Background
This chapter provides the fundamental background knowledge in the area of insider threats,
preliminaries on graph theory and complex networks, descriptions of the datasets, software,
and tools utilised for the experiments carried out in this thesis. Section 2.1 starts by present-
ing the various definitions used for the terms malicious insiders and malicious insider attacks
(subsection 2.1.1). The characteristics of insider attacks are discussed in subsection 2.1.2.
Influential factors on insider threats are described in subsection 2.1.3. A comprehensive re-
view of the various insider threat detection approaches proposed in the literature is presented
in subsection 2.1.4.
Section 2.2 presents the preliminaries of graph theory and networks. This includes the
basic definitions and notations, various network measures, and descriptions of different graph
clustering algorithms used in this thesis. Section 2.3 discusses the preliminaries on receiver
operating characteristics (ROC) curve analysis, which was used as the core evaluation tech-
nique for the proposed models. Section 4.2 describes the insider threat datasets utilised in this
analysis. Section 2.5 presents the software and tools utilised when conducting experiments.
In addition to the related literature, definitions, and notations presented in this chapter,
any other specific literature, definitions, and notations applicable to individual chapters are
described within the relevant chapter where necessary.
2.1 Background on Insider Threat Problem
2.1.1 Malicious Insiders and Malicious Insider Attacks
A number of definitions for the terms malicious insider and insider threat have been proposed,
even though there is no standard definition agreed upon by the research community. An initial
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definition of an insider in the context of security was introduced by Bishop [15] as, a trusted
entity that is given the power to violate one or more rules in a given security policy. The term
insider threat was defined as the threat that the insider may abuse his/her discretion by taking
actions that would violate the security policy when such actions are not warranted. To avoid the
binary distinction of an insider in the previous definition, an extended definition is proposed by
Bishop and Gates [17] based on two primitive actions: (a) violation of a security policy using
legitimate access and (b) breach of an access control policy by obtaining unauthorized access.
The latter definition was proposed arguing that a security policy is represented by the access
control rules employed by an organisation. Thus, this definition adopted a lattice approach
going beyond the binary classification adopted in the former definition.
Brackney and Anderson [23] defined the insider threat as malevolent (or possibly inadvert-
ent) actions by an already trusted person with access to sensitive information and information
systems. Maybury et al. [103] defined an insider as anyone in an organization with approved
access, privilege, or knowledge of information systems, information services, and missions and
a malicious insider as one motivated to adversely impact an organization’s mission through a
range of actions that compromise information confidentiality, integrity and/or availability. This
definition considered only the employees within an organization. Magklaras et al. [98] defined
an insider as a person that has been legitimately given the capability of accessing one or many
components of the IT infrastructure, by interacting with one or more authentication mechan-
isms (plain text password, PKI, biometric or smart card token). According to Aleman-Meza et
al. [5] insider threat was the potential malevolent actions by employees within an organisation,
a specific type of which relates to legitimate access of documents. Predd et al. [124] defined the
term insider as someone with legitimate access to an organisation’s computers and networks,
in which they did not define the term legitimate.
Althebyan and Panda [7] concentrated on the knowledge in modelling the behaviour of
insiders and defined the term as an individual who has the knowledge of the organization’s
information system structure to which he/she has authorized access and who knows the under-
lying network topologies of the organization’s information systems. At the “Countering Insider
Threats Seminar - 2008”, which brought together researchers and policy makers to develop a
common vision to categorize insiders, it was proposed that an insider is a person that has been
legitimately empowered with the right to access, represent, or decide about one or more assets
of the organization’s structure [125]. The removal of any IT biased definitions and consider-
ation of organizational assets broaden the spectrum covered by this definition. Kandias et al.
[81] defined an insider as a human entity that has or had access to the information system of an
organization and does not comply with the security policy of the organization for their work.
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This definition did not consider the type of access and the level of skills required to commit the
attack.
The various definitions mentioned above highlight several key factors when defining the
term malicious insider. These key factors include the following;
1. an individual with the knowledge of the organization’s information assets,
2. an individual who has or had access privileges to the organization’s information assets,
3. an individual motivated to adversely impact the confidentiality, integrity and/or availab-
ility of the organization’s information assets,
4. an individual who intentionally misused authorised access and privileges to commit an
attack.
Transfer of enterprise infrastructure to cloud environments, outsourcing, and vendor in-
volvement expanded the number of parties involved in enterprise system operations. This cre-
ated the requirement for consideration of trusted business partners who have or had authorised
access to organization’s assets as insiders. The following definition proposed by CERT-CMU
[39] collectively captures many of the aspects identified in previous definitions of a malicious
insider threat.
Definition 2.1 A malicious insider threat is a current or former employee, contractor, or busi-
ness partner who has or had authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data
and intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner that negatively affected the con-
fidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s information or information systems.
Considering the comprehensiveness of this definition compared to the other definitions dis-
cussed previously, it is adopted throughout this thesis.
2.1.2 Characteristics of Insider Attacks
There is no particular demographic profile for malicious insiders. However, based on the com-
mon characteristics of malicious attacks, there are three broad categories of insider threat,
namely (i) information technology (IT) sabotage, (ii) theft of intellectual property (IP), and
(iii) IT fraud [29]. The next three subsections describe the key features of the three broad
categories of insider threats.
IT Sabotage
IT sabotage is defined as an insider’s use of information technology (IT) to direct specific harm
at an organization or an individual [29]. These attacks are technically sophisticated attacks
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identified from the published insider threat cases [29]. IT sabotage causes substantially high
financial and reputation damage to the targeted organizations. Typically, technically sophist-
icated users with privileged access commit these attacks. Theses insiders include, but are not
limited to system administrators, network administrators, database administrators, information
system consultants, and technicians. Employees who commit IT sabotage can be permanent
employees, contractors, consultants, and even former employees. Most of these attacks were
setup during the employment and executed after resignation. There are a few cases that were
committed by former employees using their previous user credentials. The duration of these
type of attacks spans from a few weeks to a few months. However, there are a few number
of cases which spanned over several years. The motivation for these type of attacks is due to
negative workplace events such as demotions, terminations and not getting pay rises, bonuses,
and promotions. Figure 2.1 summarises the employee designation, possible malicious activ-
ities, vulnerable assets/systems, vulnerable sectors, and attack resources which characterise IT
sabotage. This summary was prepared by analysing the IT sabotage threat cases published in
[29].
Remote access is one of the major techniques used by insiders to initiate malicious attacks
[29]. Planting logic bombs and use of removable media are also common in IT sabotage.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the correlation of malicious activities carried out through remote access.
This diagram is an excellent example to illustrate the complexity of malicious insider threat
analysis. It is observed from figure 2.1, that the malicious insiders, commit some of the attacks
as a combination of several events. Thus it necessitates the requirement to analyse several
systems to capture evidence related to a single threat in IT sabotage cases.
Theft of Intellectual Property (IP)
Theft of IP is an insider’s use of IT to steal intellectual property from the organization [29].
Insiders who steal IP are usually current employees such as scientists, engineers, program-
mers or salespersons. However, it is rare that technically sophisticated users such as system
administrators are involved in such activities even though they hold the keys to the kingdom.
Possible vulnerable assets under this category include sensitive information, proprietary soft-
ware, source codes, business plans, project proposals, strategic plans, trade secrets, customer
information and product information. Insiders who committed theft of IP were categorised
into two overlapping models by CMU-CERT. The first type is the Entitled Independent and
the second category is the Ambitious Leader. The Entitled Independent is an insider who acts
alone to steal information for his own advantage. The Ambitious Leader is a leader who cre-
ates a group of insiders to steal information. The second type of insiders want to steal more
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Table 2.1: A summary of IT sabotage scenarios: this summarises the possible types of employees and malicious activities related to IT sabotage with vulnerable
systems and attack resources. Vulnerable industry sectors are also listed.
Employee Role Possible Malicious Activities Vulnerable Asset Systems Attack Resources Vulnerable Sectors
Vice president - engineering Authorised /unauthorized remote access to network /system Employee databases Remote access logs Government
Network manager Authorized/unauthorized physical access Payroll databases Firewall logs Telecommunication
Information systems consultant Plant logic bombs User account databases File access logs Banking and finance
Project manager Plant virus codes Remote access system Database logs Information technology
Principal software developer Modify/delete records Email systems Application logs Postal and shipping
System administrator Send suspicious emails Authentication system Email logs Energy
Database administrator Large downloads to removable media Wireless authentication system Audit logs Food
Security administrator Remote information transfer(passwords/account information) Video monitoring system Error logs Manufacturing
Programmer Create admin accounts Web servers Authentication logs Pharmaceutical
Application developer Create backdoors DNS servers System log Chemical industry
Inspector Create VPN tokens Document management systems CCTV logs / records
IT worker Use of unauthorized software in desktop Wireless network management system
Technical support officer Disable antivirus software in desktop Backup management system
Computer technician Use of password cracking programs Software management system
Wirless network installation team member Use of Internet Relay Channels (IRC) Network monitoring system
Use of network sniffers Manufacturing software system
Steal backup tapes
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Figure 2.1: An example insider threat scenario using remote access: this illustrates possible actions of a malicious attack carried out through remote access.
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information than what they were authorized.
The motivation behind theft of IP sometimes includes carrying it to a new job or starting a
new company. Some insiders even focused on stealing IP to share with foreign governments
or with foreign organizations. However, there were a few cases reported on IP theft aimed at
financial advantage, by selling the IP to other interested parties. Financial damage caused by
this type of attack is significant, and they expand through most of the critical infrastructure
segments. However, the majority of organizations who faced this kind of attack are in the IT
sector [29].
The top three methods used for stealing IP are emailing from work, using removable media
and remote network access. Most of the IP were transferred through the network by encrypted
tunnels such as Virtual Private Networks (VPN) or through File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Com-
monly used removable media types for theft of IP included USB devices, CDs, and removable
hard drives. However, the physical removal of IP was small and rare compared to the other
techniques. Information stealing within the 60 day resignation window is another important
pattern in this type of attacks. Figure 2.2 summarises the employee role, possible malicious
activities, vulnerable assets/systems, vulnerable sectors and corresponding information assets
related to the theft of IP.
IT Fraud
IT fraud is defined as an insider’s use of IT for the unauthorized modification, addition or dele-
tion of an organization’s data for personal gain or theft of information that leads to an identity
crime [29]. The major difference between IT fraud and the other two types of attacks is that the
insiders who are involved in these attacks can be either individuals or a small group of people.
Reported IT fraud incidents have caused an enormous financial impact on organizations [29].
This type of attacks also led to a compromise of substantial personal information. The motiv-
ation for most of the reported incidents was to solve the insider’s personal financial problems.
The most common and straightforward means used by insiders was stealing information from
the databases for which they were given access. There were a few incidents where sophistic-
ated technical methods such as keystroke loggers were used. However, the majority of cases
were quite straightforward. These crimes were committed by technically lower level employ-
ees in an organization such as data entry clerks, administrative assistants, and customer service
representatives. Insider fraud is typically a long and ongoing crime and an average crime
spans around fifteen months [29]. Figure 2.3 summaries the employee role, possible malicious
activities, vulnerable assets/systems, vulnerable sectors and corresponding information assets
related to IT fraud.
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Table 2.2: A summary of theft of IP scenarios: this table summarises the possible types of employees and malicious activities related to theft of IP with vulnerable
systems and attack resources. Vulnerable industry sectors are also listed.
Employee Role Possible Malicious Activities Vulnerable Asset Systems Attack Resources Vulnerable Sectors
Product development director Copy unauthorized data into removable media (USB, CDs) Proprietary source codes Medical record databases Information and telecommunication
Senior systems engineers Use of prohibited data copying programs Proprietary documents Document management system Chemical industry
Programmer LinkedIn profile update Trade secrets Remote access logs Manufacturing
Engineer Steal intellectual property Business plans Firewall logs Government - federal 
Scientist Use of a backdoor to connect to the network proposals Email logs Banking  and finance
Download source codes Strategic plans Audit logs Defense
Download password files Customer information Commercial facilities
Steal physical documents Product information Education
Manufacturing information Energy
Schematic diagrams Water
Confidential documents Health care
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Table 2.3: A summary of IT fraud scenarios: this table summarises the possible types of employees and possible malicious activities related to IT fraud with vulnerable
systems and attack resources. Vulnerable industry sectors are also listed.
Employee Role Possible Malicious Activities Vulnerable Asset Systems Attack Resources Vulnerable Sectors
Loan officer Steal identity (personal and financial information) Credit history databases History logs Government - federal
Foreign currency trader Modify data /records with own privileges Employee databases File access logs Government - state/local
Data entry operator Modify data /records with other employees' privileges Payroll databases Database logs Banking and finance
Salesman Delete data /records with own privileges User account databases Application logs Defense
Help desk operator Delete data /records with other employees' privileges Email Systems Email logs Commercial facilities
Police communication operator Delete history logs Driver's license databases Audit logs Emergency services
Data entry clerk Create fake data in systems Asylum application databases Error logs Agriculture
Computer information resouce manager Create fake emails in systems Product requisition databases Authentication logs Health care
Plant key stroke loggers Disability claims databases System log Credit report organization
Share passwords
Format backup tapes
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2.1.3 Influential Factors on Malicious Behaviour
The analysis of insider threat literature and published threat cases revealed that there are a few
important influencing factors behind insider attacks. Various motivational factors, different
levels of capabilities, the psychology of the insider and advances in technology are among
them. The following subsections elaborate more on the insider threat influential factors.
Motivation
The Motivation of an insider is the extent to which the insider is prepared to execute a threat
[129]. The major motivational factors which drive an insider to commit malicious activities
are financial gain, revenge, competitive advantage, religious and political issues, knowledge,
power, curiosity and terrorism. Unmet personal expectations is the most common motivation
factor behind many of the insider threat attacks. The following are some of the unmet expecta-
tions of individuals found in IT sabotage cases published by CERT @ CMU.
• Insufficient salary increase or bonus,
• Limitation of use of company resources,
• Diminished authority or responsibilities,
• Perception of unfair work requirements,
• Feeling of being treated poorly by co-workers.
These unmet expectations can motivate a dissatisfied insider for revenge. Insiders use their
technical privileges and the knowledge acquired during employment for abusing the system,
mainly to show the others (especially supervisors and peers) how powerful they are. There
were some incidents, where insiders felt unhappy about their diminishing power and authority
with the introduction of new peers and contractors. In such cases, they overused their power
to commit malicious activities. Another example is when higher level employees (managerial
level) get unhappy when their subordinates override their decisions. This type of behaviour can
result in higher level employees committing malicious activities to shield themselves.
Dissatisfaction is one of the key motives to commit malicious activities by users under
Entitled Independent category of theft of IP. Development of a competing product or a new
company is the main motive behind Ambitious Leaders. Some of the issues leading to dissatis-
faction includes the following;
• Disagreements over IP ownership,
• Disagreements over benefits,
• Company attempting to obtain venture capital.
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Significant financial difficulties which arise due to external pressure such as medical bills,
high credit card balances, and addiction problems are the main motivation behind many of the
IT fraud cases.
Motivation has been identified as one of the main actor characteristics in the framework by
Nurse et al. [115]. They suggest that an actor’s current psychological state would significantly
influence insiders’ motivation to attack. They use two principal characterizations in motivation,
“deliberate”, and “accidental” to ensure their framework is inclusive enough to capture all types
of threats. Even though there are different discussions on the correlation between motivation
and insider threat as in [96], there aren’t many direct measurements to capture the motive
behind the attack. However, various indirect indicators such as workplace behavioural changes,
increased stress levels or conflicts with others can be used as indicators for the motivation to
attack. To our knowledge, the work by Berk et al. [13] is the only technique that quantitatively
defines motive in an insider threat framework. Change in motive is measured as the change in
the type of URL visited.
Capability
An insider who is motivated to pose a threat to an organization needs to have the required cap-
abilities to continue with the desired actions. Based on the components of capability defined by
Jones and Ashende [76], it is a collection of resources, technology, software, and knowledge.
Insiders are the most trusted and privileged users of an organization. Access privileges of in-
siders range from the company’s most critical information systems to the entry door. Therefore
all employees from the top management to the lower level staff possess some capability to ini-
tiate a malicious attack. The other important fact is that malicious insiders do no need to find
a special time for committing these attacks, as they can plan and commit malicious activities
during regular operations.
When considering the capabilities of technically sophisticated users, one must note that
they are equipped with all necessary privileged access to perform day to day operations under
the perimeter of access control. Besides they know how to bypass these security controls and
hide the evidence from the system. Also, they have the knowledge accumulated during their
employment, which amplifies their technical capabilities to do any malicious activity. They also
know the vulnerabilities of the existing system which can be used to harm the information assets
of an organization. Damage by a malicious attack is directly proportional to the capability of
an insider threat agent [129]. Evidence from reported incidents also supports the fact that an
insider’s capability is an important factor in understanding characteristics of insider attacks.
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Opportunity
Opportunity is the insider’s ability to exploit the vulnerabilities of an organization’s information
systems [96]. An opportunity is required for an insider equipped with the motive and the
capability to commit an attack [129]. Privilege access, control over an organization’s critical
systems, control over the single copy of the software, known vulnerabilities of systems, poor
security policies, and controls, managerial permissions are some of the opportunities open
to malicious attackers. Technology advancements, high availability of open source tools and
software also increases the avenues for a disgruntled insider.
Psychology
Understanding the psychology of an insider is an important factor in analysing user behaviour
in the context of the insider threat problem [14]. An article by Shaw et al. [139] which analyses
psychosocial characteristics of malicious insiders, identified the following personal character-
istics as direct implications for risk.
1. Sense of entitlement
Insiders develop a sense of ownership of systems for which they have privileged access and
use in day to day operations. Especially system administrators, database administrators who
look after a particular system for an extended period of time, develop a sense of ownership
and they do not like another person to take over their privileges. Also, employers rely on the
expertise of these people, and consequently insiders develop a feeling of entitlement. On the
other hand, programmers, who develop source codes, programs or software, feel ownership
of these organizational assets.
2. Personal and social frustration
Many of the reported incidents are by perpetrators who have personal or social frustrations
which lead to a negative attitude towards authority. This type of characteristics can be
developed due to financial problems, personal problems and unmet expectations in office
environments.
3. Ethical flexibility
Lack of training in computer ethics, lack of specific policies in privacy and security and lack
of legal penalties for IT abuses broaden the horizon for malicious insiders. Most malicious
insiders do not view their violations as unethical. Instead, they try to justify the attack under
different circumstances.
4. Reduced loyalty
An employee’s fear of job security due to outsourcing, downsizing, organizational restruc-
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tures and transfer of jobs overseas to minimize associated cost, can affect the loyalty and
can destroy the employer-employee relationship.
5. Lack of empathy
This is another psychological factor which can be seen in malicious insiders, that is the total
disregard for the impact of his/her actions on the organization.
6. Computer dependency
According to psychologists, people addicted to computers are more aggressive loners who
are interested in exploring networks, breaking security codes, hacking into computer sys-
tems, challenging security professionals and highly resistant to new security policy imple-
mentations. Also, these people are highly involved in online activities, and they prefer their
online presence and online relationships than the real world presence.
Self-centredness, arrogance, risk-taking, manipulativeness, coldness, self-deception and de-
fensiveness are some of the other psychological indicators associated with malicious insiders
[116]. Immaturity, low self-esteem, unethical perspective, superficiality, proneness to fantasy,
restlessness, and impulsivity, and lack of conscientiousness are also identified as several beha-
vioural precursors of malicious insiders [116]. Nurse et al. [116] argued that it is possible to
have links between specific psychological characteristics with a specific type of attacks rather
than all attacks. All indicators mentioned above indicate the significance in analysing psycho-
logical, behavioural pattern for insider threat mitigation. However, the real issue is how an
organization can capture all these psychological, behavioural patterns.
Organizational Factors
In addition to the factors mentioned above, one needs to consider an insider’s observable be-
haviour in the workplace. Published threat cases by CERT @ CMU identified the following
personal predispositions in disgruntled employees. These type of continuous behavioural pat-
terns also provide a significant amount of input in identifying malicious insiders.
• Conflicts with fellow workers
• Inability to conform to rules
• Serious personality conflicts
• Difficulties controlling anger
Emerging Trends
Emerging technologies such as cloud computing, virtualisation platforms, and outsourcing also
expanded the threat landscape of this smart security attack. With the rapid spread of social
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networks, users tend to publicize their inside (in-office) experiences online. This includes their
interests which have been influenced by positive and negative organizational dynamics. An
individual’s post about an organization or their job may not represent a threat on it’s own,
but a collection of such information from a set of users from the same company can reveal
confidential or sensitive information to the outside world. Therefore the insider threat research
community has identified users’ social network behaviour as a critical factor in understanding
malicious insiders.
As a summary, figure 2.2 illustrates who is involved in malicious insider attacks, what are
the influential factors for committing insider attacks, who are the victims of insider attacks and
what needs to be analysed for insider threat detection and prediction.
2.1.4 Insider Threat Detection Approaches
Various technical strategies have been proposed by previous researchers for detecting and pre-
venting malicious insider attacks. This section describes the different insider threat detection
and prediction models proposed in the literature.
Intrusion Detection System Based Approaches
Some research efforts on insider threat were influenced by techniques that have been used to
mitigate external attacks. Traditional insider threat detection techniques mainly adopt methods
from Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Theses systems are deployed to detect real time at-
tacks on a network (network based intrusion detection systems (NIDS)) and host systems (host
based intrusion detection systems(HIDS)). The two primary principles of IDSs are anomaly
based detection and signature based detection. Anomaly detection is defined as flagging all
abnormal behaviour as an intrusion while signature detection is defined as flagging behaviour
that is relatively close in comparison of some defined, known pattern of an intrusion that has
been previously defined as part of the IDS [11].
One of the early attempts in combating insider attacks using IDSs proposed the use of a
combination of intrusion detection systems at different network segments [48]. The systems
that can be deployed to assist in combating insider attacks include network intrusion detection
systems (NIDS), network node intrusion detection systems (NNIDS), host-based intrusion de-
tection systems (HIDS), anomaly-based intrusion detection systems, and distributed intrusion
detection system (DIDS). Even though these researches attempt to capitalise on multiple in-
dicators of insider attacks, several critical conditions have been overlooked [135]. One such
condition is that insiders are in a much better position to disable, turn off or interfere with the
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Figure 2.2: Summarised view of the insider threat problem: this is a summarised view of the insider threat problem indicating the parties involve, influential factors,
victims of malicious insider attacks, and factors need to be considered for threat prediction and detection.
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implemented hybrid intrusion detection system. From the various aspects of insider attacks,
this framework only looked into the technical factors of the problem. Heavy reliance on such a
system would not be wise in combating the insider threats as there are significant characteristic
differences between external and internal attacks.
Work by Bradford and Hu [24] presented an augmented intrusion detection system with
forensic tools. The layered architecture model proposed by the authors examines user’s activ-
ities by analysing his/her processes. This model followed a black box approach to understand
user processes by analysing its inputs and outputs and their relationships without the know-
ledge of the process’ internal structure. The main purpose of the first layer is to identify the
common misuse processes running on user hosts. The second layer captures the unauthorised
processes associated with particular user roles. The remaining processes are further examined
at the bottom layer by a statistical analyser. At each state details of detected processes are
logged for further investigation using forensic tools. Reduction of false negatives to an accept-
able threshold with reasonable cost has been identified as a major challenge of this design.
A paper by Platos et al. [122] revealed insider attacks could easily be detected by a well
designed IDS. The proposed method includes a non-negative matrix factorization technique
that process related IDS logs effectively. They conducted experiments in three phases namely
data reduction, a training phase and a testing phase. An important feature for real time intrusion
detection was selected in the first step. Matrix factorization was used in the training phase to
construct a model using training data. In the testing phase, the test data was passed through
the trained model to detect intrusions. The use of supervised learning and limiting only to IDS
data are some limitations of this model.
The study by Barrios [11] presented a multilevel IDS based method focusing on database
level intrusions instead of network level intrusions. This model can be used to measure the
probability of an intrusion by an authorised entity (insider) to a database system. Even though
this model proved successful in the context of database intrusion detection by an insider, it
requires a considerable expansion to consider as an insider threat detection model.
A considerably higher number of false positives, heavily based on audit trails left in the
systems, and the signature based detection are the major drawbacks of application of intrusion
detection based approaches for insider threat detection.
System Call Based Approaches
Another common approach introduced for insider threat detection in the early stages was based
on system calls. One of the early attempts by Nguyen and colleagues [114] investigated the
possibility of using system call traces for insider threat detection. They analysed the system
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call data by considering the relationship between users and files, users and processes and pro-
cesses and files. Since both file access and process execution are so crucial and unavoidable
for the user, the authors argued that the system call activities can be excellent candidates for
reflecting user behaviour. They proposed user oriented and process oriented models for analys-
ing file access patterns. Daily file and directory usage patterns of human users and the system
users were analysed in their model. Even though they achieved successful results with system
users, file access patterns of human users were very dynamic. The analysis on process oriented
methods revealed that there is a correlation between the files accessed by the processes. Even
though the models described in their paper couldn’t catch all attacks, those techniques can still
be useful if integrated to a system that monitors users’ abnormal behaviour.
The paper by Liu et al. [92] argued that the system calls at the operating system level offer
a higher degree of information assurance than application logs. Since this approach provided
successful results in detecting external threats, they believed it could be applied in the insider
threat problem as well. Based on the above argument, they proposed three different types of
feature representations (n-gram, histogram and parameter-based) for outlier detection. Based
on their experimental results, they recommended the development of stronger parameter-based
models for insider threat detection. They also recommended unsupervised anomaly detection
techniques as a long term solution for insider threat detection as opposed to supervised learning
anomaly detection technique.
Honeypot/Honeynet Approach
Another well known technique, Honeypots, which is used to detect external vulnerabilities has
been studied to apply in insider threat research. A honeypot is an information system resource
whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource. Spitzner et al. [145] discussed
how honeypot technologies can be used to detect, identify and gather information on insider
activities. As per his suggestion, two honeypot technologies, honeynets and honeytokens have
a great potential for detecting insider threats.
Honeynets are similar to a mirror image of existing systems and applications of an or-
ganization. Even though theses systems have the flexibility of placing new resources such as
servers and routers, the implementation of a mirror system would not be cost effective in large
scale networks. The author believed the honeynets performed extremely well in identifying
automated credit card frauds and identity thefts. Thus the application of the same concept in
relation to the insider threat problem was evaluated. Honeytokens are the second type of hon-
eypots they proposed for combating insider threats. Honeytokens are digital entities (e.g. an
Excel spreadsheet) which is again based on the honeypot technology. As in honeypots and hon-
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eynets, no one needs to interact with a honeytoken and users who interact with those entities
are considered as suspicious.
White and Panda [159] also proposed honeytokens as a useful tool for catching malicious
activities. Their research was mainly focused on personally identifiable information (PII) data.
They argued that the deployment of internal PII honeytokens can significantly reduce the risk
profiles within an organization because monitored honeytokens can detect illicit behaviour be-
fore they escalate into full blown data leaks. This could be used as an early warning system for
administrators. Bowen et al. [22] also proposed the use of embedded honeytokens; computer
login accounts that provide no access to valuable resources, as a suspicious activity detector in
their proposed model.
Despite the fact that the above techniques based on honeypots advances the detection of
insider attacks they carry some inherent weaknesses. If an insider knows or discovers the
identity of a honeynet or a honeytoken, disgruntled insider may never use or interact with it.
Also insiders can inject false or bogus information to complicate the detection, and may even
try to disrupt the honeypot, honeynet or honeytoken. We should not forget that the insider
attacks are generated by the smartest species in the entire world.
Visualisation Approaches
With the complex problem of handling the enormous amount of data associated with the in-
sider threat problem, a few researchers introduced the use of enhanced visualisation techniques
to combat this severe threat. Pixel-oriented colour maps [33] and graph based visualisation
(e.g., [7] [25] [31] [46] [111]) techniques are the two major visualisation methods proposed in
literature.
Colombe and Stephens [33] explored the use of inference and visualisation techniques to
filter out host based false positives generated from IDS systems in identifying insider attacks.
In this method, all of the information in an alarm description were encoded to an equal length
binary vector. Anomaly detection was performed by calculating a typicality score for each
alarm. Lower typicality scores were regarded as anomalies, and higher values were considered
as normal. They developed an alarm visualisation software to indicate the alarms and the typ-
icality scores of the alarm descriptive tokens as a colour map. This model can be considered
as an integrated model to IDS approach with visualisation capabilities for insider threat detec-
tion. Direct dependency on the alarms generated through IDS system and addressing only the
host-based anomalies are some of the limitations of this model.
The study by Althebyn and Panda [7] suggested the use of graph theory to formalise two
components, the knowledge graph and the object dependency graph. A knowledge graph (KG)
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represented the knowledge units for a given insider, and they were updated over time. Different
knowledge units were assigned different lifetimes. Any piece of information an insider got
access to and kept in their knowledge base was considered as a knowledge unit. A dependency
graph (DG) is a global hierarchical graph that shows all of the dependencies among various
objects and documents about the organisation. DG was updated for each document creations
and document deletions. A clustering algorithm was used for grouping related documents in
the DG. For each request of an insider, a cluster was created if it did not exist. In their proposed
threat prediction model objects were assigned different priority values upon the creation of
the document. A risk value for the cluster was computed based on the priority values of all
documents in the cluster. When an insider requested a document, the proposed model executed
a decision algorithm to determine whether to grant or deny the request. The above method was
proposed as a theoretical model and authors intended to perform simulations to validate the
performance.
Eberle and Holder [46] [47] proposed a graph based anomaly detection technique for dis-
covering malicious insider threats. They developed three separate graph based anomaly detec-
tion algorithms to discover three different graph based anomalies. The three general categories
of anomalies identified by them are insertions, modifications and deletions. The presence of
an unexpected vertex or an edge was regarded as an insertion. The existence of an unexpected
label on a vertex or an edge was considered as a modification. Unexpected absence of a vertex
or an edge was considered as a deletion. They used a simulated passport processing scenario
to evaluate the proposed graph based anomaly detection techniques. The evaluation was per-
formed based on some potential malicious activities considering various scenarios. Generated
anomalies were detected at least by one of the three anomaly detection algorithms.
The study performed by Nance and Marty [111] introduced the use of bipartite graphs for
identifying and visualising insider threats. They tried to establish acceptable insider behaviour
patterns based on workgroup role classifications. Bipartite graphs were used to visualise re-
lationships between work-groups and precursors of a malicious attacks. These precursors can
vary across and within specific domains. A lookup table was used to determine whether the
activity is within the identified norms or not. Edge colouring was used to indicate inconsistent
edges associated with workgroups. Identification and expansion of scenario specific precurs-
ors, refining the set of work-groups and minimising false positives are several challenges in this
method.
The specialised network anomaly detection (SNAD) model proposed by Chen et al. [31]
is a graph based approach used for detecting insider actions in collaborative information sys-
tems. In their model, access logs are mapped into a bipartite graph. The similarity of users is
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compared based on the number of subjects an user accesses from a collaborative information
system, using the cosine similarity measure. To determine if a particular access is anomalous
or not, the authors considered the influence of a user on the similarity of the access network
by suppressing each user at a time. Even though they achieved better performance than their
competitors (spectral anomaly detection models), they identified difficulties in implementing
their approach on real world networks.
Another recent study [25] proposed a proactive insider threat detection by graph learning
and psychological modelling of users. The proposed model is a combination of structural an-
omaly detection and psychological profiling and explored the possibility of including dynamic
properties of nodal attributes. Due to the lack of availability of proper insider threat datasets,
they conducted experiments with a publicly available gaming data set. Even though they val-
idated their proposed model with regards to scalability and feasibility, validation on an insider
threat dataset would be much useful.
Lamba et al. [88] proposed a clustering based approach over behavioural graphs to detect
anomalous behaviour in software systems. When a user interacted with a software system,
all the related activities were captured from activity logs. Then the entire activity log over
the underlying system was represented in a graph. Resources of the software system were
represented as nodes and edges were generated by order of user activities. User’s activities
were represented as a path in the graph. Finally, they utilised path based clustering algorithms
to find anomalies.
The paper by Kent et al. [87] proposed the use of authentication subgraphs for analysing
users behaviour within an enterprise network. They utilized a set of subgraph attributes in
user profiling, and believe that user authentication graphs enable an excellent platform for
behavioural analysis based on a variety of graph attributes. Time series analysis of subgraphs
and use of bipartite graphs were also present in their work.
By looking at the graph based insider threat detection models described above, it is evident
that the graphs are an important means for representing an enormous amount of data associated
with the insider threat problem. However, many of the graph based approaches described above
were either application specific or scenario specific insider threat detection models. Evaluation
of the proposed theoretical methods is one of the biggest challenges faced by all of the insider
threat research community, due to lack of availability of proper insider threat datasets.
Machine Learning Approaches
The BAIT (Behavioural Analysis of Insider Threat) system proposed by Azaria et al. [10]
includes a set of seven algorithms built on top of two classical machine learning algorithms:
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support vector machines (SVM) and multinomial naive Bayes. Their approach was based on
semi-supervised learning and addressed the imbalanced data problem inherited with the in-
sider threat problem. They used various types of features that included basic features such as
number of occurrences of an action and features derived from a combination of basic features.
The BAIT system was validated with the support of a one-person game designed by the au-
thors. With the proposed framework the authors were able to identify several properties that
distinguishes malicious users from benign users.
Research work by Goldberg et al. [63] [64] and Young et al. [166] [167] proposed an
ensemble-based, unsupervised prototype called PRODIGAL for insider threat detection. Their
core hypothesis was that the combination of a different suite of detectors can produce high
quality results for further investigation by a human or automated system for identifying mali-
cious actors. They have used three main detectors; indicator based, anomaly based and scenario
based. Detector specification in this prototype includes a variety of features associated with the
insider threat problem.
Stream Mining and Graph Mining approaches
In contrast to the techniques mentioned above, research work by Parveen et al. [119] explored
the possibility of using stream mining and graph mining techniques to detect insider threats.
The ensemble-based approach, which was used in this model showed a lesser number of false
positives compared to related single-model approaches. The authors concluded that this ap-
proach also requires a certain amount of tuning to further reduce false positives and to reduce
classifier run time.
Research work by Tuor et al. [151] presented an online unsupervised deep learning system
to detect insider threat on heterogeneous data streams. Their model trains continuously in
an online fashion to adopt to changing data patterns of data streams. The model proposed
by Tuor et al. [151] used deep neural networks and recurrent neural networks to train and
asses whether the user behaviour is normal or abnormal. With the stream processing scenario,
no data is cached indefinitely and decisions are made as quickly as new data is fed into the
neural network models. The evaluation of their model outperformed several anomaly detection
techniques. However, the potential to miss anomalous patterns happening within a single day
is one of the limitations of [151].
Process Based Approaches
Rather than focusing on identifying insider attacks by monitoring event logs, Bishop et al. [16]
approached this problem in an alternate angle. They proposed a process based approach to
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determine the places in organisational processes where an insider attack can be successfully
launched. Knowing the vulnerable processes could direct the organisation to restructure the
process to reduce the exposure to malicious insider activities. They mainly focused on sabotage
attacks and data exfiltration attacks. Techniques such as fault tree analysis were introduced to
examine how to prevent the disruption. While the effectiveness of the results remains to be seen,
this method determines how to prevent disruption or how to increase the cost to the attacker.
A preliminary model proposed by Stavrou et al. [147] considered combination of business
process security and a series of a psychosocial parameters. The model suggested by the authors
considered three types of inputs: (a) online monitoring, which processes data extracted from
social media, (b) business process monitoring, which monitors employee’s performance and
(c) threat management, which evaluates the processes the suspected user is involved in. Po-
tential incident alerts and the risk that refers to the specific processes of the organisation were
proposed as the outputs from the proposed architecture. The authors also discussed some of the
requirements and limitations of the introduced approach. The requirement of having at least
one social network profile, big data analysis and expansion and integration of the organisation’s
Business Process Management System (BPMS) were some of the essentials identified by the
authors. Privacy concerns on monitoring personal social network profiles, possible adverse
impacts on excessive monitoring were also discussed as possible implications in this model.
Hybrid Models
Each of these previously mentioned approaches have studied only a part of this unique and
complex security threat. However, there has been relatively little research attempted on produ-
cing hybrid models which incorporate technical, behavioral, psychological and organizational
factors in insider threat detection and prediction.
The model proposed by Kandias [81] is a decision making tool for predicting users who
can be potentially dangerous for the information system and organization. This model collects
two types of information related to a user. The first type of information is user characteristics
collected from psychological profiling, and the second type of information is collected from IT
components. Their proposed model consists of several components in which, the first building
block is “user taxonomy” where each user is categorized under four dimensions (system roles,
sophistication, predisposition and stress level). The second building block is psychological
profiling which focuses on industrial and organizational psychology. The third component is
the real time usage profiling, which monitors the user interaction with technical components
of an information system. They used system call analysis, intrusion detection systems and
honeypots to define users’ real time technical behaviour. Results from the above three com-
33
Chapter 2. Background
ponents are then processed by a decision manager, which assesses potential malicious insider
behaviour. Even though this interdisciplinary approach targeted on combining technical factors
with psychology, this model requires implementation of test and real time environments for
validation.
Another predictive approach proposed by Frank and Deborah [68] comprises of a know-
ledge base of indicators and heuristic models of insider behaviour. Their model is a multi-
layered process which progresses from data to observations, to indicators to behaviours. They
recognised the imperative to address both human and cyber elements that compose the insider
threat in their model. Due to the lack of appropriate data and ground truth for predictive assess-
ments, they accomplished model verification by soliciting judgements from expert evaluators
who examined the same observables used by the model.
To predict the likelihood of insider attacks, Kuheli [129] suggested the use of a multi-
layered analysis approach in processing raw data which are produced from firewalls, intrusion
detection systems, etc. Another important point highlighted by the author is that insider threat
prediction can be done by matching behaviour against the database of insider activity from
internal and external sources.
Even though many researchers proposed various approaches for mitigating the smartest at-
tack in information security, which is the insider threat, still the malicious activities are rising.
The above mentioned plethora of knowledge contributed by insider threat researchers world-
wide highlighted the complexity of this attack. Applications of different techniques, analysis
of insider threat influential factors, proposals of theoretical frameworks, and case studies com-
bined a huge amount of knowledge on this specific security threat posed by the users within
the perimeter of an organization. However, time to time worldwide news headlines are ded-
icated to talk about these incidents. This thesis is a contribution of theoretical knowledge and
empirical results to the insider threat research community. Since one of the major objectives of
this thesis is to explore the application of graph/network based techniques for feature extrac-
tion, heterogeneous data representation, and anomaly detection, the next section describes the
related preliminaries on graph theory/networks.
2.2 Background on Graph Theory and Networks
A network is a simplified representation that reduces a system to an abstract structure capturing
only the basics of connection pattern and little else [112]. Networks have been widely used
to model various systems in many disciplines such as biology, social sciences, information
sciences, mathematics and physics. The Internet, the world wide web, ecological networks,
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and movie-actor networks are a few widely known examples of networks. Even though the
network science is an emerging area of scientific research, the mathematical counterpart, the
graph theory has been first used for practical application by Leonard Euler in 18th century to
solve the Bridges of Ko¨insberg problem.
The terms network and graph are often used interchangeably to describe the same mathem-
atical concept. The term is mostly depend on the context. In the theoretical context the term
graphs is used while in the application domain the term networks is preferred. A graph is a
collection of vertices and edges while a network is a collection of nodes and links. Vertices
(nodes) represent the components of the system of study whereas edges (links) represent the
relationships among the components. Both vertices and edges could contain attributes. The ver-
tex attributes are used to represent attributes associated with vertices and edge attributes such
as weight representing the strength of the edge. The remainder of this section provides relevant
definitions and notations adopted from standard textbooks in graph theory and networks [40]
[112] [158] that has been used throughout this thesis. The definitions and notations applicable
only for a particular chapter are described in-line with the relevant text where necessary.
2.2.1 Definitions and Notations
Definition 2.2 A graph is a pair G = (V,E), where V is the set of vertices and E is the set of
edges. The edge eij = (vi, vj) ∈ E, if it exists, connects vertex vi to vertex vj . In an undirected
graph eij ∈ E ⇐⇒ eji ∈ E.
Definition 2.3 A graph is bipartite if its set of vertices can be partitioned into two disjoint sets.
U and V , such that U ∩ V = Ø and E ⊆ U × V . A bipartite graph is denoted B = (U, V,E),
where U is called the primary node set and V is called the secondary node set.
Definition 2.4 A multigraph is a pair G = (V,E) of disjoint sets (of vertices and edges)
together with a map E −→ V ∪ V 2 assigning to every edge either one or two vertices, its
ends.
Definition 2.5 An attributed graph is a three element tuple G(V,E,A) where V is the set of
vertices, E is the set of edges, and A is the set of attributes. Each vertex vi is associated with a
vector (ai1, . . . , a
i
d) ∈ <d in a d− dimensional data space where the attribute aij ∈ Aj , where
Aj ⊆ A.
Definition 2.6 Two vertices vi, vj of G are adjacent, or neighbours, if eij = (vi, vj) is an edge
of G. If all the vertices of G are pairwise adjacent, then G is complete.
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Definition 2.7 The adjacency matrix A of a graph G = (V,E) is a binary n × n matrix with
elements aij , such that aij = 1 if eij = (vi, vj) ∈ E and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2.8 The degree d(v) of a vertex v is the number of adjacent edges incident on v.
Definition 2.9 Two graphs G = (V,E) and H = (V ′ , E ′) are isomorphic, denoted by G ≈ H ,
if there exists a bijection ϕ : V → V ′ such that (vi, vj) ∈ E ⇔ (ϕ(vi, ϕ(vj)) ∈ E ′ ,∀vi, vj ∈ V .
Definition 2.10 The graph G′ = (V ′ , E ′) is a subgraph of G = (V,E) if V ′ ⊆ V and E ′ ⊆ E.
If G
′ ⊆ G and G′ contains all the edges eij = (vi, vj) ∈ E with vi, vj ∈ V ′ , then G′ is induced
by the subset V
′
of vertices.
Definition 2.11 A complete subgraph is called a clique.
Definition 2.12 A cliqueG′ ∈ G is a maximal clique if no vertex of G outside ofG′ is adjacent
to all members of G
′
, meaning G
′
is not a subset of a larger clique.
Definition 2.13 The density of a graph is the edge density given by 2 |E| /(|U | (|U | − 1)),
where |U | (|U | − 1)/2 is the maximum possible number of edges in a graph G = (U,E) with
|U | nodes.
Definition 2.14 The distance d(ui, uj) between two vertices ui and uj of a graph G is the
length of the shortest path between ui and uj in G.
2.2.2 Network Measures
To capture particular features of the network topology a variety of useful network measures are
available. This subsection describes some network measures used throughout this thesis.
Degree Centrality
Degree centrality is one of the simplest network measure. In an enterprise wide user interre-
lationship graph generated based on the organisational hierarchy, employees in the managerial
level would indicate higher degree centrality than the employees in the lower level of hierarchy.
However in a user relationship graph generated considering users’ email communications, users
with higher degree centrality can be regarded as stongly connected or influential employees of
an enterprise.
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Eigenvector centrality
Eigenvector centrality can be regarded as an extension to the degree centrality measure. Instead
of considering the importance of all neighbours of a vertex in the same manner, eigenvector
centrality gives each vertex a score proportional to the sum of the sores of its neighbours.
Eigenvector centrality can be large either because a vertex has many neighbours or because it
has important neighbours. The eigenvector centrality e(ui) of a vertex ui is proportional to the
sum of the centralities of neighbours ui. With the largest eigenvalue λ1 of the adjacency matrix
A, the eigenvector centrality e(ui) is defined as follows:
e(ui) = λ
−1
1
∑
j
(aijuj). (2.1)
Closeness Centrality
Closeness centrality measures the mean distance from a vertex to other vertices. The closeness
centrality id defined as the inverse of the average shortest path of a vertex to every other vertex
in the network. Consequently the closeness centrality c(ui) of a vertex ui is given by:
c(ui) =
n∑
j d(ui, uj)
. (2.2)
In the above equation d(ui, uj) is the length of the shortest path from vertex ui to vertex uj .
Betweenness centrality
Betweenness centrality measures the number of shortest paths that run through a given vertex.
The betweenness centrality b(ui) of a vertex ui is given by
b(ui) =
∑
jk
gijk
gjk
, (2.3)
where gjk is the number of shortest paths between vertices uj and uk and gijk is the number of
shortest paths between uj and uk that contain vertex ui. If gjk = (⇒ gijk = 0), then gijk/gjk = 0
by definition.
Similarity
Similarity is another central concept in network analysis. Two fundamental approaches for
constructing measures of network similarity are structural equivalence and regular equivalence
37
Chapter 2. Background
[112]. If two vertices in a network share many common neighbours, then those two vertices
are structurally equivalent. It is not necessary to share the same neighbours to be two regularly
equivalent vertices. However such vertices can have neighbours which are themselves similar.
We only use the structural similarity measures in this thesis and the relevant definitions are
provided in the respective chapters.
2.2.3 Graph Clustering
Graph clustering is the task of grouping the vertices of the graph into clusters or groups con-
sidering the edge structure of the graph maximising the edges within each cluster and while
minimising the edges between the clusters [133]. Brief descriptions of the graph clustering
algorithms used in this thesis are presented in this subsection.
Clauset Newman Moore Algorithm
The graph clustering algorithm proposed by Clauset, Newman, and Moore (CNM algorithm)
is a hierarchical agglomeration algorithm for detecting communities in a large scale graph
[32]. The CNM algorithm measures the quality of the community by means of a property of
a network so-called modularity. Modularity measures the quality of the cluster with respect to
the density of the intra-community edges and the inter-community edges. CNM algorithm is
based on the greedy optimisation of modularity. The algorithm starts considering each vertex as
the sole member of a community of one. Then two communities are repeatedly joined together
until the amalgamation of two communities maximises the modularity. The algorithm stops by
joining (n− 1) iterations for a network with n vertices. This algorithm runs in essentially near
linear time.
Wakita Tsurumi Algorithm
The community detection algorithm proposed by Wakita and Tsurumi (WT) [157] is an expan-
sion of the CNM algorithm to handle very large size networks and scales to handle networks up
to 5.5 million vertices. WT algorithm addresses the limitations in CNM algorithm due to the
unbalanced structuring of communities. WT algorithm uses three heuristics to balance the size
of communities being merged. These heuristics used to measure the size of a community are (i)
community size in terms of its degree, (ii) two stage process for finding the largest modularity
increase, and (iii) measure the size of the community in terms of the number of its members.
38
2.2. Background on Graph Theory and Networks
Edge Betweenness Algorithm
The edge betweenness algorithm (EB algorithm) proposed by Grivan and Newman [61] focus
on the edges that are most between communities rather than looking at edges that are most
central to communities. The edge betweenness of an edge is defined as the number of shortest
paths between pairs of vertices that run along it [61]. With this algorithm the communities are
constructed by removing edges from the original graph rather than adding strongest edges to a
empty vertex set. The EB algorithm first calculate the betweenness of all edges in the network.
Then the edge with the highest betweenness is removed. As the next step the algorithm recal-
culate the betweenness of all edges affected by the removal. The above steps are repeated until
there are no edges remain.
Walktrap Community Detection Algorithm
Walktrap community detection algorithm proposed by Pons and Latapy [123] uses a measure of
similarity between vertices based on random walks for identifying community structure of the
network. A distance r between vertices is defined in this algorithm to capture the community
structure of the graph. If this distance (r) between two vertices is small then the two vertices
are in the same community whereas if the distance r is large the two vertices are in different
communities. The above distance r is calculated using information given by random walks in
the graph.
Leading Eigenvector
The leading eigenvector algorithm proposed by Newman [113] is a top-down hierarchical al-
gorithm that optimises the modularity function. In this algorithm modularity is expressed as
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a matrix known as modularity matrix. This method works by
calculating the eigenvector of the modularity matrix for the largest positive eigenvalue and then
separating vertices into two communities based on the sign of the corresponding element in the
eigenvector. If all elements in the eigenvector are of the same sign, this means that the network
has no underlying community structure.
Infomap
Infomap is a community detection algorithm which was developed based on the concept that
finding the community structure of a network is equivalent to solving a coding problem [128].
Infomap uses random walks as a proxy for the information flow.
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Label Propagation
The label propagation community detection algorithm proposed by Raghavan et al. [127] does
not require any prior information about the communities as well as optimisation of a pre-defined
objective function. With this algorithm each vertex is initialised with an unique label. At each
iteration each vertex adopts the label that the maximum number of its neighbours have while
the edges are broken uniformly and randomly. As the label propagates across the network
densely connected vertices form a consensus on their labels. The vertices which end up having
the same label are clustered together at the end of the algorithm.
2.3 ROC Analysis Preliminaries
A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is a technique for visualising, organising, and
selecting classifiers based on their performance [51]. ROC analysis is commonly used in med-
ical decision analysis, machine learning approaches, and data mining research. For a given
classifier and an instance there are four possible outcomes as follows.
• If the instance is positive and it is classified as positive it is considered as true positive,
• if the instance is positive and it is classified as negative it is considered as false negative,
• if the instance is negative and it is classified as negative, it is considered as true negative,
• if the instance is negative and it is considered as positive, it is considered as false poitive.
Based on the output of the classifier, several common indicators are calculated. The true
positive rate (TPR), also known as hit rate or recall and the false positive rate (FPR), also called
false alarm rate are calculated using following equations.
TPR =
Positives correctly classified
Total positives
(2.4)
FPR =
Negatives incorrectly classified
Total negatives
. (2.5)
ROC curves are two-dimensional graphs where the true positive rate (TPR) is plotted against
the false positive rate (FPR). The point (0, 1) of a ROC curve represents a perfect classification.
The line y = x represents the random guessing of the classifier. If the classifier falls on the
diagonal of the ROC space, then no information can be obtained about the classifier. If the
classifier falls below the diagonal, it may be said to have useful information, however it is not
using the proper way to classify. If the classifier falls above the diagonal, it is said to be a
good classifier. However what we expect is the points to be into the Northwest (higher TPR
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and lower FPR). Figure 2.3 illustrates several ROC curves that describe the performance of the
classifier.
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Figure 2.3: An example receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve
The red line is the indicator of a random classifier. Anything above the random classifier is
said to be good. However for a perfect classifier the ROC curve follows the orange curve (not
exactly a curve, but combination of a vertical line from (0,0) to (0,1) and a horizontal line from
(0,1) to (1,1)). If the ROC curve follows something similar to the purple curve, the classifier can
be considered as an excellent classifier. If the ROC curve follows the green curve the classifier
is a good one. However, if the ROC curve is below the random classifier and follows something
similar to the blue colour curve, the selected classifier is not a good one.
The most common method used to compare the performance of ROC curves is calculation
of the area under the ROC curve (AUC) value. The AUC value will always be between 0 and 1.
Also a realistic classifier expects an AUC value greater than 0.5 and very close to 1.0. When we
consider the example ROC curves in figure 2.3, we obtained the perfect AUC value for ROC1
with a value of 1. The AUC value of the purple colour curve is 0.98 and the AUC value of the
green colour curve is 0.69, which were above 0.5. Since the AUC value of the purple colour
curve is very much closer to one, it can be considered as a perfect classifier. However 0.69 is
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a moderate value, therefore the classifier corresponds to the green colour curve is a good one.
The AUC value of the blue colour curve is 0.33 that is less than 0.5 and is not a good classifier.
The ROC curve and AUC calculations are the main evaluation technique used throughout
this thesis where necessary. The ground truth of the datasets were used for each evaluation. As
in many other newly developing disciplines, the insider threat research community do not have
any universally agreed state of the art methods for comparison. Various method and models are
proposed in the literature; however, it is still hard to find any validated models. Therefore all
the validations are based on the ground truth of the dataset.
2.4 Datasets
One of the inherent problems in insider threat research is the lack of proper datasets. Due to the
privacy issues both private and government organisations are reluctant to provide or publicise
real data. There are a few datasets that have been used by researchers for experimenting and
validating the proposed models. The Schonlau dataset, one of the datasets used by insider threat
researchers, is a collection of truncated UNIX shell commands of 70 users generated using
UNIX acct auditing mechanism. The first 15, 000 commands for each user were recorded over
several months. The time of the dataset varies from user to user due to the daily amount of
commands used by different users. 50 users were randomly selected as intrusion targets while
the other 20 users were used as simulated masqueraders. Even though the Schonalu dataset
has been widely used for masquerade detection, several issues were identified by Maxion and
Townsend with the use of the Schonlau dataset for masquerade detection [102]. Glasser and
Lindauer [62] also pointed out that Schnolau dataset is missing several insider threat related
datatypes such as social information, file access, and content information. Salem et al. [131]
also emphasises that the Schnolau dataset is far from being suitable for evaluation of realistic
insider attack detection algorithms.
Another dataset used for masquerade detection is the Greenberg data set that was collec-
ted from 168 users of the UNIX csh [66]. Maxion [101] proposed the use of command line
data enriched with flags, shell grammar, arguments, and aliases information facilitate improved
masquerade detection than truncated command line data. Maxion’s work was based on the
Greenberg dataset, as opposed to the Schnolau dataset. The Greenberg dataset is also limited to
user generated commands on UNIX environment and would not be a suitable dataset for insider
threat detection research.
The other main dataset used for insider threat research is the intrusion detection datasets
(1998, 1999, and 2000) published by cyber systems and technology group of the MIT Lincoln
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Laboratory, under Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Once again this
dataset also focused on intrusion detection and prevention. One of the major drawbacks of
the above dataset was that it did not cover the extended threat landscape of the insider threat
and was only developed based on system logs. Finally, the insider threat dataset published by
CMU-CERT is the only publicly available insider threat dataset known to us. The dataset is
available at [144] and the full description of data generation is available in the paper by Glasser
and Lindauer [62]. There are six releases (R1 to R6 ) of datasets. In the R3 to R6 releases there
are two datasets available. Later releases include a superset of the data generation functionality
of earlier releases. The descriptions of the malicious activities and the malicious users are also
provided with the dataset. From the different available versions We used R1, R4.2, and R5.2
datasets for experiments in this thesis. The r1 dataset was used in the preliminary experiments
described in section 5.1. Since R5.2 and R4.2 have much richer content of data, experiments
described in chapter 3 and section 5.2 were conducted with the R4.2 dataset. Both R4.2 and
R5.2 datasets were used for the experiments in chapter 4.
Each dataset consists of users’ information extracted from Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP) directory structure. The datasets R1 and R4.2 consists of user records of
1000 employees and R5.2 consists of 2000 employees records. Users’ logon and logoff activ-
ities, USB connect and disconnect activity logs, and web access logs are common in all of the
datasets used in this thesis. In addition, R4.2 and R5.2 datasets consist of file copying activity
logs, email communications logs and psychometric data of employees. Detailed descriptions
of each dataset are presented in the relevant chapter of this thesis.
2.5 Software and Tools
The majority of the computational experiments of this thesis were conducted using the R statist-
ical language [126] with the integrated development environment (IDE) provided by RStudio
[130]. The latest available version of R was used at the time of experimentation. The only
exception is for the experiments conducted with the Isolation Forest algorithm1 as discussed
in section 4.3.6 as the algorithm is supported only a previous version of R, that is R.2.6.1. In
addition to the base R packages used for basic computations, igraph package [35] was used
for graph analysis. dplyr [163], tidyr [162], data.table [43], and scales [161] packages were
used for data formatting and enrichments. The base R utilities such as plot and histogram and
ggplot2 package [160] were used for generating all the plots.
NodeXL basic [141], a free and open source template for Microsoft Excel 2007, 2010, 2013
1R package available at https://sourceforge.net/projects/iforest/
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and 2016 for network analysis was mainly used for graph visualisation. The attractive graph
visualisation capabilities were the main reason for the use of NodeXL for graph visualisation
compared with the R, igraph package. All the graphs (networks) illustrated throughout this
thesis are generated with NodeXL basic. NodeXL also provides the easy import and export
of graphs from different formats such as .graphml, .pajek, and UCINET full matrix DL file
format. The above last file type supports the graph imports and exports from graphs generated
using Gephi [12], another graph analysis tool. NodeXL supports data to import directly from
Excel worksheets as well.
The experimental results presented in table 5.7 were obtained by executing the ClusterDe-
tectionEdcar.jar file2 on the latest version of Java at the time of experiments.
2executable .jar file available at http://dme.rwth-aachen.de/en/EDCAR
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User Profile Model
Recent advances in insider threat research have shown that the characterisation of the insider
threat problem needs to factor in human behavioural aspects in addition to insights provided
through technical controls and logs. The root cause of the insider threat motive is purely psy-
chological [45] [139]. Traces of such a mentality could be manifested through behaviour and
interaction with information assets. Hence it is critical to identify behavioural aspects and their
relative contribution to the eventual compromise of information assets.
To overcome the diverse nature of these attacks, we need to define a precise user profile
model by analysing as many insider threat correlated factors as possible [14] [91] [129]. While
many researchers in the insider threat domain have identified several insider threat related para-
meters, a comprehensive list of features associated with the insider threat problem has not yet
been developed. In this chapter we introduce a comprehensive insider threat detection and
prediction feature set that can be used in analysing users’ behaviour. The identified feature
set is mapped into a parameter-based user profile framework, that correlates technical, behavi-
oural, psychological, and organisational paradigms of the insider threat problem. Both static
and dynamic parameters are identified and analysed for the purpose of defining the user profile
model. Users’ behaviour is compared within three different hierarchical levels namely, global,
peer, and individual, to enable the differentiation of possible malicious behaviour from benign
behaviour. Finally, we define a numerical profile score value to represent user behaviour, that
can be utilised as a baseline indicator for possible risk from trusted insiders.
Our contributions in this chapter are the following:
• A comprehensive insider threat detection and prediction feature set correlating many
aspects from user, system, and network parameters is introduced.
• A hybrid user profile model categorising the identified features into technological, beha-
vioural, psychological, and organisational submodules is proposed.
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• Definition of an individual user profile score to represent user behaviour, that can be used
as a ranking mechanism to identify and predict possible high risk users.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.1 describes the literature on user behaviour
analysis in the context of insider threat detection research. Section 3.2 demonstrates the iden-
tified insider threat detection and prediction feature set. Section 3.3 presents the proposed user
profile scoring scheme. Section 3.4 describes the experimental results related to the proposed
profile model. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter with a summary.
3.1 Background
Early research on mitigating insider attacks focused on profiling user behaviour based on many
of the insider threat related technical aspects. This included the use of information on is-
sued commands, system call activities, file access behaviour [92] [114] [134] and relational
analysis on access logs in collaborative environments [31]. High false positive rates on such
analyses prompted insider threat researchers to explore several other directions. In light of the
insider threat problem, researchers identified the requirement of expanding input vectors bey-
ond technical measures (e.g.,[14] [34] and [129]). These ideas were implemented with several
integrated approaches considering parameter correlation with one or many of the technical,
psychological, behavioural, and organisational aspects of the problem.
Multidisciplinary threat prediction model proposed by Kandias et al. [81] uses psycho-
logical profiling and real time usage profiling for the identification of potentially dangerous
users. User sophistication, predisposition, and stress levels were used for psychological profil-
ing while system call analysis, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and honeypots were used for
real time usage profiling. Based on the above two components, this model evaluates the users’
potential to be a malicious actor by mapping into a scoring system defined by the authors.
A research effort by Greitzer and Frincke [68] proposed the use of cyber security audit data
(e.g., event logs, firewall logs, network IDS logs, DNS logs, etc.) and psychosocial data (per-
formance review input, clearance/background information, assessment of social/organisational
behaviour such as disgruntlement, anger, stress and attendance records, etc.) to predict po-
tential malicious insider presence. Another work by Greitzer et al. [67] strongly suggests the
use of workplace behavioural indicators in a proactive insider threat mitigation model. The
framework proposed by Brdiczka et al. [25] integrates users online behaviour through social
network data, email communications and web access with psychological data that includes rel-
evant personality, emotional, and situational variables for predicting possible insider threats.
The research work by Maasberg et al. [96] introduces ten propositions concerning the relation-
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ship between dark triad personality traits and malicious insider behaviour. Many of the above
described research papers highlighted the correlation between the insider threat problem and
psychological behavioural factors.
With the increased use of social media, the insider threat research community began to
explore different social media related parameters in the insider threat problem. The study by
Kandias et al. [80] proposed a method of outlier detection in social media using Twitter data,
to detect users with narcissistic behaviour that can be regarded as an important indicator of
malevolent behaviour. Another team with Kandias et al. [78] introduced a You Tube usage
profiling method for evaluating predisposition towards law enforcement and authorities that
can be considered as an important malicious insider personality trait. The insider threat de-
tection framework proposed by Gavai et al. [59] also utilised a feature set that includes email
usage behaviour, logon/logoff activities, web usage features, and time spent on different web
applications. The study by Alahmadi et al. [4] investigated the possibilities of predicting an
individual’s personality traits based on their web browsing history in detecting malicious in-
sider threats. The study by Colin [9] also explored the possibilities of correlating social media
parameters with insider threat attack vectors. All of the above mentioned research studies
strengthen the need for analysis of user’s online behaviour in insider threat mitigation.
The enterprise level architectural model presented by Bishop et al. [14] utilised various
types of psychological indicators, technical precursors, human resource records and language
affections. The framework proposed by Nurse et al. [115] puts an emphasis on bringing to-
gether many aspects of insider threat including technical and behavioural events/indicators as
well as human factors including precipitating event, personality characteristics, historical be-
haviour, motivation to attack and the capability to attack. The paper by Sarkar [129] addresses
many of the threat agents in technical, behavioural and organisational dimensions. The paper
by Colwill [34] examines technical, social, business, economic and cultural factors affecting
insider threats. Although all of the above described models promisingly contributed to the
identification of parameters affecting the insider threat propensity of individuals, the insider
threat research community still faces challenges in precisely modelling user behaviour.
This thesis focuses on developing a hybrid user profile model that utilises parameters cor-
related with technical, psychological, behavioural, and organisational aspects of the insider
threat problem. Technical patterns can be captured by utilising logs and audit trails from the
users’ day to day system access patterns and technical privileges. Behavioural patterns can
be revealed by mapping social network access patterns, web access patterns, email and instant
message correspondences. Different psychological factors that have a direct implication on
insider misuse, and a user’s organisational position and behavioural patterns recorded through-
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out employment will also be utilised in defining the user profile model. We have analysed
threat cases (published in [29]) to identify the possible informational sources and critical input
parameters in user behaviour analysis. Based on this analysis and related literature we have
developed a comprehensive user profile feature set that incorporates all four dimensions of the
proposed profile model.
Graphical and statistical approaches were adapted for feature extraction from heterogen-
eous informational sources such as system logs, access logs, HTTP logs, email logs, removable
media usage logs, and file copying logs. User behaviour is characterised by an individual nu-
merical value “User Profile Score” based on identified insider threat related parameters. This
profile score can be used as a ranking mechanism instead of a binary classification model
that categorised users as “normal” or “suspicious”. This type of user ranking mechanism is
much more practical than a binary classification framework in mitigating insider threat prob-
lem, because insider threat mitigation is a process of handling the most trusted members of an
organisation.
3.2 Insider Threat Detection/Prediction Feature Set
As previously discussed, the nature of this persistent and smart attack emphasises the require-
ment to analyse multi-dimensional data for unearthing possible malicious users. One of the
major concerns in this type of analysis is the need for minimisation of false positives while
keeping a high number of true positives. To address the above issue and to incorporate many
possible insider threat related parameters, we have identified the requirement of analysis of user
behaviour in four dimensions. Figure 3.1 illustrates the block diagram of the proposed hybrid
user profile model that characterises users’ behaviour based on four dimensions.
The selection of features was naturally driven by publicly available insider threat cases [29]
and published research outcomes from insider threat research. Also, this feature set covers the
three major types of insider threats namely IT sabotage, IT fraud and theft of intellectual prop-
erty (IP). The rest of this section discusses the feature selection process under each submodule.
3.2.1 Technical Profile
The technical profile module comprises of information on users’ interactions with informa-
tional, software, and hardware assets. Hardware assets could be system devices (e.g.,servers),
network devices (e.g.,routers), personal computers, laptops, printers, scanners and removable
media. Software assets may include databases, system and application log files, proprietary and
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Figure 3.1: The hybrid user profile model: this diagram illustrates the four submodules of the proposed hybrid
user profile model and the associated input sources for each submodule.
open source software used in all devices in the enterprise network. Informational assets consist
of all classified informational resources in soft format.
Interactions with various types of assets can be captured using parameters such as user lo-
gon/logoff behaviour, the frequency of access of assets, logon mechanisms, and multiple device
usage information. Logon/logoff behaviour is an essential indicator for identifying user’s gen-
eral system/network access patterns. Users’ asset usage can be analysed by the frequency of
access, access patterns within business hours and after business hours, and multiple device
access patterns. This type of parameters would help to identify deviations from general beha-
viour. The majority of malicious insiders who committ IT sabotage and theft of IP set up or
originate the malicious activity outside business hours operations [29]. Therefore after hour
login attempts can be regarded as a good source of information in insider threat mitigation. It is
obvious there can be situations where after hour access required for the real business operations
as well as planned and unplanned system downtimes or upgrades. We believe that work-related
after hour access patterns need to be identified with the frequency of access as well as their
workrole. However, the most important and interesting aspect here is the sudden change in
access patterns occurring after business hours.
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Removable media is one of the common means used in host-based ex-filtration from data-
bases [29]. USB flash drives, re/writeable CDs/DVDs and external hard drives are a few types
of media used by malicious insiders to copy classified information. Based on this fact it is cru-
cial to analyse users’ day to day usage of removable media. Based on the assigned work roles
and responsibilities some users may have to use removable media frequently, but others need
not. The insider threat model should focus on capturing a user’s normal usage as a baseline
and find any deviations. Continuous monitoring of removable media usage would be helpful in
identifying sudden usage as well as suspicious daily file copying activities that may even span
several months. In the proposed feature set users’ removable media usage is analysed based on
daily usage patterns, frequency of usage, file type, file size and file content. File types such as
.exe can be more suspicious than general file types .doc , .pdf, and .txt in threat scenarios such
as planting keyloggers or planting malicious codes/programs. But in the case of theft of IP, a
disgruntled insider may copy trade secrets, confidential information, etc. mainly in the .pdf file
format. Also a set of files can be compressed and bound to an archive such as .zip, such that
the file names would hide the content related information. Thus the analysis of file type can be
considered an essential part of the removable media usage pattern analysis.
Many of the parameters identified in this section (summarised in Table 3.1) are mostly
related to IT sabotage and theft of IP. Also many of these parameters have a direct link to the
time parameter of a suspicious activity. This set of parameters can be used to characterise users’
technical profile.
Table 3.1: Technical profile feature list: this table lists all the features identified for defining users’ behaviour on
technical profile.
Index Parameter
Device Usage
T1 Logon/Logoff device is the same as default device
T2 Email device is the same as default device
T3 Web device is the same as default device
T4 USB connect device is the same as default device
T5 File copy device is the same as default device
T6 Number of hardware assets accessed
T7 Number of software assets accessed
T8 Number of informational assets accessed
Logon/Logoff Behaviour
T9 Logon time
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Table 3.1: Technical profile feature list: this table lists all the features identified for defining users’ behaviour on
technical profile.
Index Parameter
T10 Logoff time
T11 Business hour logon time
T12 Business hour logoff time
T13 After hour logon time
T14 After hour logoff time
T15 Daily number of logons
T16 Daily number of logoffs
T17 Daily number of business hour logons
T18 Daily number of business hour logooffs
T19 Daily number of after hour logons
T20 Daily number of after hour logoffs
T21 Daily number of devices used for logon activities
T22 Daily number of devices used for logoff activities
Removable Media Usage
T23 Removable media connect time
T24 Removable media disconnect time
T25 Removable media connect time - business hours
T26 Removable media disconnect time - business hours
T27 Removable media connect time - after hours
T28 Removable media disconnect time - after hours
T29 Daily number of connects
T30 Daily number of business hour connects
T31 Daily number of after hour connects
T32 Daily number of disconnects
T33 Daily number of business hour disconnects
T34 Daily number of after hour disconnects
T35 Daily number of devices used with removable media
T36 Time duration between consecutive insert / remove actions
T37 Number of days
File Copying Activities
T38 Number of files copied
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Table 3.1: Technical profile feature list: this table lists all the features identified for defining users’ behaviour on
technical profile.
Index Parameter
T39 Number of files copied - business hours
T40 Number of files copied - after hours
T41 File copying time
T42 File copying time - business hours
T43 File copying time - after hours
T44 Number of days
T45 Number of days - business hours
T46 Number of days - after hours
T47 Daily number of devices used for file copying activities
T48 File size
T49 File type
T50 Content keywords
T51 File names with unusual characters
3.2.2 Behavioural Profile
In this subsection we look at the behavioural profile submodule. This submodule mainly fo-
cuses on online activities such as email communication, web access behaviour, instant mes-
saging activities and social network behaviour. One of the common methods used in stealing
intellectual property includes passing confidential information through emails to third parties
[29]. In addition, keeping track of email communication is one of the best methods of identify-
ing users’ extended friendship network. There may be an argument that friendship networks can
be easily captured through social networks, such as Facebook. However gathering information
from users’ personal social networks for the use of business requirements may raise privacy is-
sues. This may also be difficult due to the security controls applied on the individual profiles by
social media networks. Therefore a suitable approach for capturing users’ friendship network
can be through analysis of email communications via enterprise email systems. This would
minimise the objections on the basis of privacy concerns. Friendship networks generated using
email communication logs would be useful in identifying a user’s relationships with outsiders.
Basic email properties such as the number of recipients, the size of the email and number of
attachments can also be treated as useful indicators in identifying behavioural changes. Email
content analysis can also broaden the spectrum of the the behavioural profile module as used in
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the research work by Gavai et al. [59].
Without doubt, web access behaviour can be treated as another important set of informa-
tion in analysing online activities of an individual [4] [86]. In this digital age, the most com-
mon method of gaining knowledge is through the internet. Therefore almost all organisations
worldwide open the doors to the information superhighway rather than restricting access, as in
the past. Consequently a close look at users web access behaviour would help organisations
identify possible online behavioural changes. In addition to our work [55] on characterising
user behaviour based on web access patterns as described in chapter 5, several other researchers
such as Armstrong [9], Kandias et al. [79] have also focused on this aspect in the insider threat
domain. To characterise users’ web access behaviour we focus on a few basic parameters such
as the number of URLs, time spent on web sites, frequency of access, how common/uncommon
these web sites are, among others. According to the case studies of [29], some of the perpet-
rators spent more time on job recruitment sites and business competitors web sites nearing the
time of the threat activity. Therefore, especially in the context of the insider threat problem we
should focus on web access behaviour and activities on job recruitment sites, professional net-
works (e.g., LinkedIn) sites and business competitors. As in the case of email communication,
URL and web page content analysis would expand the possibilities of accurate prediction of
online behavioural changes.
Analysis of internal instant messaging communications as well as other public chat ser-
vices could also support the identification of hidden behaviour of individuals. Content keyword
matching would be an ideal way of recognising such anomalies. Social network and profes-
sional network behavioural analysis would be the other major component of the behavioural
module. Investigation of profile updates, posts, likes/dislikes, news feeds would also extend
the potential of malicious activity detection before the perpetrators do real damage. The list
of possible parameters that can help identifying online behavioural changes is summarized in
Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Behavioural profile feature list: this table lists all the features identified for defining users’ behavioural
profile.
Index Parameter
Emails sent from business/private domain
B1 number of recipients in ‘To’ field
B2 number of recipients in ‘Cc’ field
B3 number of recipients in ‘BCC’ field
B4 Number of attachments
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Table 3.2: Behavioural profile feature list: this table lists all the features identified for defining users’ behavioural
profile.
Index Parameter
B5 Size of email
B6 Size of attachments
B7 File type of attachments
B8 Daily number of emails sent
B9 Daily number of emails received
B10 Number of emails sent/received during business hours
B11 Number of emails sent/received during after hours
Email Content Features
B12 Subject word length
B13 Subject character length
B14 Content word length
B15 Content character length
B16 Content keywords
Web Access
B17 Number of URLs
B18 Number of unique URLs
B19 Number of common URLs
B20 Number of uncommon URLs
B21 Time spent on web sites
B22 URL keywords
B23 Content keywords
Social Network Behavior
B24 Friendship network
B25 Professional network
3.2.3 Psychological Profile
This subsection looks at the psychological profile submodule, which captures users’ psycho-
logical behaviour in characterising his/her user profile. From various studies that explored the
relationship between psychological behaviour and insider threat [14] [34] [68] [139] the fol-
lowing six personal characteristics have been identified as directly impacting on insider threat
by Shaw et al. [139] (discussed in detail in chapter 2).
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• Personal frustration
• Computer dependency
• Ethical flexibility
• Reduced loyalty
• Sense of entitlement
• Lack of empathy
The study by Greitzer and Frinckle [68] proposed a set of psychosocial indicators that can
be used in identifying possible malicious users in mitigating insider threat problem. From
the 12 indicators, they have identified disgruntlement, difficulty in accepting feedback, anger
management issues, disengagement, and disregard for authority as highest weighted threat in-
dicators. The findings in Nurse et al. [115] emphasize the significance of the influence of the
current psychological state of a malicious insider on the motivation and attitude towards the
attack. A set of personality traits of users can be defined based on several models such as five-
factor model (FFM) [77] and the Dark Triad [120]. FFM evaluates users personality based on
openness to experience, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. Also,
Nurse et al. [115] emphasise the fact that many of the personality characteristics are worthy
of consideration in identifying malicious actors, and better results can be achieved through
the clustering several characteristics together. Among the different personality traits, Nurse et
al. [115] found that “Machiavellianism” [120], excitement-seeking [100] and narcissism [120]
are the most related to insider threat problems. In addition the theoretical model proposed by
Massberg et al. [96] puts an emphasis on the use of dark triad personality traits along with
capability, motive and opportunity (CMO Model) for insider threat detection.
Based on the above literature and the case studies published in [29], a selected set of psycho-
logical indicators are listed in Table 3.3. In this exercise we summarise the many psychological
indicators identified in the literature that have direct implication on the insider threat problem.
However, identification and description of information sources related to psychological threat
agents are considered as out of the scope of this thesis.
3.2.4 Organisational Profile
In this subsection we look at the organisational profile submodule. Most disgruntled insiders
indicate behavioural changes before they commit an insider threat or during the 2 months resig-
nation window [29]. These behavioural changes can be conflicts with co-workers, arguments
with supervisors, unauthorised absences and inability to follow rules. Evidence of this type of
behavioural changes needs to be recorded by the enterprise human resources group and can be
utilised in defining the organisational profile module of the hybrid user profile model. In ad-
dition to the above information, this module also incorporates the employment type (full-time,
part-time, contractor or trainee) of an individual. A user’s position in the organisational hier-
archy and designation are also considered to be useful information sources. The roles of the
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Table 3.3: Psychological profile feature list: this table lists all the features identified for defining users’ behaviour
on psychological profile.
Psychological profile
P1 Openness (O) P14 Disgruntlement
P2 Conscientiousness (C) P15 Difficulty accepting feedback
P3 Extroversion (E) P16 Anger management issues
P4 Agreeableness (A) P17 Disengagement
P5 Neuroticism (N) P18 Disregard for authority
P6 Personal frustration P19 Social frustration
P7 Computer dependency P20 Ethical flexibility
P8 Reduced loyalty P21 Loss of sense of entitlement
P9 Lack of empathy P22 Machiavellianism
P10 Excitement-seeking P23 Narcissism
P11 Psychopathy P24 Maturity
P12 Aggressiveness P25 Superficiality
P13 Verbal behaviour
insiders who commit malicious attacks depends on which of the three broad categories (IT sab-
otage, theft of IP and IT fraud) the attack falls under. Though the parameters selected under this
module also have some relationship with psychological module, one may argue that these two
can be combined together. But for the comprehensiveness and clarity of the proposed model we
keep them as two different submodules. Therefore this module mainly comprises of informa-
tion from the human resources (HR) department for each user based on the parameters listed
in Table 3.4. This feature set also includes a few of the organisational measures identified by
Sarkar [129] as insider threat agents. In a real workplace environment we cannot expect every
single behavioural change/activity to be recorded by the human resources department. Many of
the incidents can be known only by the supervisor and by a few peers who worked closely with
the malicious actor. We argue that such indicators can be captured through the psychological
profile while only the recorded incidences can be captured through the organisational profile.
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Table 3.4: Organisational profile feature list: this table lists all the features identified for defining users’ behaviour
on organisational profile.
Index Organisational Profile
O1 Work role/Designation
O2 Unauthorised absences
O3 Conflicts with co-workers
O4 Conflict with supervisor
O5 Violations of documented policies and controls
O6 Personality conflicts
O7 Human resource review from previous employers
O8 Violation of physical security measures
O9 Reports of social engineering attempts
O10 Unapproved late arrivals
3.3 Profile Score Definition Framework
The second major contribution of this chapter is the definition of an individual user profile score
based on the identified feature set. This task is achieved by extracting the identified features
from various information records through statistical and graphical approaches. For each of
the time varying parameters, user behaviour is compared at three different hierarchical levels;
global, peer, and individual, based on the statistical average values. By using parameter spe-
cific threshold values we classify a user’s behaviour as normal or abnormal, corresponding to
the selected feature. This derives a set of unusual features for each user. The number of unusual
features is mapped into a personal profile score value. Finally, the user and the feature rela-
tionship is mapped into a graph, and this is used as the core visualisation model for predicting
suspicious users. The proposed framework is depicted in Figure 3.2 and the feature extraction
methodology is also described in this subsection.
3.3.1 Time Dependent Parameter Extraction Methodology
This subsection describes the methodology used in the time dependent parameter calculations.
For each time dependent parameter j, we first define a primary threshold value TC(j), that is
used for excluding obvious common values or possible indicators of the general behaviour of
the selected feature. If we average a data set with a large amount of possible general values and
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Figure 3.2: User profile score calculation framework: this figure illustrates the basic stages of the proposed user
profile score calculation framework.
a really small amount of other values for a selected feature, the results would deviate from the
actual average value. Therefore we assume that the definition of the primary threshold value
will help us finding the real average value of the selected feature. For example in the case
of the number of attachments in an email, the most obvious number is 0 or 1. If this is the
case for the majority of data records, averaging information corresponding to the number of
attachments would lead to an improper evaluation. In this case, we will exclude the records
corresponding to the number of attachments as 0 and 1 in further calculations of the selected
feature. Therefore the statistical analysis that incorporates averaging of input data is followed
by removing the obvious commonalities from the initial dataset. Selection criteria of primary
threshold value TC(j) for each parameter is further discussed in the experimental results section
(section 3.4). Selected commonalities are decided by looking at the parameter distribution
graphs or histograms and considering the practical aspects of the selected feature.
Users’ daily individual behaviour for each feature is compared against the following three
dimensions considering the daily individual statistical average value of the selected feature.
• global average parameter value
• peer average parameter value
• own average parameter value
For each time dependent parameter j, global, peer, and individual average parameter values
are calculated eliminating obvious commonalities outside the primary threshold values. The
global average parameter value is calculated by averaging users’ daily individual average values
of the selected feature. The Peer average parameter values are calculated based on the assigned
work role. In this case the average is calculated from all the filtered records corresponding
to each work role. Similarly the individual average values are calculated by averaging the
corresponding records for each user. At the next step we calculate the number of days an
individual exceeds the above mentioned global, peer and individual average parameter values.
The main reason behind this comparison is to analyse how frequently an individual deviates
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from the global, peer and individual behaviour.
The resulting values are represented in a time dependent feature matrix, MTD, which is of
[m× (3× p)] dimension. Here m is the number of users and p is the number of time dependent
parameters. Since each of the time dependent parameters comprise three sub parameters the
number of columns in the MTD matrix is [3× p].
MTD =

x111 x112 x113 . . . x1j1 x1j2 x1j3 . . . x1p1 x1p2 x1p3
x211 x212 x213 . . . x2j1 x2j2 x2j3 . . . x2p1 x2p2 x2p3
x311 x312 x313 . . . x3j1 x3j2 x3j3 . . . x3p1 x3p2 x3p3
...
... . . .
...
xi11 xi12 xi13 . . . xij1 xij2 xij3 . . . xip1 xip2 xip3
...
... . . .
...
xm11 xm12 xm13 . . . xmj1 xmj2 xmj3 . . . xmp1 xmp2 xmp3

m×(3×p)
where
xij1 = Number of days the feature j for user i exceeds the global average
xij2 = Number of days the feature j for user i exceeds the peer average
xij3 = Number of days the feature j for user i exceeds the individual average
Based on the histograms of the number of days against the number of users, we define a
feature specific secondary threshold value TS(j). These secondary threshold values are used
to define an individual as normal or as anomalous for the selected feature. If a user is outside
the secondary threshold value, the corresponding users is mapped as an anomalous user (1)
with respect to the selected feature and otherwise as normal (0). Based on this categorization
we convert MTD into a binary matrix M
′
TD with the same dimension. We give an example of
M
′
TD after conversion of MTD to binary. Figure 3.3 is an illustration of the above-described
methodology in terms of a flowchart, for further clarification.
M ′TD =

1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0
1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0
1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0
...
... . . .
...
1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0
...
... . . .
...
1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0

m×(3×p)
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Input data for
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Analyze feature distribution
Define threshold value: TC(i)
Remove input records which are below TC(i)
Calculate Daily
Individual Average
Calculate
Global Average
Calculate
Peer Average
Calculate
Individual Average
Calculate Number of Days for following 3 conditions
(1) Daily Individual Av-
erage > Global Average
(2) Daily Individual
Average > Peer Average
(3) Daily Individual Aver-
age > Individual Average
Evaluate distribution;
number of users
vs number of days
Evaluate distribution;
number of users
vs number of days
Evaluate distribution;
number of users
vs number of days
Define Global
threshold value TG(i)
Define Peer threshold
value TP (i)
Define Individual
threshold value TI(i)
If Days >
TG(i),TP (i),TI(i)
Normal (0)
Abnormal (1)
Stop
NO
YES
Figure 3.3: Threshold calculation framework for time dependent features: this flowchart illustrates the proposed
method for differentiating suspicious users from the benign users when analysing time varying parameters.
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3.3.2 Time Dependent Parameters - Technical profile
All of the parameters listed under logon/logoff behaviour in table 3.1 (i.e., T9 to T22) were con-
sidered as time dependent parameters. In this framework, the activities during business hours
and after hours of operation were separately analysed. As listed in table 3.1 we believe that
the logon/logoff time, the number of logon/logoff activities and the number of devices used for
logon/logoff activities are critical parameters in characterising users’ device usage behaviour.
To identify users’ removable media usage behaviour we used parameters T23 to T34 from
table 3.1 as significant time dependent parameters. These parameters are useful in identifying
individual behavioural changes in removable media connection/disconnection time as well as
the daily number of connection/disconnection activities. As in the logon/logoff analysis, re-
movable media usage is also considered for the entire time duration as well as within business
hours and after operations separately. We believe that the time duration between consecutive
connect and disconnect activities is a means of capturing large file copying activities as well as
increased use of removable media. The variations in daily number of file copying activities and
the variations in file copying activities especially in the after business operation are a few other
relevant parameters coupled with malicious insider threats. Therefore parameters T38 to T43
that are listed in table 3.1 are considered to be valuable time dependent features in analysing
file copying behaviour.
3.3.3 Time Dependent Parameters - Behavioural Profile
All of the features listed under the “email sent from business/private domains” in table 3.2
excluding B7 can be regarded as significant time dependent parameters for email behaviour
analysis. The above identified parameter set includes the variations in the number of recipients
in different email fields (To, Cc and Bcc), the daily number of sent/received emails, deviations
in email and attachment size. The identified dynamical properties related to web access beha-
viour are B17 and B21 in table 3.2. These features can be used to determine increased use of
web access.
3.3.4 Time Dependent Parameters - Psychological Profile and organisa-
tional Profile
Among the set of parameters identified under the psychological profile (table 3.3), we believe
that, psychometric scores can be treated as time dependent parameters. But this is totally
dependent upon the organisational human resource policies on the frequency of conducting
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psychometric tests. If an organisation conducts psychometric tests only in the recruitment
process this can not be analysed as a time dependent parameter. But if an organisation conducts
them regularly (annually or semi annually), new test results can be compared with previous test
results. Comparison of psychometric test results taken at different time periods can be used for
analysing personality variations.
Based on the list of parameters identified under the organisational profile (table 3.4) we
could not identify any time dependent parameters. One could argue that designation changes
due to promotions, demotions and organisational restructuring can be considered as dynam-
ics. But in the context of our proposed framework such changes cannot be regarded as time
dependent parameters. Instead such changes are included as static parameter rules.
3.3.5 Time Independent Parameter Calculation - Technical Profile
This section describes the time-invariant features identified in mitigating insider attacks under
the technical profile module.
Device Usage
Multiple Device Usage : The usage of multiple devices for accessing different services (e.g.web
access, email access and removable media) is one of the key elements we focus on in character-
ising device usage behaviour. Multiple device usage was analysed using a graphical approach
in this work. We represent user and users’ default (assigned) device relationships in a graph
G = (V,E), where V is the set of vertices (users) and E is the set of edges. The set of vertices
comprises of two distinct types of entities, users and devices while edges represent a user’s
interaction with a device. A simple example is illustrated in figure 3.4.
In a real world environment, users’ default device could be easily obtained from the enter-
prise asset registry. However, the dataset used for this analysis does not contain any information
on a user’s default device or PC. Thus we extracted that information from the provided data.
To do this, we utilised logoff events from logon.csv of the dataset described in section 3.4.1.
The number of logoff events were counted for a particular user from the entire dataset and this
number was used as the edge weight between corresponding user and device. For each user,
adjacent vertex (device) with the highest edge weight has been chosen as the default PC.
The next step compares the device/s used for email communications, web access, removable
media connections, file copying, and logon/logoff activities with the default device. We gen-
erated separate graphs for each service representing the relationship between the user and the
device. Then the default device graph and service graphs are checked for graph isomorphism
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Figure 3.4: An example user device network: this is a network of 3 users (u1, u2, and u3) and 5 devices (D1, ...
, D5). Each user is assigned a default device (u1 → D1, u2 → D2, and u3 → D3. User u1 has global access to
all devices, therefore u1 has edges to all devices. The edge between user u2 and D4 is unexpected as he was not
given access to D4
to test the similarity of graphs. Figure 3.5 illustrates the procedure for differentiating users as
normal or abnormal based on the usage of devices for different services. The normal/abnormal
behaviour of device usage is analysed based on two conditions as illustrated in the flowchart.
The first condition compares the user’s default device with the service device. This task is
achieved by checking two graphs for isomorphism. The second condition is checked if and
only if the first condition is false. Since the users belonging to IT Admin have access to all
the devices in the enterprise network of this particular dataset, the usage of multiple devices
for accessing different services was not considered to be abnormal for such users. However, if
a user who is not belonging to IT Admin had a used a device allocated to someone else that
particular user was considered as abnormal. In addition, if a user under the IT Admin role had
used a device dedicated to his/her immediate supervisor and/or subordinates (if any) this was
considered as abnormal as well. When generalising this aspect into a real world enterprise net-
work, usage of authorised devices to access any of the services by a user with global privilege
access to organisation’s information assets can be regarded as normal excluding the usage of
supervisor/subordinate dedicated devices.
Number of Devices: The number of devices or the percentage of devices used by an indi-
vidual compared to peers can also be considered as an important factor in analysing device
usage patterns. The common practice of most organisations is to allocate an individual com-
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Default PC, Ser-
vice PC, Work role
Default PC = Service PC Normal (0)
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Usage of supervi-
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Stop
NO
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YESNO
Figure 3.5: The criteria for identifying suspicious users based on device usage behaviour: this flowchart illustrates
the procedure for differentiating suspicious users from the benign users based on their device usage activities.
puter (desktop/laptop) to each employee and authorize several other devices based on their
assigned work role. Based on the publicly available threat cases [29] it has been identified that
the insiders who committed IT sabotage had a higher level of access privileges to organisa-
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tional information assets than the others. In general, these attackers can be engineers, system
administrators, database administrators, etc. who have authorised access to multiple devices.
These factors can be regarded as evidence for the necessity of analysing the utilised number of
devices by a particular user. We calculated the ratio R1(ui) between the number of devices a
particular user accessed dui and the number of unique devices accessed by peers npj as defined
in equation (3.1).
R1(ui) = (npj)
−1
dui (3.1)
Since we have represented the user-device relationship with the graph G, the degree of
nodes associated with each user dui is equal to the number of devices accessed by this user.
To get the total number of devices used by users belonging to a particular designation, we first
generated the first order subgraph G′j = (V
′
j , E
′
j) of all users under the selected designation
(j) from the original graph. Then we calculated the total number of vertices corresponding to
vertex type “device”. In graph G′j , V
′
j represents all the users of a particular designation and
devices used by the same set of users. To get the number of unique devices used by all employ-
ees belonging to a work role, we subtracted the number of employees of the workrole from the
total vertex count of the sub graph G′j . The above calculated R1(ui) value was evaluated on
global and peer levels. Users with the R1(ui)% greater than 25%, excluding all the IT Admins
and all the users with degree one were regarded as globally anomalous users and mapped as a
1 in the time invariant matrix. All the other users are mapped as a 0 in the same matrix. For the
each work role, users with the maximum R1(ui) value excluding users with the degree 1 were
considered as anomalous while others were treated as normal.
File Copying Activities
In addition to the time-dependent variables that helps to identify unusual usage of removable
media, a few other parameters based on the content and the file type were selected. We be-
lieve copying executable files into a removable media or from a removable media needs more
attention than copying a regular file type such as .doc, .pdf, .xls, and .txt. Therefore we have
selected the users who copied .exe files into removable media as anomalous and interpreted as
1 and 0 otherwise. Also, we checked for the following keywords in the content of the copied
files and users who copied files with the selected keywords were interpreted as a 1 and others
as a 0.
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• keylogger
• password
• backdoor
• rootkit
• malware
• covert
• unauthorized
• logic bomb
• sabotage
• undetectable
The above set of words is a subset of keywords linked with mechanisms used for get-
ting password information, implementation of unauthorised access paths and general security
breaches. We understand that the selected set of 10 keywords is a tiny subset of a possible
keyword list for this type of analysis. The inclusion of more keywords would further improve
the possibilities of malicious activity identification. Also, we believe a comprehensive and ex-
tensive study of language usage in the behavioural analysis would enable us to expand this set
of keywords. Since we do not consider that task within the scope of this research, we have
considered only a few of the keywords for the completeness of this analysis.
In addition to the above features, we focused our attention on some of the other features
that are useful to identify the sudden use of removable media for file copying activities. Such
events are captured based on the decision criteria illustrated in figure 3.6. Here the number of
days was selected arbitrarily as 5 for this analysis. These three criteria were used to capture
heavy usage of removable media for a short period, as well as the sudden after hours removable
media usage for a short period. In this method, regular usage of removable media as part of
designated work role was treated as normal activity while rare usage of removable media was
considered as suspicious.
The peer level comparison of the usage of removable media is carried out as follows. First,
we analysed the percentage of users who utilized removable media based on their functional
unit. This can be further expanded up to the assigned work role as well. However, for simplicity,
we first considered the analysis within the functional units. If at least 25% of users belonging
to a particular functional unit used removable media at least once, we considered it as a normal
behaviour of the functional unit. If it was less than 25%, such events were treated as abnormal.
3.3.6 Time Independent Parameter Calculation - Behavioural Profile
This section describes the time-invariant features identified for mitigating insider attacks under
the behavioural profile module.
Web Access Behaviour
Disgruntled insiders tend to search for their company’s competitor’s information, possible job
opportunities and make profile updates in professional networks such as Linkedin before they
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Figure 3.6: The criteria for identifying suspicious users based on the removable media usage behaviour: this flow-
chart illustrates the procedure for differentiating suspicious users from the benign users based on the removable
media usage activities.
commit an attack. Confidential information upload to online storage sites such as Dropbox,
Google drive and One Drive is a common way of data ex-filtration among malicious insiders
who committed IT theft. Keyloggers are used to steal other users’ authentication credentials
(e.g. passwords) that allows a suspicious user to login to a system as another user. Some
malicious users created a backdoor to get connected to the enterprise network after resignation.
Considering the above facts, individuals who access websites that contain such information can
be regarded as suspicious. Analysis of web access records will be an important way to capture
such activities.
The following list provides the criteria for the selection of the above mentioned suspicious
activities within this dataset. If a user accessed a website related to any of these features, it was
interpreted as a 1 in the time invariant binary matrix and otherwise as a 0.
• Job recruitment sites
• Online data storage sites (Dropbox, onedrive, google drive)
• Whistle blower sites (wikileaks)
• Websites that have keyloggers, rootkits, backdoor information
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In addition to the content based web access behaviour, we focused our attention on the
commonality of the URLs accessed by individuals. This analysis was carried out by dividing
the set of unique URLs into two subsets depending on the number of users who accessed a
particular URL. URLs accessed by less than one percent of the userbase were categorized as
uncommon URLs while the rest were categorised as common URLs. Then the percentage of
the common and uncommon URLs accessed by each user was calculated. Higher the percent-
age of uncommon URL accessed and lower the percentage of common URL accessed were
considered as anomalous. The corresponding threshold values (percentages) are discussed in
the experimental results section (section 3.4).
3.3.7 Time Independent Parameter Calculation - Psychological Profile
Even though we have listed a fair number of psychological factors that can be used to identify
individuals’ psychological behaviour in table 3.3, this analysis will only use the psychometric
scores provided in the dataset. Based on the characteristics of the FFM model personality traits,
we have selected the topmost 5% of users with “O and C” values and bottommost 5% of users
with “E, A and N” values. The openness personality trait reflects the degree of intellectual curi-
osity, creativity and a preference for novelty [164]. Individuals with high openness are open
minded and try to achieve self-actualization through innovative ways. When we consider the
behaviour of malicious insiders they can be at the upper end of the scale rather than at the lower
end of the scale. People with high conscientiousness are often perceived as stubborn and ob-
sessive [164]. Based on this fact we selected users with higher “C” value as possible suspicious
users. People with lower “E” values can be more solitary or reserved with negative emotions.
However highly extroverted people who are energetic and outgoing reflects positive emotions.
Therefore in the context of insider threat problem we considered users with low values of “E” as
suspicious. Since “low agreeableness personalities are often competitive or challenging people,
that can be seen as argumentative or untrustworthy” [164] we chose users with bottom most
“A” values as anomalous. Neuroticism reflects the degree of emotional stability. If a user is
preparing for suspicious activity, definitely they are not emotionally stable. Therefore in this
case users with the lower “N” values are considered as suspicious. All the users identified as
suspicious based on the above criteria are regarded as anomalous and mapped as a 1 and others
as a 0.
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3.3.8 Time Independent Parameter Calculation - Organisational Profile
This analysis considered only the designation of a particular user and a user’s late arrivals from
the proposed list of features (Table 3.4) corresponding to the organisational profile module.
We have used the C value of the psychometric score to represent late arrivals. Several work
roles have been identified as higher risk than the others based on the threat cases published in
[29] and the characteristics of three broader categories of insider threat. The selected set of
work roles are mentioned in the experimental results section (section 3.4).
The resulting feature values are represented in the matrix MTI of [m× q] dimension. Con-
sequently corresponding binary values are represented in the matrix M ′TI of [m× q] dimension
as illustrated below.
MTI =

x11 x12 x13 . . . x1j . . . x1q
x21 x22 x23 . . . x2j . . . x2q
x31 x32 x33 . . . x3j . . . x3q
... . . .
...
...
xm1 xm2 x33 . . . xmj . . . xmq

m×q
where
xij = Value of the parameter j for user i
M ′TI =

1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0
1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0
1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0
...
... . . .
...
1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0
...
... . . .
...
1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0

m×q
Above described time dependent and time independent features are used in the different
experiments carried out throughout this thesis.
3.3.9 Profile Score Calculation
The time dependent binary feature matrix M ′TD and the time independent binary feature matrix
M
′
TI are concatenated column wise to get the final binary feature matrix MP that is used to
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represent the user behaviour. The final binary feature matrix is of size [m × n], where n =
((3 × p) + q). All the elements with a 1 in the MP matrix are considered as anomalous while
all the elements with a 0 are considered as normal.
MP
n×m
= M
′
TI
n×3×p
+M
′
TD
n×q
(3.2)
MP =

1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0
1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0
1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0
...
... . . .
...
1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0
...
... . . .
...
1 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 0 0

m×n
where
n = (3× p) + q
Instead of representing the user behaviour as a row of a binary matrix, we believe it is more
practical to represent a user’s behaviour as a single numerical value. Therefore we defined
the value User Profile Score (UPS) to characterize individual’s behaviour utilizing the binary
feature matrix (MP ) based on the following two methods.
1. UPS1(i) : Weighted no.of suspicious features for user i
UPS1(i) =
Number of suspicious features
Total Number of features
(3.3)
Number of anomalous features of a particular user is the total number of elements with 1 in
the MP matrix and the total number of features is the number of columns of MP .
2. UPS2(i) : Sum of weighted no.of suspicious features per submodule (SM). Since the pro-
posed framework has four submodules, the index i varies from 1 to 4.
UPS2(i) =
4∑
i=1
Number of suspicious features of submodule j for user i
Total Number of features of submodule j
(3.4)
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This framework enabled us to extract the user behaviour from heterogeneous input data
streams and represent individual behaviour as a single numerical value, that can be used as an
indication of possible risk from each user for the organisation.
3.4 Experimental Results
We start this section with a brief description of the dataset used in the experiments of this
chapter. The following four subsections present results obtained from each module of the
proposed hybrid user profile model. The last subsection demonstrates the results related to
profile score definitions and the graphical representation.
3.4.1 The Dataset
We have utilised the insider threat dataset published by the CERT@CMU [144] for this re-
search. Out of the different versions of the available datasets, R4.2.tar.bz was used for the
experiments discussed in this chapter. This dataset consists of users’ Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP) records and six other types of data records (HTTP, logon, device, file,
email and psychometric) of 1000 employees in 42 different work roles spanning an 18 months
period. The data structure is described in table 3.5.
3.4.2 Technical Profile
This subsection describes the data analysis, and experimental results corresponding to the
four broader categories of features identified in the technical profile; (i) device usage, (ii) lo-
gon/logoff behaviour, (iii) removable media usage, and (iv) file copy activities.
Device Usage
Multiple Device Usage : Evaluation of multiple device usage for various services is presented
in this subsection. As described in the methodology (section 3.3.5) we identified the default
device for each user. Then it was compared with the device/s utilised for other five services
namely, logon/logoff, web access, email, removable media usage, and file copying activities.
Figure. 3.7a illustrates the network corresponding to the users’ default device. Users are rep-
resented by pink spheres while the devices are represented by blue squares. Subsequent figures
illustrate the user-device networks corresponding to each of the other services. Denser net-
works were observed for logon/logoff activities, removable media and file copying activities.
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Table 3.5: Data structure of the R4.2 dataset: this table summarises the details of data files and fields associated with each file in R4.2 dataset
File Name Content Number of
Records
LDAP User, Name, Email, Supervisor, Business Unit, Functional Unit, Work Role 16,743
http.csv Time-stamp, User, PC, URL, Web content key words 28,434,423
logon.csv
Time-stamp, User, PC, Activity (logon/logoff)
854,859
“Logon” activity corresponds to either a user login event or a screen unlock event, while the “Lo-
goff” event corresponds to user logoff event. Screen locks were not recorded in this dataset
device.csv
TImestamp, User, PC, Activity (connect/disconnect)
405,380
This data file includes users’ removable media (USB) usage records indicating connect and dis-
connect activities.If a user shut down the device without removing the USB, such events were not
recorded
file.csv
Timestamp, User, PC, Filename, Content
445,581
Details of file copies to removable media are recorded in this file.
email.csv Timestamp, User, PC, from, to, cc, bcc, number of attachments, size, content keywords 2,629,979
psychometric.csv
O,C,E,A,N
1,000
Psychometric scores based on big five personality traits or five-factor model (FFM) for the definition
of personality.
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The networks corresponding to email communications and web access followed a similar topo-
logy as in the users’ default device network. To evaluate the first decision point in the flowchart
(figure 3.5), which is to check the multiple device usages, we have used the graph isomorphism
property. If the two graphs are isomorphic, we stopped the evaluation as users utilised only the
designated device. If the two graphs are not isomorphic, then there could be some users who
had used multiple devices. In that case, the second phase of the flow chart (figure 3.5) was
evaluated.
Networks corresponding to email device (figure 3.7(e)) and web access device (figure 3.7(f))
were isomorphic to the default device network (figure 3.7(a)). The above fact implies that none
of the users had utilised multiple devices for email communications and web access. The denser
networks corresponding to the logon/logoff activities (figure 3.7(b)), file copying activities (fig-
ure 3.7(d)), and removable media usage (figure 3.7(c)) were due to the multiple device usages
by different users. In the above graphical representation, the degree of a node corresponding
to a particular user is equivalent to the number of devices used for the specified service. It was
observed that some of the users had degree greater than one, which is an indication of multiple
device usages. Figures 3.8(a), 3.8(b) and 3.8(c) represent networks after eliminating the users
with the degree equal to one. These graphs correspond to the sets of users who access multiple
devices on the specified service. These sets of filtered users were further analysed as per the
second decision point in the flow chart illustrated in figure 3.5 to evaluate whether the multiple
device usages is a work requirement or not.
In the case of removable media usage activities, only 16 users had utilised multiple devices
while 10 users had utilised multiple devices for file copying activities. Interestingly all these
users were under the IT Admin work role. In addition, of the 16 users who have connected
removable media to multiple devices, only 6 users had utilised 2 devices (including their de-
fault PC). However, this set of 6 users did not use multiple devices for file copying activities.
The direct execution of a piece of malicious code from the removable media, or a direct file
attachment to an email from the removable media could be some of the malicious intents of a
suspicious user if he/she was not involved in file copying activities. In view of the above we
further investigated the devices used for removable media activities by the above set of users.
It was found that the additional device utilised by these six users belonged to their immediate
supervisor. This action was considered as malicious and they were marked as suspicious.
Number of Devices : The number of devices is another important parameter we used
for analysing device usage behaviour. Figure 3.9 illustrates the variation of the number of
devices used by an individual for logon/logoff activities, removable media usage activities and
file copying activities. Since all users only utilized a single device for web access and email
73
C
hapter3.
U
serProfile
M
odel
(a) Default Device (b) Logoff Activities (c) Removable Media Usage Activities
(d) File Copying Activities (e) Email Communications (f) Web Access Activities
Figure 3.7: User - device relationship graphs: above (a) illustrates the users’ default device. Graphs (b), (c) and (d) illustrate user - device relationship graphs for logoff
activities, removable media usage activities, and file copying activities respectively. Users are represented by pink spheres while the devices are represented by blue
triangles. These dense graphs (b),(c) and (d) are due to the multiple device usages by several users. However graphs illustrated by (e) and (f) that are corresponding to
email communications and web access clearly show that each user accesses only a single device. Graphs (b), (c), and (d) are illustrated after clustering with the CNM
algorithm [32], with the intergroup edges hidden to reduce the complexity.
74
3.4.
E
xperim
entalR
esults
(a) Logoff Activities (b) File Copying Activities (c) Removable Media Usage Activities
Figure 3.8: Multiple device usage: above (a), (b), and (c) illustrate the users (pink spheres) who have utilised more than one device for logoff activities, removable
media usage activities, and file copying activities respectively. It is clear only a few number of users have utilised multiple devices for file copying activities (b) and
removable media activities. These graphs are illustrated after clustering with the CNM algorithm [32], with the intergroup edges hidden to reduce the complexity.
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communications this is not shown in this figure.
AR1(ui) value for each user was calculated using equation (3.1). This feature was analysed
at two levels, i.e. global and peer levels. To get the anomalous users compared to the whole user
base we selected the users with R1(ui) value greater than or equal to 25% for the users with
the degree higher than 1. We found only 43 users in this category, and they were represented
by an entry of 1 (anomalous) in MTI(I) matrix. The peer level comparison was carried out as
follows: users with the highest R1(ui) percentage for each work role were selected, excluding
the users who accessed only a single device. 44 users were identified by this method and again
marked as 1 (anomalous) in theMTI(I) matrix. In both of the above selection criteria, the users
under the IT Admin work role were omitted as they were authorized for all devices.
Logon/Logoff Behavior
Users’ logon/logoff behaviour was analysed using the logon/logoff activities in the logon.csv
file that has 854,859 records. Of this large number of records, 470,591 records corresponded to
logon activities while the rest of the records (384,268) corresponded to logoff activities. After
separating the records corresponding to logon and logoff activities they were further divided
in to business hours (BH) and after hours (AH) records. By looking at the distributions of the
number of daily logon and logoff activities in figure 3.12 as well as considering the practicality
of this feature, the primary threshold was chosen. The primary threshold value (TC(i)) for daily
and BH number of logon/logoff attempts was selected as one. The global, peer, and individual
average values for daily and business hours logon/logoff attempts were calculated after the
removal of records with the value 1.
The number of daily individual logon/logoff attempts were compared with the global, peer
and individual average values. Number of days exceeding the above mentioned average values
were calculated and illustrated in figure 3.10 and figure 3.11.
Not many of the users were found to go beyond the peer average and the global average
values for daily and BH logon activities. It was also observed that the users who went beyond
the global and peer average values behaved in this manner for only a few days. Consequently,
we selected all users who had exceeded the global and peer average values at least by one day
as suspicious. However, when we consider the users who exceeded the individual average,
about 35% of the user base also had this behaviour. Thus we omitted that feature in profile
score calculations considering the relatively high number of users selected under this feature.
Interestingly for the logoff activities during business hours, none of the users exceeded the
global and peer average logoff attempts. However, there were about 5% of users who indicated
a higher number of logoff attempts than their individual average values for several days.
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(a) Logoff activities
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(b) Removable media usage activities
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(c) File copying activities
Figure 3.9: The distribution of the number of devices utilised by users for various services: the majority of the
users utilised a smaller number of devices while the minority of users utilised a larger number of devices for (a)
logoff activities, (b) removable media usage activities, and (c) file copying activities.
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Figure 3.10: Behaviour comparison - number of logon attempts: the above graphs illustrates the distribution of the
number of days exceeded three hierarchical levels for logon attempts for (a) within business hours and (b) within
after hours. Only a few number of users went beyond the global and peer average number of logon attempts.
But considerably a larger number of users went beyond their individual average number of logon attempts during
business hours (as in above (a)).
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(a) Business Hours
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Figure 3.11: Behaviour comparison - number of logoff attempts: none of the users went beyond global and peer
average values during business hours and about 5% of users exceeded their individual average as shown in above
(a). In the after hour distribution as in (b) only a very few number of users went beyond three hierarchical threshold
values.
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(a) Logon - entire day
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(b) Logon - business hours
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(c) Logon - after hours
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(d) Logoff - entire day
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(e) Logoff - business hours
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(f) Logoff after hours
Figure 3.12: The distribution of the number of daily logon and logoff attempts: the general behaviour of the (a) daily, (b) business hours, and (c) after hours number
of logon activities of users is one logon attempt per day. similarly, the most common number of logoff attempts is one during the (d) entire day, (e) business hours, and
(f) after hours.
79
Chapter 3. User Profile Model
When we analysed the logon/logoff activities during after hours, only 190 users were found
with logon activities while 306 users were found with logoff activities. Since the majority of
the users from the entire user base do not participate in this particular feature, it is vital to have a
close look at the minority of users who had logon/logoff events during after hours of operation.
None of the records were excluded when calculating global, peer and individual average values
corresponding to after hours logon/logoff activities. For after hour logon/logoff parameters we
have selected all the users with at least one day above global, peer or individual average values
as suspicious. We found that 45 users had after hour logon events, which were greater than the
average global number of days for after hour logon events. However, there were no users who
exceeded the peer average number of days while there were 355 users who exceeded the own
average number of days of after hours logon activities. The relatively high number of users may
have resulted with logon activities followed by screen locks just before the particular employee
left the office. There were no users who went beyond the global average number of days based
on the after hour logoff events. Interestingly a single user was found with more than the peer
average number of days. However, there were 52 users who were with daily individual averages
above their average number of days with after hour logoff events.
Removable Media Usage
Removable media usage was analysed using the device.csv file that has 405,380 records. We
considered only the “Connect” activities of the data records which were corresponding to the
removable media connection activities. “Disconnect” activities were not considered as there
were missing disconnection activities which possibly corresponded to ejecting the removable
media after device shut down. The number of daily connections, connections during busi-
ness hours and connections during after hours were analysed separately (see figures 3.13(a) -
3.13(c)).
From the entire userbase, only 265 users utilised removable media. From this minor set
of users only 82 users had used removable media during both business hours and after hours.
Interestingly there were 22 users who used removable media only during after hours while
the others (161) had used them only during business hours. By looking at these figures, we
considered the set of users who used removable media only during the after hours as suspicious.
The set of users who had utilised removable media only during business hours were considered
as normal. To capture sudden removable media usage patterns, users who used removable
media for no more than 10 days at any time of the day were considered as suspicious.
As in the other time dependent features, users’ individual daily average feature values were
compared with the global and individual average values and illustrated in figures 3.13(d) -
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(b) Business Hours
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(c) After Hours
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Figure 3.13: Removable media usage behaviour: the distribution of number of removable media connect activities are shown for the (a) entire day, (b) during business
hours, and (c) during after hours. Relatively smaller number of removable media connect activities were happened during after hours (c) compared with the business
hours (b). The distribution of the removable media activities during the entire day (a) is dominated by the business hour distribution (b). Comparison with global and
peer behaviour for the entire day, during business hours, and during after hours is shown in (d), (e), and (f) respectively.
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3.13(f). Considering the total number of users involved in theses activities the primary threshold
was not defined and none of the records were excluded from the calculations. In addition,
the peer comparison was excluded due to relatively small user involvement in the selected
feature. Since there were users who used multiple devices for removable media activities, the
maximum and the minimum daily individual values corresponding to each user were used for
the comparison. If a particular user had used only a single device then the maximum and the
minimum value are the same. But if a particular user is utilising multiple devices, then the
maximum and the minimum values would be different. The above values were used to capture
any user who utilized a separate device to commit a malicious activity, given the fact that he/she
is a heavy user of removable media. Consideration of only the maximum value for a particular
user irrespective of the device would result in lost of valuable information. Users who exceeded
the global, peer and individual averages for no more than 10 days were regarded as suspicious.
The above mechanism supports capturing sudden usage of removable media by insiders.
File Copying Activities
Users’ file copy activities were analysed using the file.csv file that has 445,581 records. Only
264 users (i.e. 26.4%) from the entire database (1000) were involved in file copying activities.
The number of files copied during business hours, after hours as well as total number of daily
file copying activities (figures 3.14(a) - 3.14(c)) were analysed. Since the above three features
were time varying features, the number of days that exceeded the global and individual average
values were calculated and are illustrated in figures 3.14(d) to 3.14(f). Also considering the
total number of users involved in theses activities the primary threshold was not defined and
none of the records were excluded from the calculations. In addition, the peer comparison was
excluded due to relatively small user involvement in the selected feature.
Users who exceeded the global average only for 1 or 2 days were marked as suspicious
and the number of such users was only 35. When conducting the individual comparison, the
secondary threshold was selected as 10 days and only 7 suspicious users were found under this
category. For the after hour file copying activities there were 60 users who exceeded the global
average number of daily file copying and 29 users who exceeded the individual average number
of file copying. Again the analysis of days distribution allowed us to select the secondary
threshold as 100 days for the global average and greater than 0 days for the individual average.
With this classification 55 users were classified as suspicious from the global comparison while
29 users were classified as suspicious from the individual comparison.
The next parameter chosen was the file type. Table 3.6 summarises the distribution of
different types of files copied in the entire database. Comparatively, the number of files with
82
3.4.
E
xperim
entalR
esults
Number of Files
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
E
v
e
n
t
s
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
5
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
21706
10878
2167 1709
4964
4206
151 79 28 15 4
(a) Entire day
Number of Files
0 10 20 30 40
0
2
0
0
0
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
E
v
e
n
t
s
6
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
8382
9105
7728
4821
2618
1117
550354527
903
1548
2212219
3046
24 25 19 13 5 1
4
0
0
0
(b) Business Hours
Number of Files
N
o
.
o
f
 
E
v
e
n
t
s
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
8
0
0
1
0
0
0
1017
545
406 396
278
164
110
77 55 39 29 21 10 15 1 1 1
(c) After Hours
Number of Days
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
1
2
0
1
4
0
135
22
11
5 5
1
15
2 3 2
Number of Days
0 50 100 200
0
1
0
3
0
4
0
45
19
47
33
25
19
27
15
1211
6
2 2 1
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
Global Individual
(d) Entire Day
Number of Days
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
1
2
0 118
19
9
2
5
1
15
2 3 2
0 50 250
0
2
0
6
0
8
0
80
74
48
28
8
1
s 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
4
0
Number of Days
150
Global Individual
(e) Business Hours
Number of Days
0 20 60 100 140
0
1
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
50
0 1 1
3
0
5
Number of Days
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 5 10 20 30
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
92
1 0 1 1 2 2
s 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
Global Individual
(f) After Hours
Figure 3.14: Users’ file copying behaviour: distributions of daily number of file copying activities are shown in (a) for the entire day (b) during business hours, and (c)
during after hours. The majority of the file copying activities are happened during business hours. The number of file copying activities happened during after business
hours is relatively low compared with the business hour activities. Comparison with global and peer behaviour for the entire day, during business hours, and during
after hours is shown in (d), (e), and (f) respectively.
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.exe extension was lower than the other types of files. From the selected set of users, users
who had copied only .exe files were tagged as suspicious assuming the fact that executable files
can be more harmful than the other types of files. In this case, only 6 users were found to be
suspicious.
Table 3.6: Distribution of type of files: this table summarises the total number of files of each file type and the
number of users who copied the respective file type.
File Type Number of files Number of users
.doc 285,897 257
.pdf 87,953 255
.jpg 22,895 249
.txt 23,033 249
.zip 22,829 244
.exe 2,974 230
The total number of days corresponding to file copying activities was another parameter
analysed to identify file copying behaviour. Again this was evaluated based on the usage within
business hours and after hours as well as the total number of days. Since there were instances
with multiple device usages for file copying activities, two sub parameters were used when
evaluating the total number of days. We selected the users who were involved in file copying
activities for less than 10 days as suspicious irrespective of the device. In this case, we cap-
tured individuals who were not frequently involved in removable media file copying activities.
35 users were found under this category. Suspicious file copying activities conducted using a
device dedicated to another person were captured by selecting the set of users who were in-
volved in file copying for less than 10 days using any of the devices. There were 45 users
belonging to this category, and they were marked as suspicious.
From the six different types of files, only the executable files were checked for selected
keywords and table 3.7 summaries the user count corresponding to each keyword. The fairly
low number of users captured under these parameters were considered as possible suspicious
users.
3.4.3 Behavioural profile
Email Communication
Email communication of users was analysed based on two main categories: (i) the emails sent
from the business domain (BD) and (ii) the emails sent from all the other (non-business) do-
84
3.4. Experimental Results
Table 3.7: File copying content keyword summary: number of users who exhibited selected keywords in the
copied files are listed in this table.
Keyword User Count Keyword User Count
keylogger 9 password 9
malware 8 unauthorised 3
undetectable 9 virus 2
mains (OD). From the total of 2,629,979 email records 62% emails were sent from the business
domain while the rest (37%) were sent from several other domains. Distribution of data values
for an individual parameter is observed in the initial stage of the analysis. Histograms of the
number of attachments, the number of recipients in ‘To’, ‘Cc’ and ‘Bcc’ fields, the number
emails sent during the entire day, during business hours, and during after hours, and the email
size is depicted in figure 3.15 for business domain and 3.16 for non-business domains. Primary
threshold values chosen for each parameter based on the distribution of histograms are listed in
Table A.1.
Further analysis of email communication features was carried out after removing the re-
cords greater than the primary threshold values mentioned in Table A.1. In this step, we have
calculated the number of days exceeding the global, peer and individual thresholds for each
user based on all of the selected features in this category. Based on the distribution of users
who exceeded the primary threshold values for emails sent from the business domain (figure
3.17 and all of the other domains (figure 3.18), the secondary threshold values were chosen
and listed in Table A.1. All of the users who exceeded the secondary threshold values were
classified as suspicious and mapped to 1 and the others were classified as normal and mapped
to 0 in the MTI(I) matrix.
The number of users who were categorised as anomalous under the above selected email
features are summarized in Table A.2.
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Figure 3.15: Email feature histograms - business domain: the above histograms illustrates the distribution of the number of users of the selected email features based
on the emails sent from the business domain. The above histograms show that the majority of users exhibit some common behaviour while a minority of users (who
are corresponding to shorter bins) are deviating from the common behaviour.
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Figure 3.16: Email feature histograms - non-business domain: the above histograms illustrates the distribution of the number of users of the selected email features
based on the emails sent from non-business domains. Similar to email properties of business domin, the above histograms also show that the majority of users exhibit
some common behaviour while a minority of users (who are corresponding to shorter bins) are deviating from the common behaviour.
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Figure 3.17: Behaviour comparison - email communications from business domain: these graphs illustrate the distribution of users based on the number of days users
exceeded global, peer, and individual average values of selected features.
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Figure 3.18: Behaviour comparison - email communications from non business domains: these graphs illustrate the distribution of users based on the number of days
users exceeded global, peer, and individual average values of selected features.
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Web Access
As described in the methodology, we have checked for several keywords in the URLs of HTTP
records. Table 3.8 summarises the number of users who have accessed URLs with selected
keywords and the number of unique URLs found in the dataset that includes the selected
keyword.
Table 3.8: Number of users and URLs correspond to selected keywords
Keyword Number of Users Number of Unique URLs
Dropbox 142 14
Career 176 19
Wikileaks 30 1
Keylogger 9 4
These figures indicated that only a few percentage of users (i.e. less than 18%) browsed
URLs with the selected keywords. In addition to the URL keyword checks, we have analysed
the commonalities of the URLs accessed by the user base. From the 6033 unique URLs found
in this dataset, 3293 URLs were categorised as common URLs while the rest of the URLs
(2740) were classified as uncommon URLs. This categorization was carried out by considering
the percentage of users who accessed a particular URL. If a particular URL was accessed by at
least 1% of the userbase, it was categorised as a common URL and otherwise as an uncommon
URL. Figures 3.19 (a) depicts the distribution of the number of unique URLs accessed by
users while figures 3.19(b) and 3.19c(a) illustrates the distribution of selected common and
uncommon URLs accessed by users.
By looking at the distribution of unique URLs accessed by users, we observed that the
majority of users interacted with 50 to 350 of the unique URLs while the minority of users
were spread along the two edges of the distribution. Therefore the users belonging to the 50
to 350 range can be treated as normal. The users belonging to the starting edge (i.e., URL
count from 0 to 50) were also considered to be normal based on the fact that they accessed
only a few number of unique URLs. However, the users in the tail of the distribution (i.e.,
URL count above 350) were considered as abnormal in this particular feature, based on the
fact that their web access patterns were different from that of the other employees. With the
common/uncommon URLs accessed, we believe that the higher the number of common URLs
and the lower the number of uncommon URLs can be considered as normal. Opposite of the
above fact is considered as suspicious. Based on this fact we selected the bottom 5% users from
the common URL distribution, and the top 5% users from the uncommon URL distribution as
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Figure 3.19: The distribution of users based on accessed URLs: the distribution of users based on the unique
URLs accessed by users (a) shows there are a few users in the head and tail of the distribution. The users with low
number of unique URLs could be suspicious. The other two graphs (b) and (c) that represent the user distribution
based on the number of common and uncommon URLs accessed also shows a few number of users who are
deviating from the majority of common users.
possible suspicious users corresponding to the usage of common/uncommon URLs feature.
In addition to the above time invariant parameters, the daily number of URLs accessed was
compared with the global, peer, and individual average values to understand the deviations from
the normal web access behaviour. Table A.2 summarises the results of the number of users
who exceeded three hierarchical levels based on the selected threshold values as in Table A.1.
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3.4.4 Psychological Profile
Possible malicious users were selected based on the selection criteria described in the method-
ology (subsection 3.3.7). It was observed that the majority of users (792 out of 1000 users)
did not indicate any abnormality in psychometric figures. However, the rest of the users were
considered as anomalous as they had at least one psychometric trait that was considered as
anomalous. There were 183 users with only one anomalous psychometric trait. In addition
only 24 users were with two anomalous psychometric scores while only a single user had three
anomalous psychometric scores. There were no employees with four or all five anomalous
psychometric traits at a time.
3.4.5 Organisational Profile
Due to the limitations of the available data related to the proposed features under the organ-
isational profile module, this analysis considered only the designation of a particular user and
the late arrivals to the workplace. Since the conscientiousness score is a reflection of late work
arrivals, we used that value to represent late arrivals of users. This score varies from 0 to 50 for
the entire user base. Therefore we consider users with conscientiousness score - (C) equal to
50 as abnormal compared to others. 17 users from the entire user base indicated this behaviour,
and they were mapped to 1 in the binary matrix and to 0 otherwise. We considered engineers, IT
admins, administrative assistants, administrative staff, all trainers and all employees attached
to the research and engineering functional unit to be of higher risk than the others based on
the characteristics of insiders involved in published threat cases in [29]. All of these selected
users were marked as a 1 and others as a 0 in the MTI(I) matrix. There were totally 419 users
selected under this parameter. Due to the high number of users selected under this category, we
excluded this feature in the profile score calculations.
Figure 3.20 is an illustration of the number of malicious users corresponding to all the cal-
culated features of technical and behavioural submodules. Primary threshold values, secondary
threshold values and the number of anomalous users under each parameter are summarised in
table A.1 and table A.2.
3.4.6 Profile Score Calculation
As discussed in the methodology, all the feature values were converted to binary values and
represented in a binary matrix. The total number of evaluated features was 117, which includes
all the sub features of the selected features.
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Figure 3.20: The distribution of number of anomalous users vs selected features: (a) the number of anomalous
users of the majority of the (a) technical profile and (b) behaviural profile features were less than ten percent of
the total userbase.
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When calculating the profile score values, parameters with more than 100 (i.e. 10% of the
userbase) suspicious users and the parameters with 0 suspicious users were excluded. Elimin-
ation of the parameters belonging to above two categories resulted in a total of 96 parameters
for profile score calculations. The summary of the number of submodule features is listed in
table 3.9.
Table 3.9: Summary of the number of features for each submodules are listed in this table.
Profile Module Total Number of Features Number of features after
filtering
Technical Profile 53 44
Behavioural Profile 57 46
Psychological Profile 5 5
organisational Profile 2 1
The distribution of users against the number of anomalous features is illustrated in fig-
ure 3.21. Based on this analysis we found a few users with relatively large number of anomal-
ous features compared to the majority of users with a fewer number of anomalous features.
The profile score (UPS1) as defined in equation (3.3) was calculated as the weighted sum
of anomalous features. Sub module based profile score (UPS2 as in equation (3.4)) was calcu-
lated as the total of weighted sum of submodule anomalous features. The effectiveness of the
UPS1 and UPS2 were evaluated using the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves
and the corresponding area under the curve (AUC) values. We achieved AUC of 0.8302 for
UPS1 and AUC of 0.8074 for UPS2. Figure 4.28 illustrates the ROC curves corresponding
to UPS1 and UPS2 respectively. Given the fairly good AUC values we believe our classi-
fication worked fairly well. Even though there is not much difference between AUC values
corresponding to two profile score methods, we believe resulted AUC values were fairly good.
3.4.7 Graphical Representation
The visualization of the relationships between users and anomalous features was achieved
through mapping profile score matrix to a graph instance G” = (V ”, E”), where V ” is the
set of nodes and E” is the set of edges. Nodes represent either a user or a feature. An edge
between a user and a feature is corresponding to the anomalous behaviour of the particular
user corresponding to the selected feature. In this graph degree of a node corresponding to the
number of anomalous features if the corresponding node represented a user. Also, the degree
of a feature corresponds to the number of users who behave abnormally with regard to that se-
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Figure 3.21: Distribution of users based on total number of anomalous features: the majority of users exhibited a
few number of anomalous features while the minority of users exhibited a large number of anomalous features.
lected feature. Figure 3.23(a) represents the user-anomalous feature relationship for users with
at least one anomalous feature. To improve the clarity of the graph a graph clustering algorithm
was used and the graph is illustrated in a grouped layout. Intergroup edges were also excluded
for improved visualisation. Users are represented by dark blue spheres. Features correspond-
ing to each module are coloured in four different colours (Technical - red, Behavioural - blue,
Psychological - green and organisational - purple). Figure 3.23(b) illustrates the anomalous
feature network for the users with more than ten anomalous features. It was observed some of
the users behaved abnormally in quiet a few number of features belonging to a single profile
module. Also the suspected number of users are dramatically reduced when the considered
number of anomalous features were increased. With this graphical representation any security
analyst would get the benefit of identifying most anomalous users.
Considering the complexity of insider attacks, it is tough to totally detect or prevent such
an attack. However, the main idea behind all the insider threat models is to minimise the
risk and act before disgruntled insider harm the organisation. Therefore this type of graphical
visualisation method would help the enterprise security analyst to identify and predict possible
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Figure 3.22: ROC curve analysis of profile score methods: the area under the curve (AUC) values obtained from
user profile score method 1 (a) is slightly better than the user profile score method 2 (b). However, both methods
resulted excellent AUC values.
malicious attackers at an early stage. Also, this kind of graphical presentations would be bene-
ficial in reporting such incidences or convincing possible threats to the higher management. In
a real world implementation, organisations can build a baseline anomalous feature network us-
ing information records up to a specific date. Then the generation of daily, weekly and monthly
anomalous feature networks can be utilised for comparison with the baseline graph to identify
behavioural changes by looking at the individual number of anomalous features. With this
framework, we were able to reduce the enormous amount of user specific data correlated with
the insider threat problem into a single graph that can be easily interpreted and further analysed
by any human being.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a comprehensive insider threat detection and prediction feature
set based on user, system, and network parameters. The majority of the insider threat detection
and prediction models proposed in the literature are either application specific or scenario spe-
cific. Therefore finding a comprehensive feature set correlating with many of the insider threat
related factors was complicated. We believe that the feature set proposed in this chapter would
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(a) Users with at least 1 anomalous feature (b) Users with more than 10 anomalous features
Figure 3.23: User - anomalous feature graphs: even though there are a large number of users with at least one
anomalous feature (as in (a)) only a few number of users are identified as suspicious for more than ten features
(as in (b)). In the above graphs users are represented in dark blue, and four different colours are used to represent
features under each module (Technical - red, Behavioural - light blue, Psychological - green and organisational -
purple).
fill this gap and would be beneficial for any party interested in the insider threat problem, in
further developing theoretical models or commercial products.
The identified feature set comprised of time dependent features and time independent fea-
tures. Users’ behavioural changes were compared at three hierarchical levels: (i) global, (ii)
peer, and (iii) individual. Two sets of feature specific threshold values (the primary threshold
and the secondary threshold) were defined when analysing the time dependent features. The
secondary threshold value was used as the baseline when differentiating users as suspicious
or normal on the selected feature. Also, different selection techniques were introduced for
distinguishing malicious users from benign users in time independent parameters.
Identified features were broadly categorised into four dimensions: (i) technical, (ii) beha-
vioural, (iii) psychological, and (iv) organisational. A hybrid user profile model was proposed
to characterise users’ behaviour correlating above four broad categories as submodules. The
user profile score was introduced to represent each users’ behaviour in a numerical format
as a convenient means of interpretation. Two distinct definitions were proposed for the user
profile score. The first method was based on the total number of unusual features of an in-
dividual and the second method was based on the number of anomalous submodule features
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of a user. Finally, we demonstrated that the extracted user behaviour could be easily repres-
ented in a graphical format for improved visualisation capabilities. This type of visualisation
method would be beneficial in a real world implementation model to reduce the workload of an
enterprise security analyst.
The empirical results revealed the effectiveness of the selected feature set by achieving
good AUC values of ROC curves for both profile score methods. The minority of users with
the relatively larger number of anomalous features and the majority of users with a relatively
smaller number of anomalous features could also be considered as a better indication of the
effectiveness of the parameter selection. Consequently, this framework could be used as an
initial user behavioural analysis platform for identifying and predicting suspicious insiders.
Any commercial product based on this framework could be augmented by introducing daily,
weekly, monthly, and yearly user profile scores to identify user behavioural changes.
One of the challenges in this chapter is the selection of feature specific threshold values.
Validation of the selected threshold values with another dataset is a better solution. Unfortu-
nately there are ingrained difficulties with the validation of the selected threshold values due to
the practical issues in collecting a another insider threat dataset. .
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A Hybrid Insider Threat Detection
Framework
*Part of this chapter is published in [57].
In the previous chapter we identified the insider threat related factors that need to be con-
sidered when analysing user behaviour. This chapter focuses on formulation of an insider threat
detection model utilising the features identified in the previous chapter.
Massive investments in perimeter protection help organisations safeguard their IT infra-
structure from untrusted external attackers. However, they need to be more concerned about
the enemies within these perimeters who are the most trusted and privileged members of an
organisation. It takes only a short period of time for a trusted employee to become disgruntled
and to commit a malicious act. Therefore, the process of safeguarding information assets from
internal attackers has become much more complex than that of guarding against external at-
tackers.
Behavioural changes in workplace environments, in technical access patterns, variations in
day to day actions including email communications, web access patterns, social, and profes-
sional network usage are among the many parameters that can be used as indicators of anom-
alous behaviour as discussed in the previous chapter. While humans are the most fundamental
and frequently the weakest element in security, as they are also the trusted stakeholders of an
organisation. Pointing a finger at an innocent employee based on a false alarm can hugely af-
fect the performance of the employee. Therefore, the process of detecting malicious insiders
needs to be a very smooth but effective process. The hard truth behind insider threat is that it is
very difficult to perfectly predict that an individual will act as a malicious insider. Therefore it
is useful to isolate potential high-risk users from the rest of the workforce based on identified
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abnormal behavioural patterns. In the context of the insider threat problem the effectiveness of
the process depends on the ability to analyse the many correlated parameters as identified in
the previous chapter (chapter 3).
The complexity of the insider threat problem and the diversity of the related threat agents
have led the insider threat academic research community to look at various insider threat detec-
tion and prediction models. These prior research attempts span different dimensions including
external threat detection techniques: system call based approaches [93], file access behavioural
approaches [110], user behavioural analysis [90] [118], and psychological theories [25] [89]
[132]. Each of these approaches have different limitations and drawbacks. Here we formulate
an effective insider threat detection framework, as described in the rest of this chapter.
The major contributions in this chapter are the following;
• A hybrid insider threat detection framework based on graphical analysis and an unsuper-
vised anomaly detection algorithm is proposed.
• Use of “User Sub Graph (USG)s” for analysing users’ device usage behaviour is intro-
duced.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 describes the proposed
hybrid framework for insider threat detection. Section 4.2 describes the datasets used for this
analysis. Section 4.3 describes the adopted methodology. Section 4.4 discusses experimental
results. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter with a summary.
4.1 The Proposed Framework
As discussed in subsection 2.1.4, various insider threat detection methods are proposed in the
literature including host and network based intrusion detection systems, host-based user pro-
filing models, web environment profiling and program profiling approaches (see, for example
[60] [168] and [131]). Network observable user actions [99], use of honeypots, honeynets and
honeytokens [145] were among the other techniques explored by researchers. In addition, the
use of graph based and machine learning approaches have also been widely explored for the
purpose of insider threat detection. Researchers have also proposed a combination of these
individual methods.
The outcomes of these approaches indicate that the direct use of external threat detection
mechanisms, system call based approaches, or signature based anomaly detection techniques
all have limitations and drawbacks in the insider threat domain [168]. A limiting factor in the
direct application of intrusion detection is the high number of false positives compared to the
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true positives [42]. Applicability to specific systems or addressing only a few scenarios are
several other drawbacks in the previously proposed systems [115].
Given the above mentioned drawbacks and limitations in prior insider threat research, as
discussed in chapter 2, as well as the variety of insider threat agents and threat indicators iden-
tified in chapter 3 we propose the following three aspects as essential factors in the development
of an effective insider threat detection framework.
1. Feature extraction from heterogeneous information sources.
2. User behaviour comparison with own history and peers.
3. Use of effective unsupervised anomaly/outlier detection techniques.
In this framework we propose a graph theoretic approach for feature extraction integrated
with several other statistical feature extraction techniques. We also compare users’ behaviour
with (a) their own historical behaviour, as well as (b) their peers’ behaviour. In this context we
utilise the number of days a feature exceeds averages in (a) or (b) as introduced in the previous
chapter. Finally, we adopt the Isolation Forest algorithm [95] for unsupervised anomaly detec-
tion as per the reasons described in subsection 4.3.6. The proposed framework is based on a
combination of graphical and anomaly detection techniques, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. It has
two major components, a Graphical Processing Unit (GPU) and an Anomaly Detection Unit
(ADU).
Data from heterogeneous information sources in an enterprise network is formatted and fed
into the GPU, which generates graphs for representing interrelationships between information
assets of the network for different services. These data streams can be event logs (logon/logoff),
removable media usage logs, file copying activities (e.g., to removable media), email logs, web
access records, social network access data and HR records such as psychometric data. Several
user parameters are extracted from the generated service graphs. In addition we generate User
Sub Graphs (USGs) from each service graph for different levels of user neighbourhoods. Sev-
eral relevant subgraph properties (such as vertex count, edge count, density and diameter) are
calculated for each such subgraph for each service. This is used as a feature extraction mech-
anism for the comparison of user behaviour with the rest of the workforce. Calculated graph
and subgraph parameters are then fed into the ADU.
In parallel to the above process, various time-varying parameters are also extracted us-
ing several statistical mechanisms. Statistical feature extraction also includes comparison of a
user’s own current behaviour with their history as well as comparison with peers. In this con-
text, we have introduced the use of the Isolation Forest algorithm [95] for isolating anomalous
users from the rest of the user base. Based on the generated anomaly scores for each user,
possible malicious users are identified and these identities can be sent to the enterprise security
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Figure 4.1: The proposed insider threat detection framework: this diagram illustrates the proposed insider threat
detection framework which comprises of a Graphical Processing Unit (GPU) and an Anomaly Detection Unit
(ADU). This framework extracts insider threat related parameters from heterogeneous data sources and calculates
an anomaly score for each individual user.
analyst for further investigation and possible action. Anomaly scores for each user is generated
as the output of the ADU.
4.2 Datasets
We utilised the insider threat dataset published by CERT@CMU [144] for the experiments
conducted in this chapter. The dataset versions R5.2.tar.bz2 and R4.2.tar.bz2 were used for
this analysis. We chose the dataset versions mentioned above as they were the second and
third largest datasets from the different versions available, with a relatively large number of red
team scenarios. The dataset R4.2.tar.bz2 consists of six broad types of data records (HTTP,
logon, device, file, email and psychometric scores) of 1000 employees in 42 different work
roles spanning an 18 months period. logon.csv consists of user logon/logoff activities with
the corresponding PC with timestamps. “Logon” and “Logoff” are the two types of activities
found in the logon.csv file. “Logon” activity corresponds to either a user login event, or a
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screen unlock event, while the “Logoff” event corresponds to a user logoff event. Screen locks
are not recorded in this dataset. The third data file device.csv is a collection of data records of
removable media usage. It indicates connect/disconnect actions together with the relevant user,
PC, and timestamp. The details of file copies are stored in the file.csv file with date, user, PC,
filename, and content. The CERT dataset provides email communication records of ‘From’,
‘To’, ‘Cc’ and ‘Bcc’ fields. It also provides email size, the number of attachments and content
keywords. The HTTP.csv file contains user web access records which include the information
on the user, PC, timestamp, URL and the web content keywords. The psychometric.csv file
provides psychometric scores based on the big five personality traits or five-factor model (FFM)
for the definition of personality.
The dataset R5.2.tar.bz2 consists of seven broad types of data records (HTTP, logon, device,
file, email, decoy file and psychometric scores) of 2000 employees in 48 different work roles
spanning an 18 month period. In addition to the datatypes available in R4.2.tar.bz2, this dataset
includes several other data types as well. We selected the data record types which were available
in both datasets for this analysis. Table 4.1 summarises the number of records of each data
type in the two datasets.
Table 4.1: Summary of data records of R4.2 and R5.2 datasets: this table lists the number of data records in the
two datasets used for the experiments discussed in this chapter.
Record Type File Name Number of
Records (R4.2 )
Number of
Records (R5.2 )
User information LDAP 16,743 34,087
logon/logoff logon.csv 854,859 1,810,070
USB connect/disconnect device.csv 405,380 836,984
File copying activities file.csv 445,581 887,621
Email email.csv 2,629,979 17,361,575
Web access http.csv 28,434,423 58,960,449
psychometric scores psychometric.csv 1,000 2000
4.3 Methodology
The goal of this chapter is to introduce a framework for mitigating the insider threat problem
using a combination of a graph-based approach and an unsupervised anomaly detection tech-
nique. This framework utilises multidimensional inputs such as user interactions with hardware
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assets, usage of removable media, file copying activities for removable media, web access re-
cords, email correspondences and psychometric figures. The graph-based approach is a prom-
inent method for identifying inter-relationships between multidimensional entities. A user’s
interactions with devices for each service are represented by a weighted, undirected large scale
bipartite graph Gi = (U i, V i, Ei,W i). In this notation, the graph Gi represents the user -
device relationship graph for the ith service, with U i = {ui1, · · · } the set of vertices represent-
ing the users, V i = {vi1, · · · } the set of vertices representing devices, Ei = {ei1, · · · } the set
of edges representing a user’s interaction with a device, and W i = {wi1, · · · } the set of edge
weights of graph Gi. The edge weights correspond to the number of activities of the selected
service during the entire time duration covered by the dataset between an individual user and a
device. Graph visualization was carried out using NodeXL [141] and all the other calculations
were performed using the R statistical computing language [126]. The subsections that follow
describe the theoretical background and the implemented methodology in detail.
Using this approach we generated user-device relationship graphs for logoff activities G1,
removable media usage activities G2, file copying activities using removable media G3, email
correspondences G4 and web access activities G5. Even though the dataset comprises of both
“logon” and “logoff” records for individual users, we utilized only the “logoff” events for net-
work mapping in G1. The reason behind this is that we cannot distinguish logon activities from
screen unlocks as both activities were recorded as “logon” events. However, the screen locks
were not recorded, and only the logoff events were recorded as “logoff” events. Generation of
G2, which corresponds to removable media usage, was based on the “Connect” activities of the
data file. Again, we did not use the “Disconnect” activities as there can be missing disconnect
activities which correspond to removable media ejects after device shutdown. For the other
three services (file copying, email, and web access) all records were utilised in generating the
user-device relationship graphs. Similar set of graphs was used for assessing the users’ multiple
device usage parameter as discussed in the previous chapter (subsection 3.3.5). However, in
this chapter we extended the mechanism used for analysing users’ device utilisation behaviour
by introducing graph and subgraph parameter extraction as discussed in subsections 4.3.1 and
4.3.2.
Instead of using individual graphs for different services, we could have used the option
of representing user-device relationships for all the services in a single graph. However, this
would convert the graph into a multigraph where the existence of multiple edges is possible
among two vertices. To keep the first phase of the analysis simple, we stick to the generation
of individual graphs for different services. The graph/subgraph attributes describe in the next
two subsections are captured from the above graphs G = {G1, G2, G3, G4, G5} for individual
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users for further analysis.
4.3.1 Graph Parameters
In the context of this analysis, we are interested in the behaviour of users. Therefore we used
the node degree as an important graph parameter for characterizing users.
• Degree (duj(Gi)): The degree of a vertex uj in graphGi is the number of edges connected
to it. Thus this value represents the number of devices accessed by an individual user
while using each service.
4.3.2 User Subgraph (USG) Parameters
At the next step of the analysis, the focus is on the construction of subgraphs for each user j for
each service i. The use of subgraphs enables deeper analysis of graph vertices. The generation
of subgraphs up to different order neighbourhoods can be used to identify interrelationships
between vertices which cannot be extracted by using only the basic graph or the original graph.
User subgraphs were constructed until the vertex count of all subgraphs are saturated. We define
the user subgraph (USG) for kth neighbourhood Nk of jth user (uj) and for the ith service as a
weighted undirected graph Gi
Nk(u
i
j)
= (U i
Nk(u
i
j)
, V i
Nk(v
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j)
, Ei
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i
j)
,W i
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where U i
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is the set of users who are in the kth neighbourhood of uj with regards to the ith service, and
V i
Nk(v
i
j)
represents the set of devices that the users in U i
Nk(u
i
j)
connect to. Ei
Nk(u
i
j)
represents
the set of edges of Gi
Nk(u
i
j)
. The set of The edge weights of each subgraph are represented by
W i
Nk(u
i
j)
. The disjoint nature of the two types of vertices of the service graphs in bipartite format
means that all the first order neighbourhood subgraphs to have a star topology. By increasing
the order of the neighbourhood we expect to have more complex subgraphs than the first order
of subgraphs.
The following set of attributes were extracted from all the user subgraphs generated for 5
different services.
• Vertex count | U i
Nk(u
i
j)
| of the kth order neighbourhood of the jth user of the ith service
• Edge count | Ei
Nk(u
i
j)
| of the kth order neighbourhood of the jth user of the ith service
• Density ρ(uij)GiNk(uij) of the k
th order neighbourhood of the jth user of the ith service
The density of a graph is the ratio of edges to all possible edges given the number of vertices.
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• Diameter dia((uij)GiNk(uij) of the k
th order neighbourhood of the jth user of the ith service
The diameter of a graph is the largest shortest path between any two vertices.
The distributions of the above quantities are illustrated as histograms and further discussed
in the experimental results section (section 4.4) of this chapter. A summary of selected
graph/subgraph parameters can be found in table 4.2. At this stage the graph and subgraph
attribute extraction only considers static graphs and has not yet been developed for dynamic
graphs. Therefore in order to incorporate the temporal properties of user behaviour with re-
spect to the different parameters we introduced the dynamic feature extraction techniques in
the next subsection.
Table 4.2: The list of graph and subgraph parameters: identified graph and subgraph parameters for analysing
users’ device usage behaviour are summarised here.
Index Parameter
Graph Parameters
1 Degree of a vertex
Subgraph Parameters
2 Vertex Count
3 Edge Count
4 Density
5 Diameter
4.3.3 Dynamic Feature Extraction
Basic statistical properties such as the minimum, mean, maximum and mode value of each
time dependent parameter were calculated. These values support the identification of users’
normal behaviour. In order to capture deviations from a user’s own behaviour, we calculated
the number of days the parameter exceeded the average parameter value. Deviations from peers
were calculated by the number of days the parameter exceeded the peer average of the para-
meter value. All the extracted time dependent parameters were directly fed into the anomaly
detection unit. The following subsections describe identified time dependent parameters in the
context of the insider threat problem for this analysis.
Individual logon/logoff events
The set of parameters identified based on logon/logoff events can be used for identifying users
with abnormal logon/logoff activities, as most disgruntled insiders tend to commit malicious
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activities after business hours [29]. Identifying the users’ baseline behaviour on system/device
access is an essential part of addressing the malicious insider threat detection problem. For each
user, four parameters (minimum, maximum, mean and mode) for logon and logoff values were
calculated. Those four parameters were also fed as input parameters to the anomaly detection
unit.
In addition to above attributes, we propose the analysis of logon/logoff behaviour by con-
sidering the business hours and after hours separately. Therefore we separated the logon/logoff
records into two main categories: (i) business hour (BH) activities and (ii) after hour (AH)
activities. Considering the flexible working hour arrangements possible in most real world en-
vironments, we selected business hours as the time between 07:00 to 19:00 while the rest of the
day is considered as after hours.
To extract the deviations in logon/logoff activities we calculated the number of days an
individual exceeds their own average considering the (a) entire day; (b) business hours; and (c)
after hours logon and logoff activities. Similarly, deviations from the peers were calculated by
calculating the number of days an individual exceeds the peer average logon/logoff statistics.
Table 4.3 lists all the parameters identified for logon/logoff behaviour analysis.
Removable media usage events
Removable media is among the most popular means used in theft of Intellectual Property (IP)
and in extracting confidential information from organizations [29]. Tracking the use of remov-
able media can be an excellent information source for identifying suspicious events by trusted
insiders. Baseline behaviour of removable media usage was captured by the minimum, max-
imum, mean and mode time of “Connect” and “Disconnect” activities as in the logon/logoff
event analysis. This also includes the parameter extraction for entire day, business hour, as well
as after hour activities.
In addition we believe that the analysis of the daily number of connect/disconnect activ-
ities is an important parameter when identifying sudden behavioural changes. Based on the
above, we calculated daily number of connects/disconnects for entire day, within business hour
operations and for after hour operations using four statistical measures.
Similar to the analysis of logon/logoff activities, the individual behavioural changes in re-
movable media usage was extracted by calculating number of days exceeding the average value
of the relevant parameter. Deviations from the peers were extracted by calculating the number
of days exceeding the corresponding peer average value. Table 4.4 lists all the parameters
identified for removable media usage behaviour analysis.
We believe that the time gap between consecutive connect and disconnect activities can be
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Table 4.3: The list of logon/logoff parameters: this table lists the identified parameters for logon/logoff behaviour
analysis.
Index Parameter
1 Logon time - all day (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
2 Logon time - BH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
3 Logon time - AH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
4 Logoff time - all day (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
5 Logoff time - BH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
6 Logoff time - AH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
7 Daily number of logon activities - all day (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
8 Daily number of logon activities - BH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
9 Daily number of logon activities - AH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
10 Daily number of logoff activities - all day (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
11 Daily number of logoff activities - BH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
12 Daily number of logoff activities - AH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
13 Number of days an individual exceeded their own average - logon activities - all day
14 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - logon activities - BH
15 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - logon activities - AH
16 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - logoff activities - all day
17 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - logoff activities - BH
18 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - logoff activities - AH
19 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - logon activities - all day
20 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - logon activities - BH
21 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - logon activities - AH
22 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - logoff activities - all day
23 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - logoff activities - BH
24 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - logoff activities - AH
treated as a critical information for capturing large volume of data ex-filtration. Due to missing
“Disconnect” activities we did not consider this parameter in this analysis. However, in a real
world environment, calculation of such a parameter would be beneficial.
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Table 4.4: The list of removable media usage parameters: this table summarises the identified parameters for
removable media usage behaviour analysis.
Index Parameter
1 Removable media connect time - all day (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
2 Removable media connect time - BH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
3 Removable media connect time - AH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
4 Removable media disconnect time - all day (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
5 Removable media disconnect time - BH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
6 Removable media disconnect time - AH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
7 Daily number of connect activities - all day (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
8 Daily number of connect activities - BH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
9 Daily number of connect activities - AH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
10 Daily number of disconnect activities - all day (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
11 Daily number of disconnect activities - BH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
12 Daily number of disconnect activities - AH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
13 Number of days an individual exceeded their own average - connect activities - all
day
14 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - connect activities - BH
15 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - connect activities - AH
16 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - disconnect activities - all
day
17 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - disconnect activities - BH
18 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - disconnect activities - AH
19 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - connect activities - all day
20 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - connect activities - BH
21 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - connect activities - AH
22 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - disconnect activities - all
day
23 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - disconnect activities - BH
24 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - disconnect activities - AH
File Copying Activities
Thousands of documents containing classified information has ended up in whistleblowers’
hands during the last couple of years due to high profile malicious insider attacks such as
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dataleaks by Edward Snowden [18] [65] [142]. Malicious insiders who are involved in such
data leaks need to use a quick and easy way of downloading or copying such a large amount
of business critical information. Therefore, the analysis of file copying activities could reveal
suspicious insiders or increase the chances of successful detection of malicious insiders.
Since the dataset provides only the file copying activities carried out using removable me-
dia, we used that information for our analysis. But this could be extended to other types of file
copying activities such as remote file downloads, file uploads to public storage systems (e.g.,
Dropbox, OneDrive, etc). Here, given data constraints we analysed file copying time and the
daily number of file copying activities as the two major parameters. Both of these parameters
were evaluated considering the entire day, business hours as well as after hour operations. Once
again four statistical values (minimum, mean, maximum and mode) were calculated for each
of these parameters. Behavioural changes from a user’s own history as well as from peers were
also been evaluated for file copying activities. This was carried out by calculating the number
of days exceeding the individual and peer average values for the number of copied files. A
summarised list of parameters related to file copying activities can be found in table 4.5.
Email Communications
Email is one of the major communication protocols used by all organisations worldwide. Some
organisations impose strict security policies on email communications via enterprise email ad-
dress, but others do not. In addition, different organisations adopt different security controls on
the usage of private emails communicated via enterprise network. Irrespective of the controls
imposed by organisations many users tend to use both private and business emails for commu-
nication. Therefore the analysis of email communication via enterprise network resources can
be treated as another important source of information when analysing individual user behaviour.
This led us to come up with several email related parameters that are listed in Table 4.6.
Basically we analyse the number of recipients in different fields (‘To’, ‘Cc’ and ‘Bcc’) of an
email sent by an individual. Two of the other important factors we considered in this analysis
were email size and the number of attachments. We also calculated the daily number of emails
sent by an individual. This factor is evaluated based on the email communications during the
entire day, within business hours and after business hours. Minimum, maximum, mean and
mode statistical parameters are calculated for each of the above described parameters. As in
the other feature categories, email features were also evaluated based on individual and peer
comparisons. While content analysis of email body, subject and attachments can also reveal a
user’s disgruntled behaviour, the email content analysis is not included in our framework and
is outside the scope of this thesis.
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Table 4.5: The list of parameters - file copying activities: this table summarises the identified parameters for file
copying activity analysis.
Index Parameter
1 File copying time - all day (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
2 File copying time - BH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
3 File copying time - AH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
4 Daily number of copied files - all day (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
5 Daily number of copied files - BH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
6 Daily number of copied files - AH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
7 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - number of copied files - all
day
8 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - number of copied files -
BH
9 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - number of copied files -
AH
10 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - number of copied files - all
day
11 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - number of copied files -
BH
12 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average - number of copied files -
AH
Web Access Patterns
We can think of users’ online behaviour as a reflection of their offline behaviour, as they tend
to publish their feelings, thoughts, likes and dislikes through social media [8]. In addition, web
access patterns form a good indication of their online behaviour [4] [109]. Disgruntled insiders
tend to access competitors’ websites and recruitment agency websites to gather information on
potential opportunities. We postulated that the users’ online behaviour analysis will be compre-
hensive if we include multiple social media data sources and web access records. However due
to the limitations of data availability on these different domains, we will restrict this analysis to
web access records.
We identified the daily number of URLs accessed by an individual as one of the important
parameters in characterizing web access behaviour. Therefore we calculated the minimum,
maximum, mean and mode values of daily number of URLs for each user. This factor is
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Table 4.6: The list of parameters - email communications analysis: this table summarises the identified parameters
for email communication activity analysis.
Index Parameter
1 Number of recipients in TO field (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
2 Number of recipients in CC field (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
3 Number of recipients in BCC field (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
4 Number of attachments (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
5 Email size (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
6 Daily number of emails sent (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
7 Daily number of emails sent - BH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
8 Daily number of emails sent - AH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
9 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average (TO count)
10 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average (CC count)
11 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average (BCC count)
12 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average (No.of attachments)
13 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average (No.of emails sent)
14 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average (No.of emails sent - BH)
15 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average (No.of emails sent - AH)
16 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average (TO count)
17 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average (CC count)
18 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average (BCC count)
19 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average (No.of attachments)
20 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average (No.of emails sent)
21 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average (No.of emails sent - BH)
22 Number of days an individual exceeds their peer average (No.of emails sent - AH)
evaluated based on the access patterns throughout the day, within business hour operations
and within after hour operations. Deviations from the individual behaviour were analysed
by calculating the number of days the parameter exceeded the individual average. Also, we
believe that the content of web pages may have a direct link with a user’s suspicious behaviour.
However, we do not consider content analysis of web pages within the scope of this thesis.
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Table 4.7: The list of parameters - web access behaviour analysis: this table summarises the identified parameters
for web access behaviour analysis.
Index Parameter
1 Daily number of URLs (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
2 Daily number of URLs - BH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
3 Daily number of URLs - AH (Minimum/Maximum,Mean,Mode)
4 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - daily number of URLs -
all day
5 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - daily number of URLs -
BH
6 Number of days an individual exceeds their own average - daily number of URLs -
AH
4.3.4 Personality Parameters
Psychological behaviour is a non-technical aspect linked to insider attacks [67] [116] [129].
Sudden behavioural changes can be indications of misuse of privileges. Verbal behaviour,
personality traits, unauthorized absences and aggressive behaviour are a few indicators that can
be considered as small markers which come before the big attack. Though there are a large
number of precursors which can be used to identify malevolent behaviour, in this analysis we
used the psychometric data provided in the dataset. The psychometric data provided is based
on the five factor model or the big five personality traits [164].
Table 4.8: The list of parameters - psychological behaviour: this table lists the personality parameters used for
analysing users’ psychological behaviour.
Index Parameter
1 O (Openness to experience)
2 C (Conscientiousness)
3 E (Extroversion)
4 A (Agreeableness)
5 N (Neuroticism)
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4.3.5 Organisational Parameters
We have utilised the role, functional unit, department and the team parameters of an individual
to represent their organisational position. All these categorical values are mapped to integers
when feeding into the anomaly detection unit. In addition we have generated the supervisor-
subordinate relationship graph and the following two graph parameters have been calculated
for each user.
• Vertex degree
• Betweenness centrality - this attribute measures the extent to which a vertex lies on paths
between other vertices.
Table 4.9: The list of parameters - psychological behaviour: this table lists the personality parameters used for
analysing users’ organisational behaviour.
Index Parameter
1 Role
2 Functional unit
3 Department
4 Team
Supervisor - Subordinate Graph
5 Vertex degree
6 Betweenness centrality
Table 4.11 is a summary of all the properties we identified in this analysis. All of these
parameters are fed as input parameters in to the anomaly detection unit. We propose the use of
Isolation Forest algorithm as the anomaly detection algorithm within the ADU in this frame-
work.
4.3.6 Anomaly Detection
The hard truth behind the insider threat problem is that it can never be eliminated. The best
method of facing this hard truth is the proactive identification of possible high risk users and ob-
serving them closely. Considering the complexity of this unique security problem, the first step
in a successful threat mitigation framework should focus on the identification of possible mali-
cious insiders who are maximally deviating from peers as well as their own normal behaviour.
To capture such deviations we have extracted various insider threat parameters from heterogen-
eous information sources. We need to isolate outliers who can be treated as suspicious users
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Table 4.10: Summary of parameters under each input category: this table summarises the total number of basic
parameters (sub parameters not counted) identified under the each input category of the proposed insider threat
detection framework.
Property Number of Input Parameters
Graph/Subgraph properties 5 (see table 4.2)
Logon/Logoff behaviour 24 (see table 4.3)
Removable media usage 24 (see table 4.4)
File copying activities 12 (see table 4.5)
Email communications 22 (see table 4.6)
Web access 6 (see table 4.7)
Personality traits 5 (see table 4.8)
Organisational parameters 6 (see table 4.9)
from the majority of normal or benign users using the extracted information. Therefore, as the
second stage of our framework, we focus on implementing an unsupervised anomaly detection
algorithm utilizing all the parameters extracted from the previous stage of the proposed frame-
work. The anomaly detection algorithm adopted in this analysis is the state of the art Isolation
Forest algorithm, which stands out in effectively separating anomalous events from the rest of
the event instances [94]. Several other insider threat related research, e.g., Gavai et al. [59] and
Goldberg et al. [64] have also used Isolation Forest algorithm in their models. The following
is a brief description of the Isolation Forest algorithm.
Isolation Forest Algorithm - iForest : The Isolation Forest algorithm is a model-based
approach which explicitly isolates anomalies without constructing a typical profile instance.
Its linear time complexity and low memory requirements led us to use it in our experiments
due to the enormous amount of information that needs to be analysed in the field of insider
threat. Since this algorithm does not use any distance or density measures to detect anomalies
it also reduces the computational complexity. This method generates an ensemble of iTrees for
a given dataset and the instances with the short average path lengths on iTrees are considered
to be anomalies. If the calculated anomaly score value, s is very close to 1 it can be regarded
as a definite anomaly. Instances with s much smaller than 0.5 can be considered normal situ-
ations. If all the instances return s ≈ 0.5, then the entire sample is deemed to not have any
distinct anomalies. Another advantage of this algorithm is its ability to scale up to handle high
dimensional big data sets with a large number of uncorrelated attributes. This algorithm also
performs well in situations where the training dataset does not contain any anomalies. This
feature is also an added advantage when implementing it in insider threat detection models.
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4.4 Experimental Results
This section is dedicated to a comprehensive discussion of the results obtained through our
analysis. Experiments were conducted using both datasets (R4.2.tar.bz2 and R5.2.tar.bz2 ) de-
scribed in section 4.2. The evaluation of the model is performed using both datasets, and the
results are discussed in the latter part of this section. The terms R4.2 and R5.2 are used to
refer to the datasets R4.2.tar.bz2 and R5.2.tar.bz2 respectively throughout this chapter from
this point.
4.4.1 Graph Parameters
We used the graphical representation of information assets as it enables us to precisely indicate
interrelationships between different information assets, as well as being an efficient means of
extracting basic essential parameters of massively dense log data. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 repres-
ent user - device interrelationship graphs generated for different services from both datasets.
We use the notation G = {G1, G2, G3, G4, G5} to represent service graphs generated from
R4.2 dataset and H = {H1, H2, H3, H4, H5} to represent service graphs generated from the
R5.2 dataset. In all of these graphs users are represented by pink spheres while devices are
represented by blue triangles. The vertex size is proportional to the degree of the vertex, which
is an indication of the number of devices accessed by a particular user. The width of the edges
is proportional to the number of events (logoff events, removable media disconnection, file
copying activities, email communication activities and web access), which occurred during the
entire period of the dataset. The dense graphs illustrated in figures 4.2(a) - (c) and 4.3(a) -
(d) were obtained after executing a community detection algorithm [32] for easy visualization.
The intergroup edges are combined and represented by a relatively wider single link.
Figures 4.2(a) and 4.3(a) are an illustration of users’ device access networks based on lo-
goff activities of both datasets. Figures 4.2(b), 4.3(b) and figures 4.2(c), 4.3(c) illustrate user-
device interrelationship graphs for removable media usage activities and file copying activities
respectively. From these representations, frequently accessed devices can be easily identified
by the relatively wider edges (not the intergroup edges) between the corresponding user and the
device. These wider edges of the graphs corresponding to logoff activities (figures 4.2(a) and
4.3(a)) can be interpreted as logoff events on a user’s assigned or default device. The thinner
edges or activities corresponding to less frequent logoff events could be interpreted as activit-
ies of interest. Another important observation is that the majority of edges in the removable
media activity graphs (figure 4.2(b) and 4.3(b)) and file copying activity graphs (figure 4.2(c)
and 4.3(c)) have smaller weights (thinner edges) with only the minority of edges having larger
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(a) Logoff activities (G1) (b) Removable media activities (G2) (c) File copying activities (G3)
(d) Email communications (G4) (e) Web access (G5)
Figure 4.2: User - device relationship graphs for R4.2 dataset; above (a), (b), and (c) illustrate user - device relationship graphs for logoff activities, removable media
usage activities and file copying activities respectively. Users are represented by pink spheres while the devices are represented by blue triangles. Graphs (a), (b), and
(c) are illustrated after clustering with the CNM algorithm [32], with the intergroup edges hidden to reduce the complexity. These dense graphs (a),(b) and (c) are due
to the multiple device usages by several users. However graphs illustrated by (d) and (e) that are corresponding to email communications and web access clearly show
that each user accesses only a single device.
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(a) Logoff activities (H1) (b) Removable media activities (H2) (c) File copying activities (H3)
(d) Email communications (H4) (e) Web access (H5)
Figure 4.3: User - device relationship graphs for R5.2 dataset; above (a), (b), (c), and (d) illustrate user - device relationship graphs for logoff activities, removable
media usage activities and file copying activities respectively. Users are represented by pink spheres while the devices are represented by blue triangles. Graphs (a),
(b), (c), and (d) are illustrated after clustering with the CNM algorithm [32], with the intergroup edges hidden to reduce the complexity. These dense graphs (a),(b),(c),
and (d) are due to the multiple device usages by several users. However the graph illustrated by (e) that is corresponding to web access clearly indicates that each user
accesses only a single device.
118
4.4. Experimental Results
weights (wider edges). This behaviour can be due to the assigned work roles and responsib-
ilities. Employees such as IT admin (in the analysed datasets) have access to all the devices
in the enterprise network. They may need to use removable media and file copying activities
to provide different types of assistance to other employees. But someone could misuse this
privilege to commit a malicious activity. Therefore, the edges with relatively small weights
representing infrequent activities need more attention. The low total vertex count of the graphs
G2, H2, G3, and H3 compared to the graphs corresponding to logoff events (G1 and H1) were
due to the involvement of the minority of the userbase in removable media and file copying
activities.
We observed much denser graphs for logoff events, removable media usage and file copy-
ing activities (figures 4.2(a) - (c)) than the user - device graphs corresponding to email (fig-
ure 4.2(d)) and web services (figure 4.2(e)) of the R4.2 dataset. For this particular dataset none
of the users utilized multiple devices for accessing email and web services. This is the main
reason behind the simplicity (one to one mapping) of the user - device graphs corresponding to
email and web services. In an operational environment this can be different as some users may
be given access to a device pool rather than a dedicated device. In contrast to the user - device
graph obtained with the R4.2 dataset, a much denser graph was obtained for email communic-
ations from the R5.2 dataset analysis. This behaviour could be due to several reasons such as
utilisation of a device from a device pool, the use of another user’s device as a work require-
ment or the use of another user’s device in a malicious intent. Similar to the R4.2 dataset, none
of the users utilised multiple devices for web access (figure 4.3(e)).
To numerically capture the number of devices utilised by a user, the degrees of the vertices
corresponding to users were calculated. The degree distributions of graphs corresponding to
logoff activities, removable media usage activities, and file copying activities of the R4.2 data-
set were illustrated as histograms in figure 3.9 in the previous chapter. The degree of a vertex
that represents a user is the number of devices utilised for each service by that particular user.
It was observed that the majority of users have a lower degree while the minority of users have
a higher degree for all three services. Users corresponding to shorter bins of the histograms in
the tails of the distributions could be a result of work requirements, while there is no guarantee
that any of these users were behaving normally. However, to closely analyse the distribution of
users corresponding to low degree values, figure 4.4 illustrates the degree distribution from 0 to
20 for logoff activities, removable media usage activities, and file copying activities. Since all
the users of R4.2 dataset utilised only a single device for email communication and web access
the degree distribution analyses relevant to these two services are meaningless.
The observations show that the majority of users (680 of 1000) utilised only a single device
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for logoff activities. Among the minority of users who were involved in removable media activ-
ities and file copying activities (265 and 264 respectively) the most common number of devices
used by each user is one. From the 265 users who performed removable media activities, only
16 users utilised multiple devices. Ten users used multiple devices from the 264 users who
performed file copying activities. However, from the users who utilised multiple devices there
were a few users who used only a small number of devices (e.g.; 2 or 3) for logoff activities,
removable media activities and file copying activities that could be suspicious.
From the degree distribution analysis of the service graphs of the R5.2 dataset it was also
observed that the majority of users (1379 of 2000) utilised only a single device for logoff activ-
ities, while the minority of users (621 of 2000) utilised multiple devices. From the 447 users
who used removable media, only 28 users utilised multiple devices. Only 58 users utilised mul-
tiple devices from the total of 473 users who performed file copying activities. The majority of
users (1970) utilised only a single device for email communications while the minority of users
(30) utilised multiple devices for email communications. Similar to the R4.2 dataset analysis,
none of the users of the R5.2 dataset utilised multiple devices for web access. With the above
figures, we believe the majority of users behave similarly regarding the number of devices used
for accessing different services.
4.4.2 Subgraph Parameters
As described in subsection 4.3.2, user subgraphs of different neighbourhoods were gener-
ated from each service graph. The maximum order of neighbourhoods for the generation of
subgraphs is determined by the saturation level of the subgraph vertex count. Based on this
assumption we observed saturation limits of order 5, 6, and 6 neighbourhoods for logoff, re-
movable media usage and file copying networks respectively for the R4.2 dataset. Since users
utilised only a single device for the email and web services, user subgraph generation for those
two services are meaningless. All the subgraphs generated from such networks would be very
simple connected two node networks. Consequently no subgraph parameters were extracted
from email (figure 4.2(d)) and web service (figure 4.2(e)) graphs.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the histograms of selected subgraph properties for the different order
of neighbourhoods based on the logoff activity graph (G1). Figure 4.5(a) illustrates the his-
togram of vertex count for the different order of neighbourhoods for user subgraphs. These
histograms show that the majority of users have a small number of vertices in their lower order
subgraphs while the minority of users have a larger number of vertices in their subgraphs, res-
ulting in more complex user subgraphs. When the order of neighbourhood increases, the size of
the subgraphs also increases and reaches the vertex count of the original graph. Figure 4.5(b) is
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(a) Logoff activities
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(b) Removable media usage activities
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(c) File copying activities
Figure 4.4: The distribution of the number of users for the degree between 0 to 20; the above graphs corresponding
to the number of devices utilised up to 20 devices by users for (a) logoff activities, (b) removable media usage
activities, and (c) file copying activities. The majority of users have utilised a single device for all the above three
activities. However, there are a few users who have utilised a fewer number of devices.
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Figure 4.5: Histograms of subgraph properties for logoff activities - R4.2 dataset: each histogram illustrates the distribution of the corresponding subgraph attribute.
Histogram bins correspond to the number of users. Sets of users correspond to tall histogram bins exhibit a similar behaviour while the minority of users correspond to
short histogram bins deviate from the common behaviour.
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an illustration of the distribution of edge counts across the different order of neighbourhoods.
These values also follow a distribution which is very similar to vertex count. The subgraph
density and the diameter for all USGs are shown in figure 4.5(c) and figure 4.5(d) respectively.
With the increase of the order of neighbourhood, subgraph densities also get closer to each
other. Due to the memory allocation limitations, we could not calculate subgraph diameters for
the higher order neighbourhoods. Histograms corresponding to subgraph diameter reveals the
commonality in the majority of users while the minority of users have different subgraph dia-
meter values. Based on these observations we believe that subgraph parameter extraction from
higher order (> 3 in this case) neighbourhoods would not be essential to identify differences
among users.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate the histograms of subgraph properties extracted from the
removable media usage activity graph (G2) and the file copying activity graph (G3). Since
not all the users utilised removable media and/or were involved in file copying activities the
total number of users corresponding to these histograms are less than the total userbase. It
was observed that a minority of users behave differently from the majority of users in terms of
subgraph vertex count. Shorter histogram bins of figures 4.6(a) and 4.7(a) could correspond
to the users who were deviating from the normal behaviour. Histograms corresponding to
the subgraph density (figures 4.6(c) and 4.7(c)) also showed two major groups of users for
subraphs generated from many of the neighbourhoods. The subgraph diameter was calculated
only until the 3rd order of neighbourhood due to the memory allocation limitations, as in the
case of logoff activity analysis. Shorter histogram bins of figures 4.6(d) and 4.7(d) could
correspond to users who were deviating from the rest of the user base. From these two sets of
histograms, we observed that the parameter extraction from higher order neighbourhoods (> 4
for these two cases) would not be essential for analysing behavioural changes.
Similar to the R4.2 dataset analysis user subgraph properties were extracted from all ser-
vice graphs (H1 to H4) except from the web access service graph (H5). Based on the subgraph
property distributions illustrated in figure 4.8 we observed that one or two major groups of
users (tall histogram bins) exhibit similar behavioural patterns. The short histogram bins could
be due to deviations from the normal behaviour and possibly need more attention. Similar to
the R4.2 dataset analysis we believe subgraph parameter extraction from higher order neigh-
bourhoods (near saturation limit) would not reveal much information on behavioural changes.
The subgraph property histograms of removable media activities and file copying activities are
illustrated in figures 4.9 and 4.10 respectively. Once again one or two major groups (cor-
responding to tall histogram bins) and several other minor groups are visible for many of the
selected parameters.
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Figure 4.6: Histograms of subgraph properties for removable media activities - R4.2 dataset: each histogram illustrates the distribution of the corresponding subgraph
attribute. Histogram bins correspond to the number of users.
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Figure 4.7: Histograms of subgraph properties for file copying activities - R4.2 dataset: each histogram illustrates the distribution of the corresponding subgraph
attribute. Histogram bins correspond to the number of users.
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Figure 4.8: Histograms of subgraph properties for logoff activities - R5.2 dataset: each histogram illustrates the distribution of the corresponding subgraph attribute.
Histogram bins correspond to the number of users.
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Figure 4.9: Histograms of subgraph properties for removable media activities - R5.2 dataset: each histogram illustrates the distribution of the corresponding subgraph
attribute. Histogram bins correspond to the number of users.
127
C
hapter4.
A
H
ybrid
InsiderT
hreatD
etection
Fram
ew
ork
Order 1
Vertex Count
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 600
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 2
Vertex Count
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 1000
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 3
Vertex Count
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 1500
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 4
Vertex Count
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 1500
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 5
Vertex Count
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 1500
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 6
Vertex Count
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 1500
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
(a) Vertex count
Order 1
Edge Count
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 400
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 2
Edge Count
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 2000
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 3
Edge Count
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 6000
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 4
Edge Count
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 6000
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 5
Edge Count
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 6000
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 6
Edge Count
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 6000
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
(b) Edge count
Order 1
Density
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0.0 0.6
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 2
Density
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0.0 0.6
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 3
Density
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0.0 0.6
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 4
Density
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0.0 0.6
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 5
Density
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0.0 0.6
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 6
Density
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0.0 0.6
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
(c) Density
Order 1
Diameter
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 2000 6000 10000
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
Order 2
Diameter
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 5000 15000
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
5
0
0
(d) Diameter
Figure 4.10: Histograms of subgraph properties for file copying activities - R5.2 dataset; each histogram illustrates the distribution of the corresponding subgraph
attribute. Histogram bins correspond to the number of users.
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Figure 4.11: Histograms of subgraph properties for email communications - R5.2 dataset; each histogram illustrates the distribution of the corresponding subgraph
attribute. Histogram bins correspond to the number of users.
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Chapter 4. A Hybrid Insider Threat Detection Framework
In contrast to the R4.2 dataset analysis, subgraph properties were extracted from the email
service graph (H4) as some of the users utilised multiple devices for email communications.
However, the vertex count of the user subgraphs generated from the sparse graph H4 was not
saturated at a lower order neighbourhood as in the other cases. Since all the users utilised
only a single device for web access, subgraph parameter extraction was not performed, as no
additional information can be captured.
To maintain the consistency of the selected order of the neighbourhood of different ser-
vices, we chose parameters extracted from 1st, 2nd and 3rd order neighbourhoods for anomaly
detection.
4.4.3 Dynamic Feature Extraction
This subsection discusses the results obtained for other time-varying properties, which were
identified as significant parameters for the insider threat problem in section 3.2.
Individual Logon/Logoff Behaviour
Figure 4.12 is an illustration of users’ logon behaviour considering the logon records for the
entire period of the dataset. Three different graphs are used to depict the daily, business hours
(BH) and after hours (AH) logon behaviour. Four statistical parameters (mean, minimum,
maximum and mode) are shown in four different colours in each graph.
By looking at the figure 4.12, we observed that the most frequent logon time (mode) for all
the users are within the 07:00 to 09:00 window. Average logon time varies around a wider time
window. Minimum logon events which occur during early office hours can be interpreted as the
first logon event of the day. There are some other logon events, especially when we consider the
maximum logon events that occur during regular working hours, which can be treated as logins
followed by screen locks during the day. The logon times that we need to pay more attention to
are the events that happen after normal business hours. A few users were identified as having
minimum and maximum logon events which occurred during late night, something that might
be unusual for normal operations. This factor can be identified from the figure 4.12(c) which
illustrates the after hours logon behaviour. It was observed that not all the employees exhibit
after hours logon activities. From the set of users who have after hours logon events, a portion
of users may be logged on to perform their assigned job functions. The suspicious behaviour
would correspond to the logon events for employees who do not have assigned after hours job
functions. In real world enterprise networks, we can expect system user logon activities during
this type of unusual time periods for scheduled jobs such as backups, log rotations and routine
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Figure 4.12: (a) Users’ logon behaviour of the entire day with the R4.2 dataset: the minimum, average, maximum, and mode values of logon activities during the
entire day for each user is illustrated. UserIDs are not indicated in the x-axis to avoid congestion in x-axis labels. The majority of the logon activities were happened
during 07:00 to 09:00 window. Distributions of logon activities during business hours and after hours are illustrated in the next two figures.
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Figure 4.12: (b) Users’ logon behaviour during business hours (BH) with the R4.2 dataset: the majority of the logon activities are happened during 07:00 to 09:00
window.
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Figure 4.12: (c) Users’ logon behaviour during after hours with the R4.2 dataset: while not all the users had after hours logon activities, users with frequent logon
activities (mode values) around midnight could be suspicious.
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activities. However, observations of such logon activities for non-system users (i.e., human
users) needs further investigation to differentiate between a genuine and a suspicious activity.
One of the other critical parameters of insider threat detection, the “logoff” behaviour of
users is illustrated in Figure 4.13. These graphs also illustrate the mean, mode, minimum and
maximum logoff times of each user for the entire period. As can be seen in the graphs, the
majority of logoff events happen during late office hours. As in the case of logon behaviour
we are concerned about after hours logoff events which are abnormal compared to the majority
events during regular business hours. Again, as shown in figure 4.13(c) not all the employees
exhibit after hours logoff events.
Similar to the R4.2 dataset analysis users’ logon and logoff behaviour of R5.2 dataset were
analysed considering the entire day, within business hours activities and after business hours
activities (figures 4.14 and 4.15). We observed much similar behaviour to that of R4.2 dataset.
It was also observed only the minority of users exhibit after hours logon and logoff events which
could be suspicious or work related.
Removable media usage
Figure 4.16 is an illustration of users’ removable media usage statistics. Similar to the lo-
gon/logoff analysis, time dependencies of removable media usage was investigated. Figure 4.16
and figure 4.17 show the maximum, minimum, mean and mode value of removable media con-
nect and disconnect events respectively. Different graphs are used to illustrate the removable
media activities during entire day, within business hours and after business hours. One import-
ant factor brought out by this analysis is that only about 25% of employees exhibit removable
media usage. Average values and most frequent removable media connect/disconnect activit-
ies that occurred after business hours can be treated as suspicious. We observed several users
falling into this behavioural pattern.
Similar to R4.2 dataset analysis the majority of users did not perform removable media
activities while the minority of users (about 25%) performed removable media activities of
the R5.2 dataset. Removable media connection time and the disconnect time were analysed
and respective graphs are illustrated in figure 4.19 and figure 4.20. Removable media con-
nect/disconnect events exhibit after business hours could be suspicious. But it is not entirely
possible to conclude any user as a malicious user just by looking at a single set of activities.
134
4.4.
E
xperim
entalR
esults
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
lll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
23:00:00
00:00:00
01:00:00
02:00:00
03:00:00
04:00:00
05:00:00
06:00:00
07:00:00
08:00:00
09:00:00
10:00:00
11:00:00
12:00:00
13:00:00
14:00:00
15:00:00
16:00:00
17:00:00
18:00:00
19:00:00
20:00:00
21:00:00
22:00:00
23:00:00
00:00:00
01:00:00
user
t
i
m
e
var l l l lavg_logoff_T max_logoff_T min_logoff_T mode_logoff_T
(a)
Figure 4.13: (a) Users’ logoff behaviour of the entire day with the R4.2 dataset: the minimum, average, maximum, and mode values of logoff activities during the
entire day for each user is illustrated. UserIDs are not indicated in the x-axis to avoid congestion in x-axis labels. The majority of the logoff activities were happened
during 17:00 to 18:00 window. Distributions of logoff activities during business hours and after hours are illustrated in the next two figures.
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Figure 4.13: (b) Users’ logoff behaviour during business hours (BH) with the R4.2 dataset: the majority of the logoff activities are happened during 17:00 to 19:00
window. The average and mode values outside the common window, especially happened in early working hours could be suspicious.
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Figure 4.13: (c) Users’ logoff behaviour during after hours with the R4.2 dataset: while not all the users exhibited after hours logoff activities, users with frequent
logoff activities (mode values) around midnight and early morning could be suspicious.
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Figure 4.14: (a) Users’ logon behaviour of the entire day with the R5.2 dataset: the minimum, average, maximum, and mode values of logon activities during the
entire day for each user is illustrated. UserIDs are not indicated in the x-axis to avoid congestion in x-axis labels. The majority of mode logon times were happened
during 07:00 to 09:00 window and the average logon time varied during 09:00 to 11:00 window. Distributions of logon activities during business hours and after hours
are illustrated in the next two figures.
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Figure 4.14: (b) Users’ logon behaviour during business hours (BH) with the R5.2 dataset: the majority of the logon activities are happened during 07:00 to 09:00
window.
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Figure 4.14: (c) Users’ logon behaviour during after hours with the R5.2 dataset: while not all the users had after hours logon activities, users with frequent logon
activities (mode values) around midnight could be suspicious.
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Figure 4.15: (a) Users’ logoff behaviour of the entire day with the R5.2 dataset: the minimum, average, maximum, and mode values of logoff activities during the
entire day for each user is illustrated. UserIDs are not indicated in the x-axis to avoid congestion in x-axis labels. The majority of logoff events exhibited during 16:00
to 19:00. Distributions of logoff activities during business hours and after hours are illustrated in the next two figures.
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Figure 4.15: (b) Users’ logoff behaviour during business hours (BH) with the R5.2 dataset: the majority of the logoff activities were happened during 16:00 to 18:00
window. Interesting there are a few users with mode logoff times during morning hours.
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Figure 4.15: (c) Users’ logoff behaviour during after hours (AH) with the R5.2 dataset: while not all the employees exhibited after hours logoff events, frequent logoff
events happened during mid night and early morning would be suspicious.
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Figure 4.16: (a) Users’ removable media connect behaviour during the entire day with the R4.2 dataset: the minimum, average, maximum and mode values of
removable media connect activities during the entire day for each user is illustrated. UserIDs are not indicated in the x-axis to avoid congestion in x-axis labels.
Distributions of removable media connect activities during business hours and after hours are illustrated in the next two figures. Only 265 users from the entire
userbase (1000 users) had performed removable media usage activities.
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Figure 4.16: (b) Users’ removable media connect behaviour during business hours with the R4.2 dataset: the majority of the frequent events happened during 09:00
to 16:00 window. The events outsider that window could be suspicious.
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Figure 4.16: (c) Users’ removable media connect behaviour during after hours with the R4.2 dataset: the number of users who exhibited after hours removable media
activities is very low compared with the total userbase. Activities happened during mid night and early morning could be suscpicious.
146
4.4.
E
xperim
entalR
esults
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
23:00:00
00:00:00
01:00:00
02:00:00
03:00:00
04:00:00
05:00:00
06:00:00
07:00:00
08:00:00
09:00:00
10:00:00
11:00:00
12:00:00
13:00:00
14:00:00
15:00:00
16:00:00
17:00:00
18:00:00
19:00:00
20:00:00
21:00:00
22:00:00
23:00:00
00:00:00
01:00:00
user
t
i
m
e
var l l l lavg_USB_D_T max_USB_D_T min_USB_D_T mode_USB_D_T
(a)
Figure 4.17: (a) Users’ removable media disconnect behaviour during the entire day with the R4.2 dataset: the minimum, average, maximum and mode values of
removable media connect activities during the entire day for each user is illustrated. UserIDs are not indicated in the x-axis to avoid congestion in x-axis labels.
Distributions of removable media disconnect activities during business hours and after hours are illustrated in the next two figures.
147
C
hapter4.
A
H
ybrid
InsiderT
hreatD
etection
Fram
ew
ork
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
07:00:00
08:00:00
09:00:00
10:00:00
11:00:00
12:00:00
13:00:00
14:00:00
15:00:00
16:00:00
17:00:00
18:00:00
19:00:00
user
t
i
m
e
var l l l lavg_USB_D_T_BH max_USB_D_T_BH min_USB_D_T_BH mode_USB_D_T_BH
(b)
Figure 4.17: (b) Users’ removable media disconnect behaviour during business hours with the R4.2 dataset: frequent events exhibited in the early business hours
could be suspicious.
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Figure 4.18: (c) Users’ removable media disconnect behaviour during after hours with the R4.2 dataset: frequent events happened during early morning could be
suspicious.
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Figure 4.19: (a) Users’ removable media connect behaviour during the entire day with the R5.2 dataset: the minimum, average, maximum and mode values of
removable media connect activities during the entire day for each user is illustrated. UserIDs are not indicated in the x-axis to avoid congestion in x-axis labels.
Distributions of removable media connect activities during business hours and after hours are illustrated in the next two figures. Only 447 users from the entire
userbase (2000 users) had performed removable media usage activities.
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Figure 4.19: (b) Users’ removable media connect behaviour during business hours with the R5.2 dataset: the majority of the frequent events happened during 10:00
to 16:00 window. The events outsider that window could be suspicious.
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Figure 4.19: (c) Users’ removable media connect behaviour during after hours with the R5.2 dataset: the events happened during the midnight, late night, and early
office hours could be suspicious.
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Figure 4.20: (a) Users’ removable media disconnect behaviour during the entire day with the R5.2 dataset: the minimum, average, maximum and mode values of
removable media disconnect activities during the entire day for each user is illustrated. UserIDs are not indicated in the x-axis to avoid congestion in x-axis labels.
Distributions of removable media disconnect activities during business hours and after hours are illustrated in the next two figures.
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(b)
Figure 4.20: (b) Users’ removable media disconnect behaviour during business hours with the R5.2 dataset: the majority of the frequent events happened during 10:00
to 16:00 window. The events outsider that window could be suspicious.
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Figure 4.20: (c) Users’ removable media disconnect behaviour during after hours with the R5.2 dataset: a few events happened during late night, midnight and early
morning could be suspicious.
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Chapter 4. A Hybrid Insider Threat Detection Framework
File Copying Activities
From the various attributes calculated in relation to file copying activities, figure 4.21 demon-
strates the variation of users’ file copying time. For the R4.2 dataset only a few users were
involved in file copying activities. Consequently the file copying activities with removable me-
dia cannot be treated as a typical behaviour among all users. We noticed that among the set
of users involved in file copying activities, a few have such events occurring only during after
hours which is suspicious.
Similarly only a few users were involved in file copying activities in the R5.2 dataset as
well. File copying activities that happen during business hours could be considered normal
while not guaranteeing there are no suspicious events. However, the file copying activities that
happened only during after hours could be more suspicious than file copying events during
business hours.
Email Communication
Email communication was analysed based on several features as summarized in table 4.6.
From the basic features such as number of recipients in ‘To’, ‘Cc’, ‘Bcc’ fields significant
variations were not observed among users. However interesting variations were observed in
the daily number of emails sent during the entire day, within business hours and after hours
operations. Figure 4.23 illustrates the histograms of daily number of emails sent by users
of both datasets. With the histograms corresponding to the R4.2 dataset we observed that
there are a few users (corresponding to shorter histogram bins) who deviate from the others
with regard to the number of sent emails. However, it is not feasible to clearly distinguish
normal behaviour from suspicious behaviour just by looking at these histograms as there are a
considerable number of similar histogram bins. It is also evident that not all the employees had
email communications after business hours. However, a relatively large number of after hour
emails are being sent by a minority of users.
With reference to the R5.2 dataset a few short histogram bins were observed that possibly
correspond to users who were deviating from the general behaviour (figures 4.23(d) - (f)). In
addition the distribution of the number of emails sent during the business hours is very close
to the distribution of the number of emails sent during the entire day. Another important fact
that can be gathered from these histograms is that only a few users were involved in email
activities during after hours. Consequently email communications during after hours may need
further investigations. There can be situations where after hours email communications are
necessary for business operations. However we cannot guarantee that all the after hour email
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Figure 4.21: (a) Users’ file copying behaviour with the R4.2 dataset: the minimum, average, maximum and mode values of removable media disconnect activities
during the entire day for each user is illustrated. UserIDs are not indicated in the x-axis to avoid congestion in x-axis labels. Distributions of removable media
disconnect activities during business hours and after hours are illustrated in the next two figures. Only 264 users from the entire userbase (1000 users) performed file
copying activities.
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Figure 4.21: (b) Users’ file copying behaviour during business hours with the R4.2 dataset: events happened during early and late business hours could be suspicious.
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Figure 4.21: (c) Users’ file copying behaviour during after hours with the R4.2 dataset: only a very few users exhibited after hours file copying activities.
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Figure 4.22: (a) Users’ file copying behaviour with the R5.2 dataset: the minimum, average, maximum and mode values of removable media disconnect activities
during the entire day for each user is illustrated. UserIDs are not indicated in the x-axis to avoid congestion in x-axis labels. Distributions of removable media
disconnect activities during business hours and after hours are illustrated in the next two figures.
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Figure 4.22: (b) Users’ file copying behaviour during business hours with the R5.2 dataset: events deviating from the common patterns could be suspicious.
161
C
hapter4.
A
H
ybrid
InsiderT
hreatD
etection
Fram
ew
ork
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l l
l l l l l l l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
23:00:00
00:00:00
01:00:00
02:00:00
03:00:00
04:00:00
05:00:00
06:00:00
07:00:00
08:00:00
09:00:00
10:00:00
11:00:00
12:00:00
13:00:00
14:00:00
15:00:00
16:00:00
17:00:00
18:00:00
19:00:00
20:00:00
21:00:00
22:00:00
23:00:00
00:00:00
01:00:00
user
t
i
m
e
var l l l lavg_FC_T_AH max_FC_T_AH min_FC_T_AH mode_FC_T_AH
(c) File copying time - after hours
Figure 4.22: (c) Users’ file copying behaviour during after hours with the R5.2 dataset: frequent events happened during mid night could be suspicious.
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(a) Number of sent emails (R4.2 dataset)
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(b) Number of sent emails - BH (R4.2 dataset)
Minimum
No.of emails
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
Mean
No.of emails
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
Maximum
No.of emails
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
Mode
No.of emails
N
o
.
o
f
 
U
s
e
r
s
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
(c) Number of sent emails - AH (R4.2 dataset)
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(e) Number of sent emails - BH (R5.2 dataset)
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(f) Number of sent emails - AH (R5.2 dataset)
Figure 4.23: Histograms of email properties of both datasets; the distribution of daily number of sent emails is illustrated for the entire day, business hours and after
hours. Above (a), (b), and (c) correspond to R4.2 dataset analysis and (d), (e), and (f) correspond to R5.2 dataset analysis.
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communications are work related.
Web Usage Behaviour
We calculated the daily number of URLs accessed by users throughout the day, during business
hours and after business hours. The above daily number of URLs is the total number of URLs
accessed by a user in a particular day and it is not the distinct URLs accessed by a user. Each
user’s behaviour was compared with their own historical behaviour by calculating the number
of days that exceed the individual average value of the selected feature. Figure 4.24 illustrates
the user behaviour on the number of days an individual exceeds their own daily average number
of URLs accessed.
Figures 4.24(a) and 4.24(b) show that the majority of users do not go beyond their daily
average number of access of URLs. There are a few users who exhibit a relatively large number
of days (more than 100 days) exceeding their normal web access behaviour (figure 4.24(a))
which cannot be considered as malicious. Our focus is on the users who have web usage
patterns more than the normal average for a fewer number of days (e.g. less than 20 days) as in
figure 4.24(b). The web usage behaviour during business hour operations also shows that the
majority of users are within their normal web usage patterns. During the after hours operations,
we observed several users who were deviating from their normal web usage patterns. Similar
behaviour was observed with the R5.2 dataset as well.
4.4.4 Personality and Organizational Parameters
The psychometric data was used to represent users’ personality parameters in this analysis. The
inter user relationships were extracted using the supervisor - subordinate relationship graph
illustrated in figure 4.25. The degree and the betweenness centrality of each vertex (user) of the
the graph were extracted to capture the users’ interrelationships. In addition, designation, team,
functional unit and the business unit were also used as important parameters in characterizing
organisational position of an individual.
4.4.5 Anomaly Detection
All of the above calculated parameters were fed as inputs in to the Isolation Forest algorithm,
which was selected as the anomaly detection algorithm for the proposed framework as de-
scribed in subsection 4.3.6. Table 4.11 summarises the number of parameters selected under
each category as the input parameters for the anomaly detection unit. In this analysis we have
260 (respectively 273) attributes from various input streams utilizing different graphical and
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Figure 4.24: Web usage behaviour - R4.2 dataset; the distribution of number of days an individual exceeded the
daily number of accessed URLs is illustrated in these histograms. The majority of users do not go beyond their
own average number of accessed URLs.
statistical features from the R4.2 (respectively R5.2 ) datasets. The R5.2 dataset has 13 more
attributes due to the extraction of graph and subgraph parameters from the user - device graph
of the email communications from this particular dataset.
Anomaly scores were calculated considering individual categories as well as considering all
parameters together based on two distinct values of the randomization factor (rFactor) of the
Isolation Forest algorithm 1. Anomaly scores corresponding to graph and subgraph properties
1The experiments were performed using the R package available at https://sourceforge.net/projects/iforest/.
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(a) R4.2 dataset (b) R5.2 dataset
Figure 4.25: User interrelationship graph based on organizational hierarchy; users are grouped based on the
functional unit. The size of the each node corresponds to the degree of the node. Figure (a) illustrates the user
interrelationship graph of the R4.2 dataset (1000 users) and (b) illustrates the user interrelationship graph of the
R5.2 dataset (2000 users).
Table 4.11: Summary of the number of parameters used for anomaly detection.
Property Number of
Parameters -
R4.2
Number of
Parameters -
R5.2
Graph/subgraph properties 39 52
Logon/logoff behaviour 60 60
Removable media usage 60 60
File copying activities 30 30
Email communications 46 46
Web access 14 14
Personality traits 5 5
Organisational parameters 6 6
Total number of parameters 260 273
were computed using 39 (respectively 52) input parameters with R4.2 (respectively R5.2 ) data-
sets. Similarly, anomaly scores corresponding to other services (excluding personality para-
meters and organizational parameters) were calculated independently using Isolation Forest.
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Figure 4.26 illustrates the distribution of anomaly scores for individual categories as well as for
the whole set of parameters for R4.2 dataset with rFactor=1.
Based on the theory of the Isolation Forest algorithm, only the instances with high anomaly
scores can be considered as anomalies. With these results, we can only find a relatively small
number of definite anomalies. Figure 4.27 illustrates the distribution of anomaly scores for
individual categories as well as for the whole set of parameters for R5.2 dataset with rFactor=1.
In this case also we can find a few definite anomalies considering the anomaly score threshold
as 0.8.
Considering the complexity of the insider threat problem, instead of categorizing individu-
als as benign or suspicious, we believe it would be much more practical to have a ranking
mechanism based on the obtained anomaly score. Based on this assumption, we use the cal-
culated anomaly score value as a risk ranking scheme for enterprise users in the context of
insider threat mitigation. The users with high anomaly scores are considered as high risk, and
vice versa. To evaluate the effectiveness of the selected feature set as well as the framework,
we calculated the area under the curve (AUC) value of the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve based on following two scenarios.
1. Scenario 1 : Calculate anomaly score values based on each feature category.
2. Scenario 2 : Calculate anomaly score values based on all calculated features.
In addition, each scenario is evaluated based on the two distinct values of the randomization
factor (rFactor) of the Isolation Forest algorithm. Since the rFactor can be selected between
0 (fully deterministic) and 1 (fully random), AUC values were evaluated corresponding to the
anomaly scores calculated with the rFactor equal to 0 and 1. The ground truth in the dataset was
used in this evaluation. Table 4.12 summarises the AUC values for feature sets selected under
each category based on both datasets. With the calculations of the R4.2 dataset for rFactor=0,
we obtained excellent AUC values for web usage, file copying activities and removable media
usage parameters. The AUC value corresponding to graph and subgraph parameters indicates
the importance of the selected parameters. AUC values for the logon/logoff feature set and
and email communication features were not as impressive. We believe that the introduction of
email content analysis would be a possible improvement for the email feature set, which we
leave for future work. The AUC value obtained for the entire set of parameters is 0.7478 for the
rFactor = 0. The AUC value corresponding to all parameters (corresponding ROC curve can
be find in figure 4.28a)as well as the majority of individual features were improved with the
selection of rFactor value as 1 for the R4.2 dataset. With the change of rFactor value from 0 to
1 we observe fairly good AUC values for logon/logoff and email parameter sets as compared
to the performance with rFactor = 0.
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Figure 4.26: Anomaly score distribution - R4.2 dataset; the anomaly scores for each user (1000 users) based on the whole set of parameters and individual parameter
sets are presented in different colours. The users denoted in the x-axis is plotted based on the descending order of the anomaly scores calculated on all parameters.
The x-axis labels (userIDs) are omitted in the illustration. The users in the tail of the distribution exhibit lower anomaly scores for all sets of parameters. However the
other set of users indicate highly distributed anomaly score values for various sets of parameters. The users with anomaly scores above 0.8 can be regarded as definite
anomalies.
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Figure 4.27: Anomaly score distribution - R5.2 dataset; the anomaly scores for each user (2000 users) based on the whole set of parameters and individual parameter
sets are presented in different colours. The users denoted in the x-axis is plotted based on the descending order of the anomaly scores calculated on all parameters.
The x-axis labels (userIDs) are omitted in the illustration. The distribution of anomaly scores is relatively similar to that of R4.2 dataset. Several users are observed
with anomaly scores going beyond 0.8 who can be considered as definite anomalies based on the interpretation of the anomaly score values of the Isolation Forest
algorithm.
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To compare and validate the results, AUC values were calculated based on the analysis of
the second dataset (R5.2 ). Again, anomaly scores were calculated for both values of the ran-
domization factor of the Isolation Forest algorithm. With the rFactor = 0, the results were not
very promising for the entire set of parameters as well as for the majority of individual feature
sets. However, we achieved good results when considering the graph and subgraph parameters.
We obtained very good results, with the rFactor = 1, with the same dataset (ROC curve cor-
responds to all parameters is illustrated in figure 4.28b). Based on these results we believe that
the identified feature set as well as the proposed framework works very well in characterizing
user behaviour and identifying possible malicious users. Also for the best overall performance,
Isolation Forest algorithm needs to be executed with the rFactor = 1. Experimenting with
other rFactor values is considered as a future direction of this research.
Table 4.12: AUC value summary of for feature sets selected under each category: AUC values obtained for the
entire set of parameters as well as individual parameter sets is excellent with the rFactor = 1.
Parameter Set
AUC values
R4.2 R5.2
rFactor=0 rFactor=1 rFactor=1 rFactor=1
Graph/Subgraph parameters 0.8691 0.8822 0.8072 0.7810
Logon/Logoff behaviour 0.5699 0.6898 0.5100 0.7094
Removable media usage 0.9006 0.9371 0.6790 0.8352
File copying activities 0.9147 0.9099 0.4655 0.8929
Email communications 0.5501 0.7174 0.6191 0.6080
Web access 0.6771 0.8701 0.6612 0.7026
All parameters 0.7478 0.9226 0.6157 0.8997
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a hybrid framework for identifying potential malicious insiders.
This framework is based on heterogeneous feature extraction and unsupervised anomaly detec-
tion techniques. Feature extraction from insider threat related input streams were carried out
by graph based methods and statistical mechanisms. In particular, the introduction of user sub-
graphs for users’ device usage characterization is a key contributions of this chapter. Instead
of analysing users’ device usage behaviour only on logon/logoff events, it was expanded to all
the available services such as removable media usage, file copying activities, email communic-
ations and web access. The selection of above service was totally based on the available data.
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Figure 4.28: ROC curves for two datasets: the area under the curve (AUC) values obtained for both datasets with
all parameters (R4.2 (a) and R5.2 (b)) with rFactor=1 resulted promising AUC values.
However, in a practical implementation any other service (e.g., printing, scanning) could be
analysed based on the same mechanism as described in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.
User behaviour comparison with the user’s own history as well as with peers is another
important characteristic of the proposed framework. This model generates anomaly scores
for each user based on the selected set of input parameters. In this framework, the Isolations
Forest algorithm, which stands out in isolating anomalous instance from the general instances
was used. Comparison with several other machine learning algorithms such as SVM, Ran-
dom Forest, Ensemble methods is considered as future work. We believe the use of individual
anomaly scores as a ranking mechanism would be much more practical in a real world imple-
mentation than a binary classification of users as malicious and normal.
Empirical results reveal the significance of many of the selected parameters in combating
this type of patient and smart attacks. Based on the resulting AUC values, we believe that the
individual feature sets were a good choice. The only exception is the email behaviour feature
set, which we expect to improve with the introduction of content analysis that is not covered
under the scope of this thesis. Consideration of the entire set of parameters also resulted in
an excellent AUC values for the ROC curves for both datasets. Both datasets yield very good
AUC values, with rFactor equal to 1, thus validating the excellent performance of the proposed
insider threat framework. Based on overall results we believe proposed insider threat detection
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framework works very well in the context of insider threat mitigation.
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Chapter 5
Graph Based Approaches for Insider
Threat Detection
*Parts of this chapter are published in [55] and [56].
As discussed in chapter 2, many of the insider threat detection approaches proposed in the
literature have different drawbacks and limitations. The unpredictability of malicious attackers
and the complexity of malicious actions necessitates the careful analysis of network, system
and user parameters correlated with the insider threat problem. Thus is created a high dimen-
sional, heterogeneous data analysis problem in isolating suspicious users in the context of the
insider threat problem. In addition to the promising results obtained from the proposed hybrid
framework in the previous chapter (chapter 4), the feasibility of the use of graph based anom-
aly detection techniques is investigated in this chapter. Multidimensional data representation
capabilities, improved visualisation abilities, and unsupervised anomaly detection capabilities
are the main drivers for us to select graph based approaches in combating insider threats. These
ideas are further elevated by the four broad reasons highlighted by Akoglu et al. [2] in favour
of the use of graph based methods for anomaly detection: (i) the inter-dependent nature of the
data, (ii) powerful representation, (iii) relational nature of problem domains (insider threat in
this case), and (iv) robust machinery.
The contributions by various graph based insider threat detection frameworks proposed
in articles by Chen et al. [31], Brdiczka et al. [25], Althebyn and Panda [7], Nance and
Marty[111], Eberle and Holder [46] and Kent et al. [87], as discussed in chapter 2, clearly
indicate the feasibility of the usage of graph based approaches for representation of insider
threat related data. Also, it is evident that the above researchers were focused on various graph
based anomaly detection techniques for identifying possible malicious users. However, many
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of those proposed methods do not expand to capture the heterogeneity and high dimensionality
associated with the insider threat problem. The graph based anomaly detection techniques
utilised in the above frameworks do not consider both graph topology and graph attributes
simultaneously.
This chapter investigates two distinct graph based anomaly detection techniques for the
identification of malicious users in the context of the insider threat problem. The first method
investigates the use of graph based anomaly detection in plain graphs considering the two dis-
tinct vertex similarity measures. The second approach investigates the use of attributed graph
clustering for insider threat detection that has not been previously explored for the insider threat
problem.
The major contributions in this chapter are the following;
• A graph based anomaly detection technique on vertex similarity measures is investigated.
• A graph based approach to capture inter user relationships based on users’ web access
records is presented.
• A graph based approach to capture inter user relationships based on email communica-
tions is presented.
• An insider threat detection framework based on attributed graph clustering (subspace and
subgraph clustering) is introduced.
• An outlier scoring scheme based on subspace dimensionality and several graph attributes
is proposed.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 describes the proposed
graph based anomaly detection method using vertex similarity techniques. Section 5.2 de-
scribes the insider threat detection framework based on the attributed graph clustering tech-
nique. Each of the above sections includes the proposed methodology and the experimental
results. Section 5.3 concludes the chapter with a summary of the findings.
5.1 Finding Anomalous Users Through Vertex Similarity
The use of vertex similarity forms the preliminary analysis for exploring the feasibility of the
use of graph based anomaly detection techniques for the insider threat problem in this thesis.
The main focus of this work includes user behaviour analysis based on web access behaviour.
Web access behaviour is one of the major aspects identified in characterising the user behaviour
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in the context of the insider threat problem as discussed in chapter 3. This initial analysis
focuses on anomaly detection in “plain static” graphs. If a graph contains only vertices and
edges (without any vertex or edge attributes) and the graph structure is not varying over time,
such graphs are considered as plain static graphs.
Section 5.1.1 describes the related literature on anomaly detection in static plain graphs.
Section 5.1.2 briefly describes the dataset utilised for this analysis. Section 5.1.3 discusses the
proposed methodology with the experimental results and their evaluation presented in section
5.1.4. A discussion of the results is presented in 5.1.5.
5.1.1 Anomaly Detection in Plain Static Graphs
The anomaly detection techniques of plain static graphs exploits the structure of the graph to
extract the patterns and differentiate anomalies from the normal instances. These structural
patterns can be of two types: (i) structure based patterns and (ii) community based patterns [2].
Structure based anomaly detection techniques can be further categorised into two classes: (i)
feature based approaches and (ii) proximity based approaches. The feature based approaches
use graph-centric features associated with the nodes as well as the global graph structure [2].
Graph measures associated with the nodes can be node degree, centrality measures (between-
ness [54], eigenvector [19], closeness [112]), dyadic features (reciprocity [3], edge betweenness
[61], and the number of common neighbours), and egonet features [1] (such as number of tri-
angles, total weight, principle eigenvalue). A few example measures that can be used to extract
global graph structure are the number of connected components, global clustering coefficient,
principle eigenvalue, and average node degree [84]. Proximity based approaches utilise the
graph structure to measure the proximity or the closeness of graph objects. In this method
close-by objects are considered to be in the same category. PageRank based on random walks
[27], Personalised PageRank [71], SimRank [75], Jaccard similarity [72] and Katz measure
[85] are various approaches used in proximity based approaches.
The second major type of anomaly detection mechanism on static plain graphs is based
on the community based patterns. Community based anomaly detection techniques focus on
finding the densely connected groups of nodes and the nodes that have connections across com-
munities [2]. Based on the above fact the bridging nodes or the nodes that are not connected
to a specific community are considered as anomalies. AUTOPART anomaly detection method
proposed by Chakrabarti [30] clustered the nodes with similar neighbours together. Nodes that
have many connections to multiple different communities are considered as anomalies. The
edges that do not belong to any structure such as cross-cluster bridge edges are considered as
anomalies. Tong and Lin [150] proposed a graph anomaly detection technique based on non
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negative residual matrix factorization. Work by Ding et al. [41] looked for communications
entering the communities to identify intruders. The algorithm (SCAN - Structural Clustering
Algorithm for Networks) proposed by Xu et al. [165] focused on anomaly detection by cluster-
ing. Their algorithm detects clusters, hubs and outliers based on a structural similarity measure.
The two vertices are clustered based on the common neighbours.
5.1.2 The Dataset
We utilised the insider threat dataset published by CERT@CMU [144] for the experiments
conducted with this method. Since this was one of the preliminary studies of this thesis we
selected the dataset version R1.tar.bz (referred as R1 dataset from this point) for this analysis.
The R1 dataset consists of three broad types of data records (HTTP, logon, and device) of
1000 employees in 15 different work roles spanning an 18 months period. “logon.csv” consists
of user logon/logoff activities with the corresponding PC with timestamps. The second data
file “device.csv” is a collection of data records of removable media usage. It indicates con-
nect/disconnect actions together with the relevant user, PC, and timestamp. The “HTTP.csv”
file contains user web access records which include the information on the user, PC, timestamp,
and URL. Table 5.1 summarises the number of records of the selected dataset. The case study
related to this section is carried out using only the LDAP records and web access records.
Table 5.1: Summary of data records of (R1 ) dataset: this table lists the type and number of data records in the
dataset used for the experiments discussed in this section
Record Type File Name Number of Records (R4.2 )
User information LDAP 17,413
Logon/logoff logon.csv 849,580
USB connect/disconnect device.csv 65,668
Web access http.csv 3,451,664
5.1.3 Methodology
The major objective of this section is to introduce a graph based anomaly detection technique
on plain static graphs that can be applied to the insider threat problem. The proposed method
was analysed based on the web access records of users under a particular designation. Users’
interactions with websites were represented by an unweighted, undirected large scale graph
Gi = (U i, V i, Ei) for the ith designation. In this notation, U i = {ui1, · · ·} is the set of users,
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V i = {vi1, · · ·} is the set of URLs, and Ei = {ei1, . . .} is the set of edges representing users’
interactions with different URLs. Graph visualisation was carried out using NodeXL [141]
and all the other calculations were performed using the R statistical computing language [126]
and Microsoft Excel 2010. In this method, we investigated the anomaly detection using graph
clustering. The main focus of this investigation was on graph clustering based on two distinct
vertex similarity indices.
Two different vertex similarity measures were calculated in this approach (i) normalised
Jaccard metric and (ii) normalised square root distance as in [72]. The definitions of the above
two similarity measures are as follow: given two users uj and uk, where d(uj) and d(uk) are
the degrees of the users uj and uk respectively, and d(ujk) the number of common neighbours
(URLs) between users uj and uk:
1. Normalised Jaccard Similarity Metric
DJD(uj, uk) = 1− d(ujk)/(d(uj) + d(uk)− d(ujk)). (5.1)
2. Normalized Square Root Distance
DSQRT (uj, uk) = 1− d(ujk)/
√
d(uj)d(uk). (5.2)
The pairwise similarity between all pairs of users were calculated using the above two equa-
tions. These pairwise similarity calculations were performed based on the individual graphs
generated for each designation. The degree of a user is the number of unique URLs accessed
by a particular user. The number of common URLs accessed by the selected pair of users
is represented by the number of common neighbours between two vertices. Considering the
above interpretations we believe the vertex similarity measures defined in equations (5.1) and
(5.2) are good choices for comparing users’ web access patterns with their peers. The pairwise
similarity values of the two distinct similarity measures were represented, for each designation,
by two symmetric, square matrices Ai(JAC) and A
i
(SQRT ) with zero diagonal elements. Thus the
entry aijk is the normalised Jaccard similarity metric value between user u
i
j and u
i
k in the case
of Ai(JAC) (the normalised square root distance between user u
i
j and u
i
k in the case of A
i
(SQRT )
respectively). At this point we choose threshold values T i(JAC) and T
i
(SQRT ) for each designa-
tion based on the 25th percentile value of the corresponding similarity matrix. The selection of
25th percentile value is arbitrary and could be changed to get optimised results.
For all elements [aijk] in matrix A
i
(JAC), given the threshold value T
i
(JAC) we define the new
binary matrix A˜i(JAC) as follows:
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A˜i(JAC) =
 ˜[aijk] = 1 if aijk ≥ T i(JAC),˜[aijk] = 0 else. (5.3)
The resulting symmetric, binary square matrix A˜i(JAC) has dimension (m
i×mi), where mi
is the number of users in the ith designation. Row and column indices of A˜i(JAC) represent the
users under the particular designation. Thus we could say that users uij and u
i
k are adjacent to
each other if ˜[aijk] =
˜[aikj] = 1 . We can then think of the above matrix A˜
i
(JAC) as an adjacency
matrix of an undirected graph Gi(JAC) = (U
i
(JAC), E
i
(JAC)), where U
i
(JAC) = {ui(JAC)1 , · · · } is
the set of vertices (users) and Ei(JAC) = {ei(JAC)1 , . . .} is the set of edges (interactions among
users).
The major objective of this representation is that in the context of the insider threat problem
we are interested in users. Basically we wish to cluster users who behave similarly based on
the accessed URLs and find the outlier users who are deviating from the general pattern. If we
consider clustering the original graph generated on user - URL relationship (Gi), there is a pos-
sibility that the resulting clusters would not reflect the actual user relationships. Consequently
we take the binary projection of the original graph Gi onto the set of users using the threshold
values before applying anomaly detection techniques.
Similarly, for all elements [aijk] in matrix A
i
(SQRT ), with the threshold value T
i
(SQRT ) we
define the new binary matrix A˜i(SQRT ) generated with normalised square root distance as fol-
lows:
A˜i(SQRT ) =
 ˜[aijk] = 1 if aijk ≥ T i(SQRT ),˜[aijk] = 0 else. (5.4)
This relationship is also illustrated by an undirected graph Gi(SQRT ) = (U
i
(SQRT ), E
i
(SQRT )),
where U i(SQRT ) = {ui(SQRT )1 , · · · } is the set of vertices (users) and Ei(SQRT ) = {ei(SQRT )1 , · · · }
is the set of edges (interactions among users).
The next step is the anomaly detection from the plain static graphs generated as above. We
approached finding the similar users as a maximal clique problem with some constraints. The
maximal clique is a complete subgraph that is not contained in any other complete subgraphs
[28]. Technically we were not interested in finding all the maximal cliques of the graph. There-
fore we paid attention only to non-overlapping cliques of our graph. The users who can be
clustered into a non-overlapping clique were considered as normal users, and the users who did
not cluster to any of the cliques were regarded as anomalous users.
Bron and Kerbosch [28] provide an algorithm for finding all cliques in an undirected graph.
In our study we slightly modify the classic Bron-Kerbosh algorithm to find only the non over-
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lapping maximal cliques. In contrast to randomly selecting the vertex at each recursive call,
the modified algorithm selects the vertices in the descending order of the degree. The modified
algorithm (see Algorithm 2) was used to generate all non overlapping maximal cliques given
a graph G = (U,E) in this thesis. In this particular case the higher the degree of a vertex,
the more likely the user represented by that vertex exhibits behaviour common to other users.
Therefore by selecting users on the descending order of the degree would support reducing the
false positive rate.
Classic Bron-Kerbosh Algorithm
The Bron–Kerbosch algorithm is a recursive backtracking algorithm that searches for all
maximal cliques in a given graph G. Given three sets R, P , and X , where R is the temporary
set of vertices of maximal cliques of G, P is the set of possible candidates for calculating
maximal cliques, and X is the excluded set or the nodes already in some clique. The algorithm
starts by initialising R and X to be zero and setting P to be the vertex set of the graph U .
Within each recursive call, the algorithm considers the vertices in P in turn, if there are no such
vertices, it either reports R as a maximal clique (if X is empty), or backtracks. For each vertex
u chosen from P , it makes a recursive call in which u is added to R and in which P and X
are restricted to the neighbour set N(u) of u, which finds and reports all clique extensions of R
that contain u. Then, it moves u from P to X to exclude it from consideration in future cliques
and continues with the next vertex in P .
Algorithm 1 Classic Bron-Kerbosh Algorithm
1: BronKerbosh(R,P,X)
2: if P and X are both empty then
3: Report R as a maximal clique
4: end if
5: for each vertex u in P do
6: BronKerbosh(R ∪ (u), P ∩N(u), X ∩N(u))
7: P := P − {u}
8: X := X ∪ {u}
9: end for
Modified Bron-Kerbosh Algorithmm The major difference in the proposed modified al-
gorithm is the order of vertex selection. The vertices are arranged so that the highest degree
node is first selected and so on. In the modified Bron-Kerbosh algorithm we also initialise
the algorithm by setting R and X to zero and setting P to be the vertex set of the graph U
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ordered in the descending order of the degree of the vertices. If an independent maximal clique
is found, all the vertices belonging to that clique are removed from P at once. In the special
case of the insider threat problem, finding the malicious users is more complicated. Therefore
the most interesting users in this domain are the users who exhibit completely uncommon be-
haviour. That is the users who cannot be grouped with at least one other user. Considering the
above, once the algorithm finds a maximal clique, the entire clique is removed. Therefore with
this modification the number of iterations that the algorithm goes through will in general be
reduced.
Algorithm 2 Modified Bron-Kerbosh Algorithm
1: function(R,P,X)
2: if P and X are both empty then
3: Report R as an independent maximal clique
4: S := R(u)
5: end if
6: for each vertex u in (P − S) in the descending order of the degree do
7: function(R ∪ (u), P ∩N(u), X ∩N(u))
8: P := P − {u}
9: X := X ∪ {u}
10: end for
Based on the number of users in each clique we define three broad categories of users as
(i) common user groups (ii) small user groups and (iii) individuals. The above categorisation is
performed considering the criteria described in table 5.2.
Table 5.2: The criteria for the user categorisation.
User Group name Criteria
Common User Group No.of users in the group ≥ 10 % of the userbase
Small User Groups No.of users in the group < 10 % of the userbase
Individuals Not clustered users
We compared the results obtained from our prosed algorithm with the results obtained from
two existing clustering algorithms (i) Clauset-Newman and Moore (CNM) algorithm, a state
of the art clustering algorithm based on modularity [32] and (ii) Wakita and Tsurumi (WT)
algorithm, a modified version of CNM algorithm [157]. Brief descriptions of the above al-
gorithms can be found in chapter 2 and both of these algorithms are inbuilt functions of No-
deXL software [141].
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5.1.4 Experimental Results
Experiments were carried out with web access records from users belonging to six major desig-
nations of the R1 dataset. As discussed in the methodology (subsection 5.1.3) the user - URL
relationship graphs were generated for each designation (see figure 5.1). As in the previous
chapters all the dense graphs obtained are illustrated after clustering using the CNM algorithm,
with the intergroup edges hidden to reduce the complexity of the image. If we take the security
designation (figure 5.1(e)), there are 25 groups with a one big group consisting of large number
of users, 6 groups with two users and remaining groups belonging to single users. Such graphs
can be used to visualise the user communities based on the accessed URLs in this case.
Table 5.3: Summary of user-URL graphs
Designation Vertex
Count
No.of
Users
No.of
URLs
Edge
Count
Technicians 48,910 194 48,716 165,474
Administrative Staff 44,709 165 44,544 141,787
Engineers 42,690 144 42,546 131,002
Tradesman 40,503 141 40,362 123,274
Administrative Assistant 28,040 75 27,965 67,752
Security 2,309 43 2,266 3,715
Relatively large numbers of URLs compared with the number of users in these graphs (as
shown in Table 5.3) suggest user-URL graphs would not be the best option to capture inter user
relationships. Consequently as discussed in the methodology (subsection 5.1.3) we generated
the inter user relationship graphs by calculating the two vertex similarity measures introduced
(normalised Jaccard metric and normalised square root distance). For comparison purposes
we clustered the inter user relationship graphs using the (a) modified Bron-Kerbosh algorithm
(Algorithm 2), (b) Clauset Newman Moore (CNM) algorithm, and (c) Wakita Tsurumi (WT)
algorithm. We used the inbuilt clustering functionalities of NodeXL for obtaining clusters of the
latter two algorithms. The following two subsections describe the related results corresponding
to the normalised Jaccard similarity metric and the normalised square root similarity distance.
Approach 1 - Vertex clustering by Jaccard Similarity Metric
As an example, figure 5.2 illustrates the clusters obtained by the three clustering algorithms
applied to the users belonging to security designation. The graphs in figures 5.2(a) - (c) cor-
respond to the inter-user relationship graphs generated, based on the Jaccard similarity metric
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(a) Technicians (b) Administrative Staff (c) Engineers 
(d) Tradesman (e) Administrative Assistant (e) Security 
Figure 5.1: User - URL relationship graphs of different designations: the above graphs illustrate the relationship between users and URLs for six designations. The
graphs are illustrated after clustering with the CNM algorithm, with the intergroup edges hidden to reduce the complexity. Considering the very small ratio between
the users and the URLs, these graphs were projected into user interrelationship graphs based on the vertex similarities of users.
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(a) Clustering by Algorithm 2 (b) Clustering by CNM algorithm (c) Clustering by Wakita Tsurumi al-
gorithm
Figure 5.2: Clusters of security users based on the inter-user relationship graph generated using the normalised
Jaccard similarity metric. One or two major groups of users (possibly normal users) and a few individual users
(possibly suspicious users) are found in each graph.
calculations. From these three graphs, one or two major groups of users were observed. With
the CNM algorithm a single major group that connected about 50% of the users was found,
with all the other users clustered as individuals (figure 5.2(b)). However, the percentage of
individuals obtained from the other two algorithms (WT and algorithm 2) are relatively small
compared to the percentage of users belonging to the multiple user groups (see figures 5.2(b)
and 5.2(c)). Tables 5.4, reports the percentages of users belonging to the three major user
categories described in table 5.2 under each designation for all the three clustering algorithms
(Algorithm 2, CNM algorithm, and WT algorithm).
Based on the percentages of users categorised into the three broad categories, the results
of the modified Bron-Kerbosh method (algorithm 2) are relatively consistent compared with
the other methods. For all the designations except engineers, the percentage of individuals is
around 15%. Relatively high proportion of individuals in engineering could be due to the in-
volvement in different work related projects as well as be having their own specific work related
subjects. The results obtained with the CNM algorithm are quite distinct from the other two
methods. With the CNM algorithm, all the users of engineer and tradesman designations were
categorised as common users as the algorithm grouped all the users into two broad groups. In
contrast to the above, fairly large percentage values of individuals were observed for remaining
designations. These results indicated the CNM algorithm may not be the best candidate for
identifying possible anomalies of the generated graphs in this particular case.
However, the percentages of individuals obtained from the Wakita-Tsurumi (WT) algorithm
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Table 5.4: This table summarises the percentage of users in each user category based on the clusters generated with different clustering algorithms on the projected
graph using the normalised Jaccard similarity metric. The last three columns are related to the percentage of users in each user category when the original graph is
clustered using CNM algorithm. The percentage values are more consistent with the modified Bron-Kerbosh algorithm than the other methods.
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Technician 194 42.27 44.33 13.40 32.99 0.00 67.01 80.41 19.59 0.00 58.25 39.66 2.06
Administrative Staff 165 49.70 34.54 15.67 35.76 0.00 64.24 77.58 22.42 0.00 41.21 56.97 1.82
Engineer 144 64.58 11.81 23.61 100.00 0.00 0.00 88.19 5.56 6.25 36.81 45.83 17.36
Tradesman 141 56.03 28.37 15.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 85.11 14.18 0.71 63.12 34.75 2.13
Administrative Assistants 75 56.00 28.00 16.00 50.67 0.00 49.33 93.33 6.67 0.00 37.33 41.33 21.33
Security 43 69.77 16.28 13.95 55.81 0.00 44.19 79.07 18.60 2.33 30.23 27.91 41.86
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are relatively low compared with the other two methods. With this algorithm, all the users
belonging to technicians, administrative staff, and administrative assistants were clustered into
several clusters, without leaving any isolated users. The interpretation of clustering all the users
into several groups is that all the users are behaving similarly at least compared to a few of the
other users. In such a situation we could consider the users belonging to the smallest group as
suspicious or none of the users as suspicious. Consequently, at this point, we consider the WT
algorithm and the modified Bron-Kerbosh algorithms as suitable candidates for clustering for
this particular case.
Users were also categorised into three broader categories based on the clusters obtained
from the original user-URL relationship graphs. Considering the size of the graphs, the CNM
algorithm, which showed excellent performance in other applications on high dimensional
graphs was used for original graph clustering. Based on the number of users in each cluster, the
users were categorised into the three broad categories introduced in table 5.2 and the percent-
ages are shown in the last three columns of table 5.4. The percentage of individuals for many
of the designations were relatively low compared to the percentage of users in other groups.
However, in the particular case of the security designation relatively higher number of indi-
viduals were observed. Considering the relatively smaller ratio between the number of users
and the number of URLs, we believe direct clustering of the user-URL graph would end up
with limitations and drawbacks.
Approach 2 - Vertex clustering by Normalised Square Root Distance
As an example figure 5.3 illustrates the clusters obtained from the three clustering algorithms
applied to the users belonging to the security designation. These graphs are corresponding
to the inter-user relationship graphs generated, based on the normalised square root similarity
distance calculations. From these three graphs one or two major groups of users were also
observed. Particularly in figures 5.3(b) that corresponds to clustering by the CNM algorithm,
users were grouped into two distinct groups. In the particular case of the insider threat problem,
this type of clustering would increase the false positive rate. With the WT algorithm (figure
5.3(c)) all the users are clustered into four different groups. With the proposed modified Bron-
Kerbosh algorithm (Algorithm 2) the majority of users were clustered into several cliques,
and a few users were not clustered into any of the groups. Table 5.5, reports the percentages
of users belonging to the three user categories described in table 5.2 under each designation,
based on the different clustering algorithms.
Clusters obtained using CNM algorithm resulted in two major groups for most of the des-
ignations except technicians. In the case of technicians, the majority of users were left as
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(a) Clustering by modified Bron
Kerbosh
(b) Clustering by CNM algorithm (c) Clustering by Wakita Tsurumi al-
gorithm
Figure 5.3: Clusters of security users based on the inter-user relationship graph generated using the normalised
square root distance. One or two major groups of users (possibly normal users) and a few individual users (possibly
suspicious users) are found in the above case (a). However, with the CNM algorithm (above (c)) all the users are
clustered into two distinct groups without leaving any individuals. With the WT algorithm also all the users were
clustered into four groups (above (b)).
unclustered users. Based on these facts we believe that the use of CNM algorithm is not the
most appropriate algorithm for clustering users for this particular application. However, with
the WT algorithm, the percentages of users categorised as individuals is relatively low com-
pared with the percentage of users in the other two groups. Also, it was observed that all the
users with security and tradesman designations were clustered into common and small group
categories. None of the users of the above designations were left as individuals. However,
the results obtained from the modified Bron-Kerbosh algorithm (Algorithm 2) showed fairly
consistent percentages on all the designations. With this method we also observed the fairly
large proportion of engineers who were categorised as individuals. This high percentage may
be a result of unique URLs accessed by many of the engineers based on the different projects
they were assigned. Similar to the case of approach 1, the percentage of users under the three
broad categories is shown in table 5.5 based on the clustering of the original user - URL graph.
5.1.5 Discussion of Results
From the above results, we believe that the clustering of users based on the accessed URLs
could be reliably achieved by the proposed two stage graph mapping technique rather than the
direct clustering of the original graph. In a dense network with two types of vertices in which
there is a significant difference in the number of vertices of two categories, direct application of
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Table 5.5: This table summarises the percentage of users in each user category based on the clusters generated with different clustering algorithms on the projected
graph using the normalised square root distance. The last three columns are related to the percentage of users in each user category when the original graph is clustered
using CNM algorithm. The percentage values are more consistent with the modified Bron-Kerbosh algorithm than the other methods.
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Technician 194 53.09 33.51 13.40 32.99 0.00 67.01 80.41 19.07 0.52 58.25 39.66 2.06
Administrative Staff 165 50.91 26.67 22.42 100.00 0.00 0.00 76.97 22.42 0.61 41.21 56.97 1.82
Engineer 144 63.19 7.64 29.17 100.00 0.00 0.00 91.67 3.47 4.86 36.81 45.83 17.36
Tradesman 141 56.03 30.50 13.48 100.00 0.00 0.00 84.40 15.60 0.00 63.12 34.75 2.13
Administrative Assistants 75 72.00 6.67 21.33 100.00 0.00 0.00 64.00 33.33 1.33 37.33 41.33 21.33
Security 43 76.74 11.63 11.63 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 30.23 27.91 41.86
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clustering algorithm would lead to a loss of some important information. In the particular case
of insider threat, the related evidence would not be significantly visible in such an extensive
network. Consequently, the graphs generated to indicate the interrelationship among users
based on the vertex similarity of the original graph were chosen. We believe considerably
good results, regarding the percentage of users belonging to the three broad categories of users,
were achieved with both modified Bron-Kerbosh algorithm and the Wakita-Tsurumi algorithm.
In this particular case, the results were not that promising with the Clauset-Newman-Moore
algorithm.
With this preliminary analysis, we observed that the graph based anomaly detection could
be a good candidate to address the insider threat problem. However, we identified that if we
continue with plain graphs, we will face difficulties in representing high dimensional, hetero-
geneous attributes associated with the insider threat problem. The two possible methods to
address the above mentioned limitation is to represent all the insider threat associated factors
as different vertices in a single graph or the use of attributed graphs for data representation.
However, the first option would create a very large graph, which would increase the computa-
tional intensity. Considering the better practicality of the second method, we investigated the
use of attributed graph anomaly detection for the insider threat problem as discussed in the next
section.
5.2 Malicious Insider Ranking through Attributed Graph Clus-
tering
In the previous section, we investigated the use of plain (non-attributed) static graphs to cat-
egorise users based on their web access patterns. However, when we consider the entire insider
threat problem, anomalous user identification could well be addressed by considering the at-
tributed graphs. The main reasoning behind the above argument is that attributed graphs could
be used to represent various parameters from the heterogeneous information correlated with the
insider threat problem. Consequently, in this section, we introduce the use of attributed graph
anomaly detection techniques for malicious insider detection that has not been widely applied
to the insider threat problem so far. Also, we introduce several outlier ranking scores which
can be used as an indication of the possible risk from individuals to an enterprise network. This
scoring scheme is based on both topological structure and high dimensional attribute values
generated from heterogeneous data sources. The basic framework proposed in this section is
depicted in figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: The proposed framework: this figure illustrates the proposed framework that can be used to rank
malicious insiders based on the attributed graph clustering technique.
Inputs from heterogeneous information sources such as system logs from system and net-
work devices, application logs, email communication logs, and web usage logs are used in this
framework similar to the framework described in the previous chapter. Features are extrac-
ted from different information streams using graph based approaches and statistical methods.
An enterprise wide user inter-relationship graph is generated considering the organisational
hierarchy as well as email communications. The extracted parameter values are integrated as
vertex attributes of the user inter-relationship graph. An attributed graph clustering algorithm
is used to find users who are deviating from the rest of the user base. Finally, an outlier ranking
technique is used to rank each user based on the characteristics of the selected features.
Section 5.2.1 describes the related work on anomaly detection in attributed graphs. Section
5.2.2 describes the literature on outlier ranking in attributed graphs. Section 5.2.3 describes the
proposed methodology for malicious insider ranking. Section 5.2.4 discusses the experimental
results. Section 5.2.5 presents the evaluation of the results.
5.2.1 Anomaly Detection in Static Attributed Graphs
Attributed graphs provide a way of obtaining richer graph representation, in which vertices and
edges exhibit their properties through both graph topology and graph attributes. These types
of graphs can be used to represent multi dimensional information and inter-relationships of ob-
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jects in many real world networks such as social networks, transaction networks, technological
networks, and biological networks. For example, in a social network, information associated
with users such as users’ interests, education level, visited locations, etc. can be represen-
ted as vertex attributes. Considering the diversity of the associated input information with the
insider threat problem, attributed graphs could be regarded as an appropriate means for data
representation.
Anomaly detection in attributed graphs can be categorised into structure based methods and
community based methods [2]. The basic idea behind structure based techniques is to identify
uncommon sub-structures based on graph connectivity as well as attributes. The community
based anomaly detection techniques focus on the vertices whose attribute values significantly
deviate from the other members of the community that they belong to. Based on the reasoning
behind the structure based and community based anomaly detection techniques, we believe that
community based anomaly detection in attributed graphs is more suitable for the insider threat
detection frameworks as it would be a better approach for comparing individual behaviour with
peers.
Attributed graph clustering has received much attention in the recent past with the identific-
ation of the requirement of analysing high dimensional, heterogeneous data. The survey papers
by Bothorel et al. [21] and Akoglu et al. [2] describe attributed graph clustering methods and
their conceptual differences. The attribute augmented graph clustering method proposed by
Zhou et al. [169] generates new vertices (attribute vertices) for each attribute and new edges
(attribute edges) between the vertex and the attribute vertex, if the corresponding vertex has
the selected attribute value. Then a unified neighbourhood random walk model is used on the
attribute augmented graph to find clusters.
In contrast to the method proposed by Zhou et al. [169], Moser et al. [106] and Gu¨nnemann
et al. [69] [70] proposed attributed graph clustering as a twofold clustering technique that
simultaneously represents attribute subspaces and dense subgraphs. A subspace cluster is a
set of objects with an appropriate dimension, in which object attributes are very similar to
each other. Dense subgraphs are a set of nodes that are densely connected with each other
based on “quasi-clique” property [95]. Among the above mentioned attributed graph clustering
algorithms, we believe subspace and subgraph clustering techniques are more suitable in the
insider threat context, in comparison to attribute augmented graph clustering.
5.2.2 Outlier Ranking in Attributed Graphs
The algorithms mentioned in the previous subsection are mainly focused on graph clustering of
attributed graphs. However, the scope of these algorithms does not cover the anomaly detection
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and outlier ranking simultaneously. The methods proposed by Gao et al. [58] simultaneously
finds communities as well as identifying community outliers using an unsupervised learning
algorithm called CODA. However, the usage of global attribute space for community detection,
introduced in CODA, may create limitations in direct application to the insider threat problem.
The method proposed by Muller et al., named GOutRank [107] is the first approach for
outlier ranking in subspaces of attributed graph clustering. GOutRank uses existing techniques
for the selection of subgraphs and subspaces. Muller et.al [107] then utilises three indicators,
(i) subspace dimension, (ii) cluster dimension, and (iii) the graph structure, to perform outlier
ranking. The normalised degree and the normalised eigenvector centrality of a vertex were used
as graph structure indicators in outlier ranking.
Another recent clustering mechanism is FOCUSCO, proposed by Perozzi et al. [121].
FOCUSCO simultaneously uses attributed graph clustering and outlier ranking utilising user
provided preferences, so-called focus attributes. The selection of user preference attributes is
the main new idea behind the FOCUSCO method. For known insider threat scenarios, this
method would be a choice, however, since most insider attacks are different from each other
definition of user preference attributes would be insider threat scenario specific. In addition
it is required to have a perfect understanding of the attribute sets related with each scenarios.
Considering the functionalities of GOutRank and FOCUSCO we select GOutRank for this
analysis.
In the following section, we introduced the use of subspace/subgraph clustering in attrib-
uted graphs with outlier ranking for ranking malicious users. We conduct our analysis based
on GOutRank outlier ranking mechanism [107] with the GAMER [69] and EDCAR [70] al-
gorithms proposed by Gu¨nnemann et al. for attributed graph clustering.
5.2.3 Methodology
This section discusses the adopted methodology in ranking individual users under the proposed
insider threat mitigation framework as in figure 5.4. Experiments were performed using the
R4.2.tar.bz dataset (R4.2 dataset) published by CERT@CMU as in the previous two chapters.
To facilitate the ease of reading a brief description of the dataset is repeated here as well. This
dataset consists of users’ Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) records and six other
broad types of data records (HTTP, logon, device, file, email and psychometric) of 1000 em-
ployees in 42 different work roles spanning an 18 months period. logon.csv consists of user
logon/logoff activities with the corresponding PC, with timestamps. The data file device.csv
is a collection of data records of removable media usage. It indicates connect/disconnect ac-
tions together with the relevant user, PC, and timestamp. The details of file copies are stored
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in the file.csv file with date, user, PC, filename, and content. The CERT dataset provides email
communication records of ‘From’, ‘To’, ‘Cc’ and ‘Bcc’ fields. It also provides email size, the
number of attachments and content keywords. The HTTP.csv file contains user web access
records which include the information on the user, PC, timestamp, URL and the web content
keywords. The psychometric.csv file provides psychometric scores based on the big five per-
sonality traits or five-factor model (FFM) for the definition of personality.
In the previous chapter the user inter-relationships were obtained by mapping supervisor-
subordinate relationship into a graph (see section 4.3.5). However, in this section, we extend
the user inter-relationship graph in addition to this, by considering users’ email communications
as well. Consequently as the first step of this approach, the relationships among enterprise users
were mapped into an undirected, unweighted graph H(U,E,A) where U = {u1, · · · } is the set
of vertices (users), E = {e1, · · · } is the set of edges, and A = {A1, · · · } is the set of attributes.
Each vertex uj (in this work this is a “user”) is associated with a vector of (a
j
1, . . . , a
j
d) ∈ <d in
a d− dimensional data space where the attribute ajk ∈ Ak.
When generating the inter-user relationship graph, users were represented as vertices. Then
the employees’ supervisor - subordinate relationship was first mapped into an undirected edge
between the corresponding users. Subsequently the email communication logs were used to
capture users’ communications within the enterprise network. The above relationship was ob-
tained by analysing all emails address ‘To’, ‘Cc’ and ‘Bcc’ within the business domain. Then,
an edge between the sender and the recipient was created. Thus two users uj and uk are adjacent
to each other, that is, have an edge between them, if there is either a supervisor - subordinate
relationship between uj and uk or if there has been an email communication between them or
both.
Within the scope of this research, we have excluded the directionality and the weights of
edges as the subspace and subgraph clustering algorithms were not developed to be applied
to directed graphs. In addition, we eliminated the users’ external email communications when
generating the graph. However, we did capture the relationship with external users as a separate
attribute (the number of external users connected through email).
Attribute Extraction
Several statistical techniques were used for extracting related attributes from various inform-
ation streams such as logon/logoff records, web access records, email communication logs,
removable media usage records, and file copying activities. The maximum, the minimum and
the average value of the selected attributes were extracted. The list of attributes used in this
analysis as well as the number of calculated sub-attributes are summarised in Table 5.6. The
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minimum, the maximum, and the average values of an attribute are counted as the three sub
attributes of the respective attribute. For example, the first attribute in table 5.6, the “number of
recipients in the ‘To’ field” has three sub attributes that are related to the minimum, maximum
and the average number of recipients in the ‘To’ field of emails received by a particular user.
Similarly all the attributes with three sub attributes are related to the minimum, average, and
maximum values of the selected attribute. Attribute descriptions are self explanatory for the
attributes with sub parameters equal to one. The parameter values that are corresponding to file
type were calculated as the ratio between the number of files copied by a user from the selected
file type and the total number of files copied by the same user. Since there are six types of files
(.doc, .pdf, .jpg, .txt, .zip, .exe) available in the file copying activity logs the number of sub
attributes of the file type attribute is six.
All categorical attributes of users (role, functional unit, department, and team) were mapped
into integers and the time values were converted to decimal format before feeding into attributed
graph clustering algorithms. The number of devices used for different services were extracted
using the user-device relationship graphs as discussed in the previous chapter (see subsection
4.3.1). Since the detailed descriptions of the selected attributes and their relationship with the
malicious intent is discussed in previous two chapters (chapters 3 and 4), descriptions of the
selected attributes are not repeated in this chapter.
Table 5.6: The list of attributes used in the attributed graph clustering framework is summarised in this table. The
number of sub attributes calculated with each attribute is also shown.
Index Attribute Description Number of sub
attributes
1 Number of recipients in the ‘To’ field 3
2 Number of recipients in the ‘Cc’ field 3
3 Number of recipients in the ‘Bcc’ field 3
4 Email size 3
5 Number of attachments 3
6 Daily number of sent emails (entire day) 3
7 Daily number of sent emails (business hours (BH)) 3
8 Daily number of sent emails (after hours (AH)) 3
9 Email sent time 3
10 Number of devices used for email activities 1
11 Number of email address 1
12 Number of internal users connected through emails 1
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Table 5.6: The list of attributes used in the attributed graph clustering framework is summarised in this table.
Index Attribute Description Number of sub
attributes
13 Number of external users connected through emails 1
14 Role 1
15 Functional unit 1
16 Department 1
17 Team 1
18 Logon Time (entire day) 3
19 Logon Time (business hours (BH)) 3
20 Logon Time (after hours (AH)) 3
21 Logoff Time (entire day) 3
22 Logoff Time (business hours (BH)) 3
23 Logoff Time (after hours (AH)) 3
24 Daily number of logons (entire day) 3
25 Daily number of logons (business hours (BH)) 3
26 Daily number of logoffs (after hours (AH)) 3
27 Daily number of devices used for logon/logoff activities 3
28 Number of daily usage - removable media (entire day) 3
29 Number of daily usage - removable media (business hours (BH)) 3
30 Number of daily usage - removable media (after hours (AH)) 3
31 Removable media usage time (entire day) 3
32 Removable media usage (business hours (BH)) 3
33 Removable media usage (after hours (AH)) 3
34 Number of devices used for removable media 1
35 Daily number of devices used for removable media 1
36 Total number of days - removable media 1
37 File copying time (entire day) 3
38 File copying time (business hours (BH)) 3
39 File copying time (after hours (AH)) 3
40 Number of days - file copying (entire day) 1
41 Number of days - file copying (business hours (BH)) 1
42 Number of days - file copying (after hours (AH)) 1
43 Number of files - file copying (entire day) 3
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Table 5.6: The list of attributes used in the attributed graph clustering framework is summarised in this table.
Index Attribute Description Number of sub
attributes
44 Number of files - file copying (business hours (BH)) 3
45 Number of files - file copying (after hours (AH)) 3
46 File type 6
47 Number of devices used for file copying 1
Subgraph and Subspace Extraction
In this work, we use community based anomaly detection techniques in attributed graphs. Our
aim is to identify the outlier nodes with the attribute values that deviate significantly from the
rest of the nodes in the selected community. In high dimensional attributed graphs, consider-
ation of the set of all attributes would not allow easy identification of the exceptional outliers.
Also, outliers would not be visible if we consider the irrelevant attributes [107]. This argument
is much more applicable in the insider threat problem as finding the hidden truth depends on
the analysis of enormous amounts of heterogeneous data. Further, the detection of some of the
insider threat cases requires analysis of different threat scenarios that include only a few of the
selected attributes or a subset of the global attribute space.
As proposed in [107] the first step for outlier ranking in high dimensional, heterogeneous
data requires automatic detection of (i) subgraphs as a graph context of an outlier and (ii)
subspaces as relevant attribute sets in which an outlier is deviating. Consequently, the selection
of subgraphs and subspaces can be achieved by subgraph and subspace clustering algorithms in
attributed graphs. As mentioned in section 5.2.1 we decided to adopt the subspace clustering
algorithms GAMER [69] and EDCAR [70] to achieve the clustering task. Since the subspace
and subgraph clustering is an emerging field in graph clustering techniques, we have decided
to use the above two algorithms which outperform on other clustering techniques on attributed
graphs.
To further elaborate on the theoretical background behind the selection of subspaces and
subgraphs, we use definitions of the terms as given by Gu¨nnemann et al. [69] [70]. The result-
ing twofold clusters should simultaneously represent subspace clusters and dense subgraphs.
Gu¨nnemann et al. have chosen effective and efficient cell-based methods for subspace cluster-
ing as in [108]. As described in [108] cell-based clustering is based on a cell approximation
of the data space. It looks for sets of fixed or variable grid cells that have more than a certain
threshold of objects. The objects of the cells are determined by a cell width w for each dimen-
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sion specified by an interval with a lower bound and upper bound. For this analysis we use to
a fixed width w for all attributes.
The subspace clusters are extracted based on the following two definitions.
Definition 5.1 ([69], page 846) A subspace cluster is a set of objects with a set of relevant
dimensions. The objects within each relevant dimension have to be very similar. That is, the
variation of the attribute values of the objects is restricted to a maximal cell width w. as
specified in definition 5.2.
Definition 5.2 ([69], Definition 1) Subspace cluster property: Given a set of vectors X ⊆ <d
and a set of dimensions S ⊆ Dim = {1, · · · , d}, the tuple (X,S) is a subspace cluster if
• ∀i ∈ S : ∀x1, x2 ∈ X : |x1[i]− x2[i]| ≤ w,
• ∀i ∈ Dim\S : ∃x1, x2 ∈ X : |x1[i]− x2[i]| > w.
In this definition x[i] refers to the ith component of the vector x ∈ <d.
In our case x1 and x2 denote the vector of attributes of users u1 and u2. x1[i] and x2[i]
denote the ith attribute of the attribute sets of u1 and u2 respectively.
Figure 5.5 is an example of three subspace clusters obtained from a dataspace of 10 objects
and 10 attributes, with a fixed w = 1.0 for each dimension.
To find the dense subgraphs the authors of GAMER [69] and EDCAR [70] algorithms
utilised the quasi clique property as in the following definition:
Definition 5.3 ([69], Definition 2) Quasi clique property: A set of vertices O ⊆ U within a
graph H(U,E,A) is a γ quasi clique if minu∈O{degO(u)} ≥ [γ.(|O| − 1)]. Here degO(u) is
the degree of vertex u within the set O, i.e. degO(u) = |{o ∈ O|(u, o) ∈ E}|.
Definition 5.4 ([69], page 846) The density of a quasi clique is given by:
γ(O) =
minu∈O[degO(u)]
(|O| − 1) .
Based on the extracted subspace clusters and dense subgraphs a twofold cluster is defined
as below, which fulfils both the subspace clustering and dense subgraphs requirements simul-
taneously.
Definition 5.5 ([69], Definition 3) Twofold cluster: Given a graph H=(U, E, A) ,a twofold
cluster C = (O, S), with respect to the thresholds smin, γmin, and nmin, is a set of vertices
O ⊆ U and a set of dimensions S ⊆ Dim with the following properties:
• (A(O), S) is a subspace cluster with |S| ≥ smin,
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A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10
u1 2.0 9.1 1.0 1.3 9.5 9.6 3.3 9.8 9.5 9.4
u2 1.1 3.4 3.4 1.7 2.1 5.9 7.5 9.3 9.9 9.7
u3 3.0 7.8 7.3 7.5 7.9 8.5 2.1 9.2 9.1 9.3
u4 4.5 7.0 7.5 7.1 7.7 0.2 4.3 9.6 9.8 9.7
u5 5.8 7.4 8.0 7.2 7.0 6.1 6.4 6.6 6.6 0.1
u6 6.4 8.2 9.1 1.3 6.8 6.0 6.8 6.7 6.4 6.7
u7 7.5 0.3 2.3 4.2 6.6 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.4 8.7
u8 8.4 2.4 4.5 2.1 6.4 6.4 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.6
u9 9.4 4.5 1.1 1.3 6.3 6.3 6.5 6.9 6.8 5.2
u10 9.1 6.4 8.3 3.5 7.5 5.6 3.7 1.9 1.1 2.3
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Cluster 1 (U1,U2,U3,U4) in subspace  ( A8, A9,A10)
Cluster 2 (U3,U4,U5) in subspace  ( A2, …, A5)
Cluster 3 (U5,U6,U7,U8,U9) in subspace  ( A5, …, A9)
Figure 5.5: An example for subspace clustering: this illustrates three clusters obtained from a dataspace with 10
objects and 10 attributes (dimensions), with the minimum dimension of 3, and a fixed minimum width (w) of 1.0.
• O fulfils the quasi clique property with γ(O) ≥ γmin,
• The induced subgraph of O is connected and |O| ≥ nmin.
Here A(O) = {A(o)|o ∈ O} denote the set of vectors associated to the set of vertices O ⊆ U .
The three threshold values smin, γmin, and nmin are used to parametrize the requirement for a
twofold cluster. In addition smin, γmin, and nmin represent the minimum subspace dimension,
the minimum quasi clique density, and the minimum cluster size are the minimum parameter
value that need to satisfy to being selected for a twofold cluster.
Actually the threshold parameters smin, γmin, and nmin simply control the number of two-
fold clusters while they do not influence the characteristics of optimal twofold clusters. In
addition only quasi cliques with a density 0.5 are considered for twofold clusters to ensure the
vertices of the quasi clique are connected [69].
With the above definition, the set of all the twofold clusters are determined. However, the
number of twofold clusters can be large as there can be overlapping clusters. In such a case only
the meaningful clusters or the optimal twofold clusters are obtained by the GAMER algorithm.
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Based on the conditions given in definition 5.9 GAMER greedily selects clusters based on
both, the binary redundancy relationship≺red as defined in definition 5.6 and the quality of the
cluster Q(C) as defined in definition 5.7.
Definition 5.6 ([69], Definition 5) Binary redundancy relation: Given the redundancy para-
meters robj ,rdim ∈ [0, 1], the binary redundancy relation ≺red is defined by: For all twofold
clusters C = (O, S), C¯ = (O¯, S¯): C ≺red C¯ ⇔ Q(C) < Q(C¯)∧ |O∩O¯||O| ≥ robj ∧
|S∩S¯|
|S| ≥ rdim.
Definition 5.7 ([69], Definition 4) Quality of a twofold cluster: Given a twofold cluster C =
(O, S), the quality of C is defined by,Q(C) = γ(O)a. |O|b . |S|c. Here a, b, and c can be varied,
however to rate all aspects equally we define a = b = c = 1.
Then an optimal twofold cluster is defined as in the following definition.
Definition 5.8 ([69], Definition 6) Optimal twofold clustering: Given the set of all twofold
clusters Cls, the optimal twofold clustering Res ⊆ Cls fulfils
• ∃Ci, Cj ∈ Res : Ci ≺red Cj (redundancy free),
• ∀Ci ∈ Cls\Res : ∃Cj ∈ Res : Ci ≺red Cj (maximality).
The other subspace clustering algorithm we chose for our experiments, EDCAR, uses a
much more efficient method for finding the final set of clusters based on the same twofold
clusters obtained by definition 5.5. As opposed to deciding which cluster to select for the
result locally as done by the GAMER algorithm, the EDCAR algorithm performs a global
optimisation method to obtain the final set of clusters. With the EDCAR algorithm, the final
set of clusters is extracted using the maximum quality clustering property as defined in the
following definition as given in [70].
Definition 5.9 ([70], Definition 3) Maximal Quality Clustering: Given the set of all twofold
clusters, the maximum quality clustering Res ⊆ Cls fulfils
• ∃Ci, Cj ∈ Res : Ci ≺red Cj (redundancy free),
• ∃R′es ⊆ Cls : R′es fulfils redundancy free property and∑
Ci∈R′es Q(Ci) >
∑
Ci∈Res Q(Ci) (maximum quality sum).
• Here∑Ci∈Res Q(Ci) is the quality sum of the overall clustering.
In the context of our problem, the results of the EDCAR and GAMER algorithms extracts
clusters of users and sets of correlated attributes simultaneously from the attributed graph H =
(U,E,A). We utilise this output as the input for the outlier ranking method as discussed in the
next subsection.
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Outlier Ranking
The next step involves ranking all vertices of the attributed graph H based on the identified
subgraphs and subspaces. In the context of the insider threat problem, vertex ranking can
be considered as a user ranking system that can be utilised by a security analyst for further
investigations. The first outlier ranking approach in subspaces of attributed graphs (GOutRank )
was proposed by Mu¨ller et. al [107]. We first calculate the outlier ranking scores of the user ui
based on the two proposed scoring mechanisms given in [107] that are defined based on node
degree and eigenvector centrality as in equations (5.5) ([107] definition 4 ) and (5.6) ([107]
definition 5 ).
score1(ui) =
1
3
∑
{(C,S)∈Res|ui∈C}
|C|
cmax
+
|S|
smax
+
deg(ui)
degmax
, (5.5)
score2(ui) =
1
3
∑
{(C,S)∈Res|ui∈C}
|C|
cmax
+
|S|
smax
+
EC(ui)
ECmax
. (5.6)
where |C| is the number of objects in cluster C, |S| is the number of attributes in S, cmax is
the maximum cluster size in Res, smax is the maximum dimensionality in Res.
deg(ui)
degmax
∈ [0, 1]
is the normalised vertex degree of ui,
EC(ui)
ECmax
∈ [0, 1] is the normalised eigenvector centrality of
the vertex ui.
In addition to the above two scoring mechanisms we use the betweenness centrality measure
which is a measure of the centrality in graphs based on the shortest paths (see 2.2.2 for the
description of betweenness centrality). The corresponding score is calculated as in equation
(5.7).
score3(ui) =
1
3
∑
{(C,S)∈Res|ui∈C}
|C|
cmax
+
|S|
smax
+
BC(ui)
BCmax
. (5.7)
where BC(ui)
BCmax
∈ [0, 1] is the normalised betweenness centrality of the vertex ui.
Also we calculate score4(ui), score5(ui) and score6(ui), which are combinations of the
above mentioned three graph properties (degree, eigenvector centrality and betweenness cent-
rality) as in equations (5.8), (5.9) and (5.10).
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score4(ui) =
1
4
∑
{(C,S)∈Res|ui∈C}
Y +
EC(ui)
ECmax
, (5.8)
score5(ui) =
1
4
∑
{(C,S)∈Res|ui∈C}
Y +
BC(ui)
BCmax
, (5.9)
score6(ui) =
1
5
∑
{(C,S)∈Res|ui∈C}
Y +
EC(ui)
ECmax
+
BC(ui)
BCmax
, (5.10)
where
Y =
|C|
cmax
+
|S|
smax
+
deg(ui)
degmax
.
In all the above equations |C| is the number of objects in cluster C and |S| is the number
of attributes in the subspace. cmax and cmax are the maximal cluster size and the maximal
dimensionality in Res. Also deg(ui)/degmax, EC(ui)/ECmax and BC(ui)/BCmax represent
normalized edge degree, normalised eigenvector centrality, and normalised betweenness cent-
rality respectively.
Vertices not clustered or clustered as part of tiny, sparsely connected communities with low
dimensional subspaces are considered as clear outliers. Therefore the vertices with lower score
values were regarded as outliers while vertices with higher score values were treated as normal.
5.2.4 Experimental Results
The experiments were performed using the R4.2 dataset that was introduced in section 5.2.3.
Figure 5.6(a) corresponds to the user relationship graph generated using both the organisational
hierarchy and email communications within the enterprise network. For comparison purposes,
we illustrate the user relationship graph generated only considering the organisational struc-
ture in figure 5.6(b). The less dense graph illustrated in figure 5.6(b) indicates that we can
not extract much structural information about user relationships by just considering the organ-
isational structure. Therefore the graph generated using both the organisational hierarchy and
email communications would be a good choice for identifying inter-user relationships. The
graph 5.6(a) has 1000 vertices and 116,097 undirected and unweighed edges. Each vertex
is defined as a vector of 125 attributes that were extracted from different information sources
summarised in table 5.6.
The experiments were carried out with GAMER [69] and EDCAR [70] algorithms for dif-
ferent values of nmin (minimum number of members in a cluster) and smin (minimum subspace
dimension) keeping other parameters of the algorithms fixed (γmin = 0.5, a = b = c = 1,
robj = 0.1 and rdim = 0.1). γmin defines the minimum density of the quasi clique. As
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Figure 5.6: User relationship graphs: (a) illustrates the user relationships based on both the organisational hierarchy and the email communications and (b) illustrates
the user relationship based on only the organisational hierarchy. Both graphs are shown after clustering users based on the functional unit for improved visualisation.
Inter group edges of (a) are illustrated in thick edges. The intergroup edges of (b) can be seen with thinner edges as a result of the relatively smaller number of
intergroup edges compared with (a).
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explained in the previous section a, b, and c are used in defining the quality function of the
twofold cluster and the redundancy of different clusters are controlled by robj and rdim. The
GAMER algorithm did not produce any output within three days of processing while the ED-
CAR algorithm produced all outputs within several hours. Consequently table 5.7 summarises
the number of clusters and number of users clustered together using the EDCAR algorithms
with different nmin and smin values. Based on the number of clusters and the total number of
users grouped together in each case, we achieved better clustering for lower values of nmin for
constant smin values. Based on this result we observed that nmin = 3 is a good choice for
the number of users in a cluster. The total number of users belonging to clusters as well as
the number of clusters decreases with the increase of the minimum number of members in a
cluster (nmin). This results in a higher number of users not belonging to any of the clusters. We
believe, that higher the number of users who can be clustered, higher the number of users who
indicate similar behaviour. Users who cannot be clustered based on both structural and attrib-
ute properties can be regarded as possibly high risk employees, as their behaviour is somewhat
different from the others.
To compare the effectiveness of the attributed graph clustering, we performed graph clus-
tering on the same graph with several other plain graph clustering techniques. (All these al-
gorithms are available in R - igraph package [35]). Brief descriptions of these algorithms are
presented in section 2.2.3. Plain graph clustering methods mainly looked at the graph structure
and do not consider the associated vertex attributes. The number of clusters obtained for the se-
lected topological graph community detection techniques is summarized in table 5.8. From the
number of clusters obtained using the structural community detection methods we can clearly
see that many of these algorithms do not suit our problem, due to the relatively smaller number
of clusters resulting in a larger number of unclustered users or clusters with a large number
of memberships. Even though the number of clusters obtained from the edge betweenness
community detection algorithm [61] is relatively close to the number of clusters obtained with
attributed graph clustering, many of the clusters (225) comprise of only a single vertex, which
can be regarded as not being clustered at all, and all the other users were clustered in a single
community. Therefore it is evident that the application of attributed graph clustering is much
more meaningful than the traditional structural community detection techniques in the context
of the insider threat problem. Also from the two different attributed graph clustering methods
EDCAR and GAMER, we observed better results with EDCAR as GAMER did not produce
results within three days of run time.
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Table 5.7: Clustering summary for the EDCAR algorithm: this table summarises the number of clusters and
the number of clustered users based on different combinations of minimum cluster size (nmin) and minimum
subspace size (smin).
smin
Number of Clusters Number of Clustered Users
nmin nmin
3 4 5 3 4 5
2 237 118 66 745 493 342
3 248 114 83 763 474 429
4 240 121 55 734 501 282
5 234 111 81 719 480 417
6 250 120 67 768 505 339
7 251 109 84 766 461 426
8 248 113 90 761 476 461
9 241 104 89 732 434 456
10 238 115 66 744 459 336
Outlier Ranking
Outlier ranking scores corresponding to different scoring functions (defined in equations (5.5)
to (5.10)) are calculated and illustrated in figure 5.7, in descending order of scores for three
different nmin values (3, 4, and 5). The score distributions corresponding to other cases with
same nmin values exhibit similar shape. All the other graphs are presented in appendix B.
The distribution of outlier scores in the case nmin = 3 and smin = 8 (figure 5.7(a)), indicates
that the majority of users have fairly common ranking scores while a minority of users have
either relatively higher scores or lower scores. However, based on the subspace and subgraph
clustering algorithm, the users with higher scores can be treated as normal as they correspond
to densely connected subgraphs for a set of attributes. Therefore the users with the lower scores
can be regarded as possibly suspicious actors, who deviate from the majority of users. The rest
of the outlier score graphs indicate that the percentage of users with lower scores increases
with increasing nmin. Consequently, we believe that better performance can be achieved by
keeping nmin, the minimum number of members in a cluster to a relatively small number. This
argument can be easily correlated with real world environments as only a few employees will
behave similarly when we consider sets of associated parameters.
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(c) Case 6 (n=5,s=3)
Figure 5.7: The variations of the outlier scores for different scoring functions are illustrated in above figures. (a)
is related to the best performing combination with nmin = 3, (b) is related to the best performing combination
with nmin = 4, and (c) is related to the best performing combination with nmin = 5. The best performance is
defined in terms of the AUC value of the ROC curve presented in table 5.9, reference to the case numbers (Case
9, Case 5, and Case 6) can also be found in table 5.9
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(a) Case 19 (n=3, s=8)
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(b) Case 1 (n=3, s=2)
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(c) Case 22 (n=3, s=9)
Figure 5.8: ROC curves for different scoring functions with EDCAR clustering algorithm: (a), (b) and (c) are
corresponding to the three best performing combinations in terms of the observed AUC values. Reference to the
case numbers (Case 9, Case 5, and Case 6) can be found in table 5.9
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Table 5.8: This table summarises the number of clusters and the cluster sizes obtained from the topological graph
clustering algorithms.
Clustering Algorithm No. of
Clusters
Cluster Membership Size
Edge Betweeness 226 1× 225, 775
Walktrap 12 31× 11, 659
Multilevel 11 20,23,37,39,76,107,108,135,150
Fastgreedy 3 260,298,442
Leading Eigenvector 3 245,273,482
Informap 1 1000
Label propagation 1 1000
5.2.5 Discussion of Results
The ground truth from the dataset was used for the evaluation of the results. The area under
curve (AUC) value of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves is used as the in-
dicator for the assessment. Figure 5.8 illustrates the corresponding ROC curves for the test
scenario with the best achieved AUC values. Corresponding AUC values for different scoring
functions based on the EDCAR attributed graph clustering technique are summarised in table
5.9.
From the different nmin values the best performance is observed for nmin = 3. With the
value of nmin = 3 the best performance is achieved with smin of 8. We achieved the best
AUC values of ROC curves for all the scoring functions with the combination of nmin = 3
and smin = 8. With this combination (nmin = 3 and smin = 8), scoring functions defined
with individual graph properties (equations (5.5) to (5.7)) performed better than the scoring
functions defined as a combination of graph properties (equations (5.8) to (5.10)). With these
empirical results we believe the scoring functions defined in equations (5.5) to (5.7) performed
equally well. The fairly good AUC values obtained from this analysis implies that the proposed
framework performs very well.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, we investigated the application of two distinct graph based anomaly detection
techniques for finding suspicious users. The first method investigated the possibility of use
of plain graph based anomaly detection techniques to identify anomalous users from benign
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Table 5.9: AUC values for different scoring functions with EDCAR clustering algorithm: this table lists the AUC
values of the ROC curves generated for different combinations of nmin, smin and six scoring functions.
Case nmin smin score.1 score.2 score.3 score.4 score.5 score.6
1 3 2 0.7313 0.7287 0.7478 0.7017 0.7090 0.6927
2 4 2 0.6687 0.6690 0.6669 0.6576 0.6572 0.6503
3 5 2 0.6017 0.6014 0.6009 0.5976 0.5974 0.5952
4 3 3 0.6931 0.6923 0.6958 0.6634 0.6656 0.6430
5 4 3 0.6794 0.6800 0.6781 0.6707 0.6704 0.6641
6 5 3 0.6040 0.6045 0.6032 0.5963 0.5968 0.5929
7 3 4 0.7114 0.7109 0.7100 0.6795 0.6801 0.6623
8 4 4 0.6453 0.6453 0.6442 0.6335 0.6341 0.6269
9 5 4 0.5732 0.5742 0.5708 0.5705 0.5695 0.5698
10 3 5 0.6996 0.6994 0.7004 0.6717 0.6728 0.6516
11 4 5 0.5917 0.5923 0.5918 0.5825 0.5826 0.5816
12 5 5 0.5479 0.5474 0.5473 0.5374 0.5391 0.5337
13 3 6 0.6988 0.6967 0.7021 0.6618 0.6669 0.6371
14 4 6 0.6223 0.6230 0.6210 0.6080 0.6083 0.6048
15 5 6 0.6051 0.6067 0.6028 0.6015 0.5997 0.5973
16 3 7 0.7035 0.7025 0.7034 0.6786 0.6789 0.6648
17 4 7 0.5836 0.5842 0.5834 0.5752 0.5757 0.5727
18 5 7 0.6336 0.6341 0.6327 0.6284 0.6284 0.6250
19 3 8 0.7648 0.7649 0.7638 0.7329 0.7349 0.7114
20 4 8 0.6222 0.6218 0.6235 0.6145 0.6153 0.6114
21 5 8 0.6132 0.6130 0.6135 0.6051 0.6058 0.5998
22 3 9 0.7160 0.7153 0.7139 0.6808 0.6814 0.6621
23 4 9 0.6516 0.6519 0.6508 0.6408 0.6410 0.6306
24 5 9 0.6013 0.6014 0.6003 0.5925 0.5922 0.5897
25 3 10 0.6743 0.6731 0.6775 0.6443 0.6476 0.6220
26 4 10 0.6013 0.6014 0.6003 0.5925 0.5922 0.5897
27 5 10 0.6073 0.6076 0.6055 0.6017 0.6008 0.6011
207
Chapter 5. Graph Based Approaches for Insider Threat Detection
users. In this particular analysis, we also investigated the mechanism for extracting inter-user
relationships utilising users’ web access records. It was observed that the graph based methods
are an excellent choice for representing the enormous amount of data associated with users’ web
access records. With this approach, we introduced the use of two vertex similarity measures (i)
the normalised Jaccard similarity metric and (ii) the normalised square root similarity distance
for extraction of users’ interrelationships. The selected vertex similarity measures were related
to the number of accessed URLs by an individual as well as the common number of URLs
accessed by a person within his/her designation. The calculated pairwise similarity values
were mapped into a binary value based on a threshold value, which was chosen based on the
entire similarity matrix of the designation. The resulting binary matrix was considered as an
adjacency matrix of a graph of users.
In summary, we projected the large size user - URL bipartite graph into an inter-user rela-
tionship graph with a chosen threshold value of the vertex similarity matrix. We investigated
the user clustering as an independent maximal clique problem to differentiate suspicious users
from legitimate users. The main reason for the investigation of the above clustering technique
was for a feasibility analysis on the use of graph based anomaly detection for the insider threat
problem. We believe the above described method is an appropriate technique to cluster users
based on a single aspect. Even though we achieved fairly good results for user categorisation,
we had to explore the methods to represent high dimensional, heterogeneous parameters cor-
related with insider’s behaviour. Consequently, we focused on attributed graphs as a means for
representing high dimensional heterogeneous data associated with the insider threat problem.
Since the attributed graphs provide a means of representing associated attributes as a vertex
or edge attributes, we introduced the use of attributed graphs for representing high dimensional,
heterogeneous data in the context of the insider threat detection as the second major contribu-
tion of this chapter. The insider threat detection framework proposed here combines attributed
graph clustering techniques and outlier ranking in subspaces of attributed graphs. To the best of
our knowledge, though the graph based approaches have been previously adopted in malicious
insider threat detection frameworks, anomaly detection in attributed graphs using subspace and
subgraph clustering has not been widely applied in insider threat detection frameworks. Thus
our work is a novel examples of using subspace/subgraph clustering coupled with outlier rank-
ing for anomaly detection in the insider threat research domain.
We utilised two main subspace/subgraph clustering algorithms namely, EDCAR and GAMER,
for community detection in attributed graphs. Also, we adopted the outlier ranking mechanism
GOutRank, which is the first approach in the literature for outlier ranking in subspaces of attrib-
uted graphs. In addition to the proposed vertex scoring mechanisms in GOutRank algorithm,
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we also identified betweenness centrality measure as another useful centrality score. Fairly
good AUC values obtained with the outlier scores defined in equations (5.5) to (5.7) confirms
the effectiveness of the proposed framework.
In addition to the introduction of attributed graph clustering for insider threat detection, we
identified graph based methods are an excellent way to capture the inter-user relationships from
web access records and email communications.
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Chapter 6
A Comprehensive Insider Threat
Mitigation Framework
In chapter 3, the correlation between the insider threat problem with various parameters from
technical, behavioural, psychological, and organisational aspects were identified. A user’s be-
haviour was quantified into a single numerical value based on the identified features. A user
ranking system was introduced as a preliminary insider threat prediction model. Two major
insider threat detection models were proposed in chapters 4 and 5. In this chapter we invest-
igate the feasibility of integrating the models proposed above into a comprehensive theoretical
solution for the insider threat problem.
Despite the fact that there are many proprietary solutions (for example: Splunk, observeIT,
AlienVault) available in the market for detecting malicious insider activities, the number of
victims of insider attacks are continuing to rise. Almost all of these tools are focused on user
behaviour and capitalise on emerging big data analytics platforms. Some of these tools can
accurately identify known attacks or specialized attacks on some systems. However, the smart
insider always looks for new avenues to commit the attack rather than repeating the same attack.
Consequently solutions targeting on known attacks would not be the ideal way to detect insider
attacks.
Due to its severity, in addition to the involvement of trusted humans, the insider threat prob-
lem requires a preventive or an early warning system rather than a reaction and damage control.
Therefore, threat prediction is a major requirements for an excellent insider threat mitigation
solution. The reality of the insider threat problem is that it is not possible to completely detect
or prevent insider threats solely by software analytics or access controls. Any effective insider
threat prevention program needs to be coupled with non-technical factors as well.
To achieve the minimum possible false positive rate, threat detection needs to be addressed
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along with threat prediction in a proper solution. The other major requirement of a good insider
threat solution is threat detection and prediction capability that comes with a great deal of sys-
tem automation. Such an automated system should be capable of generating critical alarms on
identified malicious users/events in a timely manner such that a security analyst can investigate
further.
The following are the major requirements of a commercially viable and comprehensive
insider threat prediction and detection solution.
• Ability to process heterogeneous data from various information sources.
• User behavioural analysis for profiling users.
• An insider threat prediction framework
• An insider threat detection framework
• An automatic alarm generation mechanism
• A graphical user interface for administration of the system
Consideration of the above facts led us to investigate the feasibility of a commercially viable
comprehensive solution using the mathematical models presented in the previous chapters. The
following are the major contributions in this chapter:
• A review of the insider threat prediction and detection frameworks proposed in academic
literature.
• A review of the existing commercial insider threat and user behaviour analysis solutions.
• Introduction of a comprehensive theoretical framework for insider threat prediction and
detection.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 describes the insider
threat detection and prediction frameworks in the academic literature. Section 6.2 presents a
review of the commercially available insider threat detection solutions. Section 6.3 introduces
the proposed theoretical framework of this thesis for insider threat mitigation. Section 6.4
concludes the chapter with a summary.
6.1 Insider Threat Detection Frameworks Proposed in Aca-
demic Literature
The insider threat prediction tool (ITPT ) proposed by Magklara and Furnell [97] is one of the
earliest models proposed for insider threat prediction. The proposed ITPT architecture is an
operating system independent model, and this can be considered as an advantage. This archi-
tecture comprises of an ITPT manager, ITPT analyser, monitoring module, and data collection
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submodules. The ITPT manager coordinates the operation of the various modules and provides
the Graphical User Interface (GUI) for the human operator. Actual insider threat estimation is
performed in the ITPT analyser that is considered to be the heart of the overall system. The
output of the ITPT analyser is a threat profile that is categorised into one of four categories of
users (possible intentional threat, potential accidental threat, suspicious, and harmless) defined
by the authors [97]. Further, the ITPT analyser uses a variety of algorithms to predict the threat.
The monitoring module is responsible for the collection of data specified by the monitoring cri-
teria. The data is collected at four submodules: (i) filesystem, (ii) memory, (iii) I/O, and (iv)
hardware. The filesystem submodule is responsible for identifying misuses of high-level file
operations such as locating the presence of certain files and directories, extraction of strings or
certain data patterns and file integrity checks. The memory monitoring submodule is respons-
ible for the monitoring of irregular memory usage patterns. The I/O submodule monitors the
relative usage of networking protocols. The hardware monitoring module is responsible for
monitoring changes to physical configurations. The major limitation of this architecture is that
the data analysis is restricted to the analysis of technical capabilities such as high level file oper-
ations, irregular memory usage patterns, and network monitoring. However, being a very early
attempt at insider threat prediction this model opens different avenues to other researchers.
Legg et al. [90] proposed an automated insider threat detection mechanism based on user
and role based profile assessments. The key components of their model are the record retrieval
system, user and role-based profiling unit, profile feature extraction unit, anomaly assessment
unit, and the threat classification unit. This system constructs a user’s daily observation profile,
and a daily profile for the work roles using the available logs retrieved from the organisation’s
central log database. The created user’s daily profile is assessed on three levels of alerts (i)
policy violations and previously recognised attacks, (ii) threshold-based anomalies, and (iii)
deviation-based anomalies. At each stage of assessment, automatic alerts are generated to a
security analyst. The analyst can decide whether the alert is correct or not. If the analyst
believes the alert is incorrect, he has the privilege to reject the alert and refine the system
parameters to minimise the false positive rate.
At the first stage of their architecture, when creating a user’s profile, in addition to the activ-
ity log analysis unit (activity parser) they proposed an optional content analysis unit (content
parser). The bag of words method and the Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) method
[149] are utilised for contextual data analysis in the content parser unit. The threat assessment
is performed using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to obtain a projection of features into
a lower dimensional space based on the amount of variance exhibited by each feature. At the
final stage, the standard deviation, Mahalanobis distance and the covariance matrix are used as
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classification models to assess the threat.
Generation of alerts at different levels is an advantage for reducing the false positive rate of
the Legg et al.’s [90] proposed system. However, the consideration of only the logs generated
inside the enterprise network is one of the limitations of this method as it does not contain any
information on users’ psychological, organisational and social behaviour.
Stephen et al. [104] introduced a distributed beneficial software system (Ben-Ware) capable
of identifying anomalous human behaviour within an organisation. Instead of a centralised data
collection approach Ben-Ware was developed as a distributed system. The lightweight probes
hosted on each computer are used for data collection. Intermediate nodes are used to cache and
forward data while the high-end nodes process the data. Human behavioural analysis was in-
corporated in this architecture that identifies individual behavioural signatures and anomalies.
Human behaviour analysis is performed using Artificial Intelligence (AI). The selected fea-
ture set only includes users’ logon activities, external storage device usage activities, file usage
activities, and web usage activities. Once again, this model does not consider users’ psycholo-
gical, social, and organisational aspects. Their prototype achieved a good detection rate with
low false positive rates. This model can be considered as a threat detection model rather than a
threat prediction model.
Real time anomaly detection in streaming heterogeneity (RADISH ) system proposed by
Bo¨se et al. [20] is based on analysing the information streams of an enterprise’s computational
network. This system is capable of simultaneously analysing heterogeneous input streams
to learn patterns of normal behaviour and search for anomalies in the context of the learned
behaviour. The RADISH system comprises of two distinct processes : (i) a learning process
(RADISH-L ) and (ii) an alerting process (RADISH-A ).
The system architecture of RADISH consists of five major units namely sensors, harmon-
izer, RADISH-L, RADISH-A, and the controller. Sensors are devices and applications capable
of relaying information on user, asset, or resource utilization to the Harmonizer. Examples of
sensors are various log files such as HTTP logs, email logs, system call logs, and database
access logs. The harmonizer normalises events into a common format and orders them based
on time. One limitation of RADISH is that when a new input stream is introduced a plugin
must be implemented to facilitate data conversion into the harmonizer’s common data format.
RADISH-L uses specialised machine learning algorithms to dynamically process streaming
data extracted from the harmonizer. Then it creates statistical models representing normal pat-
terns that are utilised by RADISH-A. If RADISH-A identifies anomalies in the event streams
with a sufficient risk factor, these events are elevated to an alert and reported to the analyst
via the controller. The analyst dashboard or the controller is the graphical user interface of the
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system. This allows the analyst to control the operation of the system and maintain situational
awareness using data visualisation.
There is no doubt that the above described theoretical frameworks and prototypes have
contributed to insider threat academic literature. However, all of these models face different
limitations and drawbacks. Various models use feature sets particularly defined by the authors
based on many of the associated system and network data, as there is no common feature set
agreed upon within the insider threat research community. This problem is further elevated by
the unavailability of commonly agreed datasets for testing and evaluations. Although many of
the systems consider associated technical parameters, they are lagging behind on analysing non-
technical parameters associated with users’ psychological, social and organisational behaviour.
6.2 Commercial Products
In addition to the above mentioned frameworks in the academic literature, we conducted a
thorough review of various insider threat tools currently on the market. Most of the tools in
the market have evolved from traditional security information and event management (SIEM)
products that are largely dependent on machine data. We came across a few tools which have
been built from the ground up to cater to the insider threat landscape. However, these tools
were still limited to technical data and using anomaly detection techniques to flag rogue user
behaviours. The following is a detailed investigation into the industry-leading tools and their
coverage.
6.2.1 Splunk User Behaviour Analytics - Splunk UBA
Splunk [146] is a dominant player in the data analytics space. It provides a software platform
for searching, monitoring, and analysing machine generated big data. The platform is capable
of consuming any type of log or a file type enabling the splunk search processing language to
manipulate this data to produce desired outcomes. Over time, Splunk has evolved to provide
anomaly detection algorithms and machine learning. Splunk user behaviour analysis (UBA) is
a tool that has been built on the underlying analytics platform which performs specific searches
around user behaviour.
According to published material [146], the tool provides malware and insider threat detec-
tion, protection from account compromise and privileged account abuses, suspicious behaviour
analysis, and data filtration and IP theft detection.
Splunk UBA analyses events using specially crafted search queries and then performs be-
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haviour baselining, peer group analytics, clustering, graph walks and other techniques to find
hidden threats. In order to provide UBA analytics it uses data ingested from various systems
such as firewalls, directory services, identity management tools, endpoint and system logs, and
any other security incident event management (SIEM) tools.
6.2.2 ObserveIT
ObserveIT is a software based user activity monitoring and internal risk identification platform
[117]. This software monitors and records all user activities from servers and desktops on Win-
dows, Unix, and Linux platforms. ObserveIT assesses the risk of every user, analyses, and
scores user activities for identifying suspicious activity and security violations. This software
uses an insider threat library - ITL, a proprietary library of alert rules configured to address
the insider threat problem. The ITL covers the most common scenarios of risky user activit-
ies across operating systems, applications, and users. Some examples of risky user activities
included in the ITL are: (i) sending sensitive documents to a local/network printer during irreg-
ular hours, (ii) creating backdoors, and (iii) changing the root password. Alerts are generated
based on the rules defined in the ITL. In addition, risk scores of the users are calculated based
on the user’s activities and ITL. Keylogging techniques are used to capture sensitive keywords
and commands that users type on websites, applications, and shell command tools. URL fil-
tering techniques are used to capture users’ web browsing habits. SQL queries executed by
database administrators on production databases are also monitored by ObserverIT. The On-
screen activity records, in both video and log format, can be used by an analyst to conduct
forensics analysis.
ObserveIT uses software agents running on each Windows, UNIX, and Linux gateways,
servers, and desktops to collect users’ activity data. Implementation of such an agent on all
servers, gateways, and desktops would definitely increase the system overhead. The data col-
lected from each device is send to the ObserveIT application server. The application servers
sends the relevant activity logs and screen video data to a database server for storage. The
application server provides the user interface for the security analyst. The main component of
the interface, user risk dashboard provides an overall organisational risk from insider threats
and prioritised list of users and applications with the greatest risk to the organisation. This
software has the capability to identify security policy violations by users by comparing with
the organisational security policy. The use of an insider threat library that is based on known
risks, the deployment of software agents on each device, and the large number of alerts are a
few of the limitations of this solution.
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6.2.3 Fortscale
The Fortscale user and entity behaviour analytic (UEBA) solution targeting on insider threat
detection is developed on Hadoop-based architecture [53]. This system collects authentication
and access data from SIEM products and other critical applications within the enterprise. It
applies an entity-level behavioural model that accurately identifies malicious activity and com-
promised accounts. This platform comprises of several proprietary data processing units that
control data collection, enrichment processes, advanced analytic engines, and investigation
capabilities. Fortscale extracts data from an enterprise’s existing centralised log system and
processes both historical and current data to create a user’s behaviour baselines. Through the
enrichment process, entities extracted from the raw data streams are coupled with other entities
such as corresponding userID with machine ID. The integrated statistical models are then used
to enrich the collected stream of log data. Fortscale uses an anomaly detection unit based on
unsupervised machine learning for abnormal user behaviour identification. At the anomaly de-
tection unit, an event is quantified as a distinctive normalised score based on the rarity and the
risk of the event. The above score relies on parameter level modelling, group-level modelling,
and statistical modelling. The event-risk scores are transformed into indicators of compromise
in the Fortscale consolidated alert generation engine.
Despite the fact that this solution performed well in protecting a traditional network con-
centrating on access and authentication logs [26], it needs a considerable amount of expansion
as a complete insider threat detection tool. This solution addresses only the access and au-
thentication logs that cover only one dimension of the insider threat problem. Content based
analysis on different aspects such as email communications and web usage patterns are not
addressed. Furthermore, this tool does not cover any psychological indicators and does not
consider workplace behavioural changes. The use of proprietary units could also be seen as a
limitation of this system.
6.2.4 Securonix
The Securonix insider threat management solution [137] addresses context based monitoring,
advanced behaviour anomaly detection, and link analysis driven investigations. Securonix de-
tects high risk users as well as high risk activities, access, and events using data mining tech-
niques. This tool builds a risk profile of a user based on various records such as identity,
security violations, system access, physical access and phone records. All of the above records
are compared to the user’s baseline, his/her peers and known threat indicators. High privileged
accounts are monitored for abnormal behaviour. This solution is also capable of identifying
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“slow and low” IT fraud activities.
According to the published solution description [137] Securonix is capable of managing in-
sider threats to a certain extent. However, users’ online behaviour analysis based on email com-
munications, web access, and social media activities is not factored into this solution. Users’
psychological behaviour, as well as the organisational behaviour changes that are often the
precursors of insider attacks, are also not considered.
6.2.5 AlienVault
AlienVaullt unified security management (USM) [6] enables insider threat detection from sys-
tems on premises, private cloud, and public cloud environments. AlienVault USM uses network
intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and host intrusion detection systems (HIDS) to inspect net-
work traffic within the perimeter. It also has the capability of monitoring device connections to
USB ports that can potentially be an unauthorised activity that can lead to data theft. AlienVault
USM also provides the detection of privilege escalations without authorised change requests.
6.2.6 Other solutions
In addition to the solutions described above, there are several other commercial products avail-
able in the market. However many of them focus only on user behaviour analysis, privileged
account security and data loss prevention (DLP). RSA data loss prevention (DLP) endpoint
solution [49] is one such method that prevents data leakage by discovering an organisation’s
sensitive data through monitoring and controlling actions such as printing, copying, emailing
and saving confidential and sensitive data files.
CyberArk Privileged Threat Analytics [36] is an advanced system for privileged account
security intelligence. Instead of collecting all data across the organisation’s IT network this
system collects only the data that contains a high risk for extensive damage. With a relatively
low amount of targeted data, the analytic engine of this solution can quickly identify anom-
alous activities. This solution includes a complex combination of proprietary algorithms for
abnormal user detection. Typical behaviour for privileged users, privileged accounts, priv-
ileged access to machines and Kerberos authentication attempts are calculated using machine
learning algorithms. Deviations from the normal behaviour are identified using statistical mod-
elling. Anomalous privileged activities are alerted to a security team, and each security event
is assigned a risk score.
Forcepoint [52] insider threat is a user behaviour monitoring tool designed specifically to
protect intellectual property or regulatory compliant data from both malicious and accidental
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threats. This system establishes a baseline for both individual and workgroup behaviours. An-
omalies are detected on an individual’s behaviour and are used to provides a consolidated daily
risk score for each user. The riskiest users are alerted to an analyst by prioritising the alerts.
Darktrace [37] is an enterprise immune system delivered for cyber defence focusing on
both external and internal attacks. The underlying technology of this software is unsupervised
machine learning and probabilistic mathematics. Based on the understanding of the general
behaviour of users, as well as devices across the enterprise, it detects anomalous activities. In
the particular case of insider threat detection Darktrace only addresses the anomalous internal
file transfers and unauthorised use of privileged accounts. Irrespective of the capabilities of the
external threat detection techniques associated with Darktrace, many more aspects need to be
integrated for real insider threat detection.
Dtex [44] provides an enterprise-wide endpoint monitoring software to protect against the
insider threat. Dtex collects data using an ultra-lightweight collector on the endpoint. This
system includes more than 5, 000 patterns of known bad behaviour that have been gathered
from real-world investigations. These patterns allow Dtex to quickly and efficiently pinpoint
known-bad behaviour from day one. Anomalies are automatically identified based on a user’s
baseline behaviour. However, supervised anomaly detection or anomaly detection based on
known signatures is not the most appropriate means for insider threat detection.
The investigation of the above mentioned commercially available insider threat detection
and/or prediction tools reveal that many of them are focusing on only a few dimensions of the
problem. Data loss prevention and high privilege account compromises are the main aspects
addressed by most of the commercial products. However with the emergence of data analytic
platforms, security service providers have focused on user behaviour analysis that is critical to
the insider threat problem. The emergence of data analytics as well as competitiveness among
security solution providers has opened different avenues to provide state of the art insider threat
solutions. Next, we investigate the feasibility of the integration of our proposed mathematical
models from the previous chapters (chapters 3 to 5) into a comprehensive solution.
6.3 Proposed Theoretical Framework
Figure 6.1 illustrates the functional blocks of the proposed theoretical insider threat prediction
and detection framework. The arrows represent the direction of the information flow amongst
the different system modules. The proposed architecture comprises four main processing units
(i) data consolidation unit (DCU), (ii) user profile processing unit (UPPU), (iii) insider threat
detection unit (ITDU), and (iv) alert processing and monitoring unit (APMU). Inputs are ex-
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tracted from three broad categories of input sources (i) system, network, and application logs,
(ii) social media communications and, (iii) organisational human resources records, to cover
the overall visibility of the insider threat problem. Data from the different input streams are
formatted and enriched into the formats required by the UPPU and the ITDU. Based on the
calculated user profile score values and the anomaly/outlier score values, four major alerts are
generated. The generated alerts are prioritised at the APMU to reduce the burden on the secur-
ity analyst of investigating a large number of alerts. The main interaction point for the security
analysts is the interface provided at the APMU. The security analysts should consult the sus-
picious user’s supervisor to identify any non-recorded workplace behavioural changes to get
further insights. We believe that supervisor consultation is an essential part of this framework
as minor behavioural changes would not be reported to the human resources department. Based
on the system alerts as well as the supervisor consultation outcome, the security analyst should
be able to make a decision on a user’s possible maliciousness.
6.3.1 Data Consolidation Unit (DCU)
The major components of a typical, large-scale distributed enterprise network include an In-
ternet edge, the demilitarised zone (DMZ), a campus network, a data centre with secure con-
nections to organizationally managed branch locations, partner sites, cloud and software as a
service (Saas) providers [143]. Such a network also includes a link to an unmanaged access
network for securely connecting to the organisational network via VPN connections. All of the
above functions are integrated into a Security Operations Centre (SOC). The management and
configuration of an organisation’s asset inventory and collection and analysis of telemetry gen-
erated from enterprise-wide assets are performed at the SOC. As described in [143], the insider
threat framework can be implemented outside the SOC considering the additional sensitivity
and specific authorities associated with the insider threat framework and security analyst.
Records of events or logs generated from all possible devices, systems or the applications
are consolidated at the data consolidation unit. Potential lines of data sources in the Internet
edge and DMZ are Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP) servers, Domain Name Service
(DNS) servers, web servers and web application firewall, web security, email security, identity
access manager (IAM) and firewall. Endpoints such as desktops, laptops, and smartphones, as
well as printers, IP phones, wireless local area network (LAN) controllers and wireless access
points are possible data sources from the campus network. Business applications, databases
and infrastructure software, hardware and storage are the main sources from the data centre.
Outsourced infrastructure and business applications from cloud providers and business partners
are the other potential information sources.
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Figure 6.1: The proposed insider threat detection and prediction framework: this figure is a basic block diagram of an entire model for insider threat detection and
prediction integrating the individual models introduced in other chapters.
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The enormous amount of logs generated from the above mentioned data sources needs to
be consolidated to a central location before feeding them to the user profile processing unit
(UPPU) and the insider threat detection unit (ITDU). A comprehensive sample architecture
for data sources and their description can be found in [143]. Consolidating logs to a central
location will reduce the continuous interaction between the individual devices and the UPPU
and ITDU. This mechanism reduces the bandwidth requirement between individual sources and
the insider threat unit in the special case of distributed networks. Telemetry data consolidation
can be performed through an existing enterprise log consolidation mechanism that is typically
implemented in many company networks. For enterprise networks without log consolidation
units, open source log management solutions such as syslog-ng [148] are viable solutions. In
this architecture we recommend that the security analyst should identify all critical data sources
(system, network and application logs) in cooperation with the respective system, network, and
application owners.
The second input stream is related to the user interactions with social networks. Data extrac-
tion methodologies from social networks related to enterprise users are not considered within
the scope of this thesis. However, it is possible to extract public information from user pro-
files on social networks through application programming interfaces (API). The work by [79]
and [105] describe examples of different mechanisms used for collection of publicly available
social network data. To avoid any ethical, privacy, and legal issues, organisations need to edu-
cate, inform and obtain employee’s consent before extracting social network data from personal
profiles. The third input stream is related to non-telemetry sources such as employee informa-
tion held by the human resources department. The required information can be extracted from
relevant human resource databases.
At the data consolidation unit (DCU), extracted logs from all three input streams are con-
verted into specific formats required for further processing in the UPPU and the ITDU. The
required data formatting and enrichments were carried out using the R statistical language in
the previous chapters. Likewise, a commercial implementation could also use the freely avail-
able R language to reduce associated costs of data analytics. Other packages such as dplyr
[163], data.table [43], and tidyr [162] are ideal for data formatting and even for extracting
big data using a single core single processor device. R also enables parallel processing with
big family packages such as bigmemory [82], biganalytics [50], and bigtabulate [83] that are
available especially for big data processing. Also, within the data consolidation unit most of
the service related data such as logon/logoff activities, email communications, and web acess
records need to be normalised to fit into a graph input format such as edgelist or pajek format,
that can be used in the igraph package [35] for graph processing. Since all of the tasks men-
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tioned above were performed in the experiments conducted in the previous three chapters, we
are confident of the feasibility of the use of R language for a commercial implementation.
6.3.2 User Profile Processing Unit (UPPU)
The underlying theoretical background of the user profile processing unit is discussed in chapter
3. The data consolidation unit passes formatted data to the user profile processing unit and to the
insider threat detection unit. As discussed in chapter 3, graph based approaches and statistical
mechanisms are used to generate behavioural profiles for all users.
Based on the user profile scores defined in equations (3.3) and (3.4) two alerts are gener-
ated. In summary, the first alert is based on the number of anomalous features of an individual
and the total number of features. The second alert is built on the number of anomalous features
of each submodule (technical, behavioural, psychological, and organisational) of an individual,
and the total number of features of each submodule. All the users are ranked in a descending
order based on the profile score value. With this ranking, the most anomalous user/s correspond
to the highest profile score and the user/users with the lowest profile score value correspond to
the least anomalous user/s.
As an initial step, the top five percent of users according to user profile score values are as
suspicious. Further, the security analysts can view the user-anomalous feature graph through
an integrated graphical user interface. In this thesis, we have only addressed the static profile
of the users. However, in a real world implementation, profile scores could be calculated on a
daily, weekly, monthly and yearly basis. Storage of such historical profile score values would
be useful for a security analyst for further investigations. Commercial solutions can also be
enriched by introducing content based analytic methods which are not within the scope of this
thesis.
6.3.3 Insider Threat Detection Unit (ITDU)
The two insider threat detection methods proposed in chapters 4 and 5 are used in the insider
threat detection unit (ITDU). We propose the use of both methods as they would enable us to
integrate as many data sources as possible and in different formats. Considering the smart and
persistent nature of insider attacks, any solution should focus on reducing false positives.
An excess of false positives results is a burden on the security analyst for further investig-
ations. However a false negative would compromise the entire enterprise with severe damage.
Considering this fact, we recommend simultaneous use of both insider threat detection models
proposed in this thesis. Consequently, the two distinct threat detection units generate two dif-
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ferent alerts. Considering the currently available high-performance computing capabilities, we
believe processing both methods would not affect the performance of the unit.
6.3.4 Alert Processing and Monitoring Unit (APMU)
The main functions of the alert processing and the monitoring units are (i) the consolidation of
four alerts generated by UPPU and ITDU and (ii) user interface for the security analyst.
To reduce the alert overhead on the security analyst, four alerts generated at the UPPU and
ITDU are consolidated into a single alert. Users are ranked based on the user profile scores
and the anomaly scores from high risk to low risk. Each user is given a ranking from 1 to n
where n is the total number of users that should be considered in the insider threat framework.
The minimum ranking value from the four alerts is assigned as the final ranking number of
an individual. Then the employees are re-ranked based on the individual ranking number in an
ascending order. In this scenario, the order of the possible risk reduces with the order of the user
ranking. For example, the user or users with rank one are considered as the most suspicious,
and the user or users with the rank equal to the highest user rank are considered as the least
suspicious. As the first warning, the top five percent of the users from the entire user base are
passed onto the security analyst for further investigations. The main assumption we have made
here is that we trust the security analyst. If the enterprise depends on a single security analyst,
he or she could be one of the biggest insider threat. Therefore, a best practice to avoid sole
ownership of the insider threat framework would be to have at least two people empowered to
conduct the same job function.
The second main function of the APMU is the user interface for the security analyst. The
APMU can be considered as the security analyst’s dashboard. It should be the monitoring
module that displays the alerts. In addition to displays alerts, it should enable capabilities for
the administration of the insider threat prediction/detection framework. Following are a list of
several necessary features that need to be implemented in this unit. However, a commercial
solution could include many more features than the list below, as required by the enterprise.
• Monitor alerts,
• Monitor historical behaviour of users who were alerted by the system,
• Add/delete new features,
• Modify the primary threshold of the feature,
• Modify the secondary thresholds of the feature,
• Modify the percentage of users to be alerted.
Even though the proposed solution addresses overall visibility of the insider threat prob-
lem by analysing technical, behavioural, psychological, and organisational data, securing the
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enterprise within the perimeter requires a collective effort from all employees of an organ-
isation. Consequently, any government or private agency who needs to implement an insider
threat solution should consider the implementation of a comprehensive insider threat mitiga-
tion framework within the organisation. We believe this thesis is not the appropriate place to
describe such best practices. However, there is a wealth of information available in the series
of technical reports published by CERT@CMU under the topic common sense guide to insider
threat [140].
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a theoretical insider threat prediction and detection framework
by integrating the user profile model proposed in chapter 3 and the insider threat detection
models introduced in chapters 4 and 5. The proposed theoretical model comprises of four
main components: (i) log consolidation unit, (ii) user profile processing unit, (iii) insider threat
detection unit, and (iv) alert processing and monitoring unit. As previously mentioned the
prototyping of this framework is out of the scope of this thesis. However, prototyping and
development of a commercially viable solution is feasible with the proposed framework.
A comparison with existing commercial products and frameworks proposed in the literature
was also presented. Despite the fact that there are a variety of commercial products available,
the majority of them were either focused on confidential data leakage prevention and/or priv-
ilege account compromises. With the emergence of analytic platforms several other products
such as Splunk, focused on user behaviour analytics targeting identification of a user’s anom-
alous activities. The similarities among many of the user behaviour analytics platforms include
comparison with users’ past behaviour as well as comparison with peers. Another common
aspect of many of the proposed solutions is the use of machine learning approaches that are
different from our proposed graph based techniques.
One of the major differences of the proposed model from the existing models is that we
introduced the use of subgraph attributes for feature extraction rather than directly using the
logs for the anomaly detection. In addition to the system generated data, we proposed the in-
tegration of records from human resources departments to capture personality traits. Behaviour
analysis coupled with users’ online behaviour specifically on email, web, and social media are
some of the other advantages of the proposed model. Alert prioritisation to reduce the alert
overhead is also a competitive feature of the framework.
Instead of finalising the decision based only on the generated alerts, we suggest a quick
consultation with the respective supervisor based on the criticality of generated alarms. Con-
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sidering the complexity of the insider threat problem we emphasise that any insider threat
detection model needs to be coupled with several other organisational security best practices.
The latest edition of the common sense guide to insider threat [140] in a series of technical
reports published by CERT@CMU carries a wealth of information for such best practices that
need to be coupled with any technical insider threat prediction and detection solution.
225
Chapter 7
Conclusion
As information security breaches continue to cause significant damage to organisations, secur-
ity consciousness is shifting from traditional perimeter defences to a holistic understanding of
what is causing the damage and where organisations are exposed. Although most known at-
tacks originate from external sources, the most damage is often caused by attacks from within
the perimeter. Technically sophisticated security controls deployed at the perimeter of the net-
work could protect the enterprise from external attackers. However, the real threat comes from
the most trusted insider who has unfettered access to sensitive data, as well as the means and
methods to access organisation wide information assets. An insider has the keys to the king-
dom, letting them carry out the harm virtually undetected.While many new techniques have
been developed and are continually being developed for insider threat detection and response,
dealing with humans, particularly trusted employees, requires a different strategy and approach
than dealing with known threats such as denial of service attacks, malware, ransomware, spam,
and viruses. Any suspicious email or file entering the enterprise network can be relatively
quickly quarantined or blocked. However, it would not be easy for an organisation to take such
an action on one of the trusted stakeholders of the organisation without proper evidence.
Consideration of the significance of the risk posed by malicious insiders led us to look
in depth into the insider threat problem and focused on developing mathematical models for
finding malicious users hidden among benign users. A comprehensive literature review and
analysis of available real threat scenarios suggested that this is one of the hardest and most
complex information security threats to overcome. The analysis of real threat cases revealed
the requirement of analysis of a multitude of systems and services for unearthing malicious
behaviour of users.
As the first step towards malicious insider threat detection, we identified the requirement of
precisely characterising user behaviour considering many of the information sources associated
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with the user, system, and networks. We identified a comprehensive set of features covering
a multifaceted view of the problem from technical, behavioural, psychological, and organisa-
tional aspects as discussed in chapter 3. The insider threat detection and prediction feature
set introduced in chapter 3 could and should be used as a reference feature set by any party
interested in developing an insider threat detection/prediction model.
In chapter 3, we presented various feature extraction techniques for user profile analysis.
Identified features were analysed based on two distinct categories, time dependent features and
time independent features. We presented a mechanism for comparing users’ time dependent
features at three hierarchical levels, namely (i) global, (ii) peer, and (iii) individual. The time
dependent feature analysis was based on two sets of feature specific threshold values: (i) the
primary threshold and (ii) the secondary threshold. The primary threshold value was chosen
based on the distribution of the data records corresponding to the selected feature. The sec-
ondary threshold values were selected based on the distribution of the number of days a user
exceeds (i) the enterprise wide behaviour, (ii) their peers’ behaviour, and (iii) their own histor-
ical behaviour. The secondary threshold value was used as the baseline when differentiating
users as suspicious or as normal concerning the selected feature.
Various feature extraction methods were evaluated for time independent features in user
profile analysis. Statistical methods such as calculation of minimum, maximum, mean, median,
and several other ratios defined in subsections 3.3.5 to 3.3.8 were utilised. Graph isomorphism,
extraction of basic graph properties (for example degree of a vertex) were also used for time
independent feature extractions. Content checks and file type checks were among the other
methods introduced for extraction of time independent features.
In the rest of chapter 3, a hybrid user profile model was introduced broadly categorising all
the identified features into four dimensions: (i) technical, (ii) behavioural, (iii) psychological,
and (iv) organisational. Users’ feature values extracted by different means were converted into
a binary value based on various criteria defined seperately for time dependent features and time
independent features. The user profile score was introduced to represent each user’s behaviour
in a numerical format as a convenient means of interpretation. Two distinct definitions were
proposed for the calculation of the user profile score. Both definitions were based on the num-
ber of anomalous features and the total number of features. However, in the second definition,
the user profile score was calculated based on the anomalous features and the number of fea-
tures of each submodule. We demonstrated that the relationship between users and anomalous
features could be represented in a graph, which would be beneficial for a commercial imple-
mentation. The empirical results also revealed the effectiveness of the selected feature set by
achieving excellent area under curve (AUC) values of receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
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curves for both profile score methods.
In chapter 4, we presented a graph theoretic approach to characterise users’ device us-
age behaviour on various services. User device relationships of different services such as lo-
gon/logoff activities, removable media usage activities, web access, email communications,
and file copying activities were represented using individual graphs. Graph properties such as
vertex count, edge count, density, and diameter were extracted from user subgraphs (USGs)
generated based on the different order of neighbourhoods. The subgraph based feature extrac-
tion methodology presented in chapter 4 is a major contribution of this thesis. This type of
indirect feature extraction techniques would be useful in unearthing the hidden truth.
We achieved excellent results with the hybrid insider threat detection model proposed in
chapter 4. With this model, attributes from heterogeneous data sources were extracted using
graph based techniques and statistical mechanisms. This model also incorporated the users’
personality traits as well as a few organisational factors. User behaviour was compared with
the user’s history as well as with peers, which is another important characteristic of the pro-
posed framework. A state of the art unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm, Isolation Forest
algorithm was integrated with the proposed model. In the proposed framework, an anomaly
score for each user was calculated and was used as a ranking mechanism for all employees.
In the context of the insider threat problem, a user ranking mechanism is much effective than
a binary classification as malicious or normal. We validated the proposed model with two
datasets that yielded excellent results.
In chapter 5, we investigated the use of graph based anomaly detection techniques for
finding malicious insiders. First, we demonstrated that graphs are an excellent choice for rep-
resenting the enormous amount of data associated with users’ web access activities. The use of
vertex similarity techniques for capturing inter-user relationships based on web access patterns
is introduced. The normalised Jaccard similarity metric and the normalised square root simil-
arity distance were used for calculating vertex similarities of user - URL relationship graphs.
A modified algorithm based on independent maximal cliques was presented for finding out-
liers based on users’ web access patterns. We demonstrated that the proposed algorithm is
more effective in finding outliers than two existing community detection algorithms (i) Clauset
- Newman and Moore algorithm [32] and (ii) Wakita Tsurumi algorithm [157].
In the latter part of chapter 5, we expanded the scope of graph based data representation by
introducing attributed graphs for representing high dimensional, heterogeneous data associated
with the insider threat problem. In the context of the insider threat problem, data representation
in attributed graphs is not prominent in the literature. Consequently, our work is one of the
early attempts in insider threat research in using attributed graphs for data representation and
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anomaly detection. An inter-user relationship graph was generated based on the organisational
hierarchy and enterprise wide email communications. Insider threat related features extracted
from various input streams were represented as vertex attributes of the inter-user relationship
graph. An overall framework for insider threat detection based on attributed graph clustering
was proposed. Then we investigated the use of subspace and subgraph clustering techniques for
attributed graph clustering. With the attributed graph clustering techniques, clusters of vertices
were selected considering both the graph structure and the associated attributes. Clustering of
users based on their interrelationships as well as the associated features is a significant part
of the insider threat problem. Based on the identified subspaces and subgraphs as well as
several other graph properties (degree of a vertex, betweenness centrality of a vertex, and the
eigenvector centrality of a vertex), an outlier ranking scheme was proposed. Experiments using
the proposed insider threat detection model in chapter 5 generated excellent results.
Chapter 6 introduced a theoretical insider threat prediction and detection framework by
integrating the user profile model proposed in chapter 3 and the insider threat detection models
introduced in chapters 4 and 5. The proposed theoretical model comprises of four main com-
ponents: (i) log consolidation unit, (ii) user profile processing unit, (iii) insider threat detection
unit, and (iv) alert processing and monitoring unit. We also proposed a fundamental alert con-
solidation technique to reduce the alert overhead on a security analyst. While the prototyping
of this framework does not fall within the scope of this thesis, prototyping and development
of a commercially viable solution is highly desirable. A comprehensive analysis of commer-
cial insider threat detection solutions and user behaviour analysis methods, as well as other
frameworks proposed in the literature, were also presented in chapter 6.
In summary, this thesis contributed to the insider threat academic literature with the follow-
ing:
• A comprehensive insider threat detection/prediction feature set,
• An effective data representation method for inputs correlated with the insider threat prob-
lem,
• A collection of feature extraction techniques based on statistical and graph based tech-
niques,
• A hybrid user profile model with definitions for characterising users’ behaviour into a
single user profile score value,
• Two distinct insider threat detection frameworks,
• A comprehensive, commercially viable, theoretical framework for insider threat predic-
tion and detection.
Contributions of this thesis also point to new avenues for further research on insider threat
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as discussed below.
The user profile model proposed in chapter 3 can be expanded to generate daily, weekly,
monthly, and annual user profile scores. Also, it is feasible to generate user-anomalous feature
graphs at the same frequency the user profile scores are calculated. A comparison mechan-
ism on user profile scores can be implemented to identify a user’s behavioural changes. The
dynamic graph analysis technique can be adopted or developed to compare user - anomal-
ous feature graphs to find sudden behavioural changes of insiders. Even though calculation and
keeping historical records would be beneficial for comparisons, storage of graphs would require
a very large amount of high performing storage. However, with the advances in technology,
storage would not be a huge limitation.
Obviously, the proposed insider threat detection and prediction feature set could be ex-
panded by analysing new threats. Also, the means for extracting psychological data is another
broad avenue that can be explored. The graph based feature extraction techniques can be expan-
ded by introducing several other local and global graph properties. Instead of statistical feature
extractions on time dependent parameters, the feasibility of the use of temporal properties of
graphs can be investigated.
In conclusion, we strongly recommend the use of attributed graphs as an excellent means
for data representation in the context of the further insider threat research on graph based meth-
ods. Investigations on the feasibility of introducing multigraph instances or edge attributes
to represent inter-user relationships from different services and application of attributed graph
clustering with graphs having both vertex and edge attributes could be possible future direc-
tions. Another avenue that can be looked at is the integration of graph temporal properties to
capture time dependencies of associated data.
Finally, prototyping of the proposed overall framework will be of interest to researchers and
industry.
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Table A.1: Threshold values of time dependent features: primary and secondary threshold values of all time dependent features are listed in this table. If any primary
or secondary threshold value is not defined it is marked as “ND”. All these threshold values were calculated based on records of R4.2 dataset of 500 days.
Index Parameter
Primary Secondary Threshold (No.of Days)
Threshold Global Peer Individual
Technical Profile
Logon/Logoff Activities
T17 Daily number logons (business hours) > 1 > 1 > 1 > 0 AND < 100
T18 Daily number of logoffs (business hours) > 1 > 0 > 0 > 0
T19 Daily number of logons (after hours) ND > 0 > 0 > 0
T20 Daily number of logoffs (after hours) ND > 0 > 0 > 0
Removable Media Usage
T29 Daily number of connects (Maximum) ND > 0 AND < 11 ND > 0 AND < 11
T29 Daily number of connects (Minimum) ND > 0 AND < 11 ND > 0 AND < 11
T30 Daily number of business hour connects (Maximum) ND > 0 AND < 11 ND > 0 AND < 11
T30 Daily number of business hour connects (Maximum) ND > 0 AND < 11 ND > 0 AND ¡ 11
T31 Daily number of after hour connects (Maximum) ND > 0 AND < 11 ND > 0 AND < 11
T31 Daily number of after hour connects (Minimum) ND > 0 AND < 11 ND > 0 AND < 11
File Copying Activities
T38 Number of files copied ND < 5 ND < 5
T39 Number of files copied - business hours ND < 3 ND < 10
T40 Number of files copied - after hours ND < 100 ND > 0
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Table A.1: Threshold values of time dependent features: primary and secondary threshold values of all time dependent features are listed in this table. If any primary
or secondary threshold value is not defined it is marked as “ND”.
Index Parameter
Primary Secondary Threshold (No.of Days)
Threshold Global Peer Individual
Behavioural profile
Email Features
B1
Number of recipients in To field (business domain) > 3 > 1 > 1 > 1
Number of recipients in To field (non business domains) > 2 > 4 > 4 > 4
B2
Number of recipients in Cc field (business domain) > 1 > 0 > 0 > 0
Number of recipients in Cc field (non business domains) > 1 > 1 > 1 > 1
B3
Number of recipients in Bcc field (business domain) > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
Number of recipients in Bcc field (non business domains) > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
B4
Number of attachments (business domain) > 1 > 4 > 4 > 4
Number of attachments (non business domains) > 1 > 4 > 4 > 4
B5
Size of email (business domain) ND > 0 AND < 30 > 0 AND < 30 > 0 AND < 30
Size of email (non business domains) ND > 0 AND < 20 > 0 AND < 20 > 0 AND < 20
B8
Daily number of emails sent (business domain) ND > 0 AND < 30 > 0 AND < 20 > 0 AND < 30
Daily number of emails sent (non business domains) ND > 0 AND < 30 > 0 AND < 30 > 0 AND < 30
B10
Daily number of emails sent - business hours (business
domain)
ND > 0 AND < 20 > 0 AND < 20 > 0 AND < 30
Daily number of emails sent - business hours (non busi-
ness domains)
ND > 5 AND < 30 > 0 AND < 30 > 0 AND < 30
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Table A.1: Threshold values of time dependent features: primary and secondary threshold values of all time dependent features are listed in this table. If any primary
or secondary threshold value is not defined it is marked as “ND”.
Index Parameter
Primary Secondary Threshold (No.of Days)
Threshold Global Peer Individual
B11
Daily number of emails sent - after hours (business do-
main)
ND > 4 AND < 30 > 4 AND < 30 > 4 AND < 30
Daily number of emails sent - after hours (non business
domains)
ND > 4 > 1 > 5
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Table A.2: Number of anomalous users and normal users corresponds to each feature is listed in this table.
Index Sub
Index
Parameter Sub Parameter No. of An-
omalous
Users
No. of
Normal
Users
Technical Profile
Device Usage
T1 T1 Logon device is the same as default device N/A 311 689
T2 T2 Email device is the same as default device N/A 0 1000
T3 T3 Web device is the same as default device N/A 0 1000
T4 T4 Removable media device is the same as default device N/A 6 994
T5 T5 File Copy device is the same as default device N/A 0 1000
T6
T6 1
Number of hardware assets accessed
Global 43 957
T6 2 Peer 44 956
Logon/Logoff behaviour
T17
T17 1
Daily number of business hour logons
Global 42 958
T17 2 Peer 16 984
T17 3 Individual 355 645
T18
T18 1
Daily number of business hour logoffs
Global 0 1000
T18 2 Peer 0 1000
T18 3 Individual 51 949
T19
T19 1
Daily number of after hour logons
Global 42 958
T19 2 Peer 0 1000
T19 3 Individual 355 645
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Table A.2: Number of anomalous users and normal users corresponds to each feature is listed in this table.
Index Sub
Index
Parameter Sub Parameter No. of An-
omalous
Users
No. of
Normal
Users
T20
T20 1
Daily number of after hour logoffs
Global 0 1000
T20 2 Peer 1 999
T20 3 Individual 52 948
Removable Media Usage
T29
T29 1
Daily number of connects
Maximum and Global 74 926
T29 2 Minimum and Global 74 926
T29 3 Maximum and Individual 34 966
T29 4 Minimum and individual 34 966
T30
T30 1
Daily number of business hour connects
Maximum and Global 56 944
T30 2 Minimum and Global 56 944
T30 3 Maximum and Individual 5 995
T30 4 Minimum and Individual 5 995
T31
T31 1
Daily number of after hour connects
Maximum and Global 60 940
T31 2 Minimum and Global 57 943
T31 3 Maximum and Individual 59 941
T31 4 Minimum and individual 59 941
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Table A.2: Number of anomalous users and normal users corresponds to each feature is listed in this table.
Index Sub
Index
Parameter Sub Parameter No. of An-
omalous
Users
No. of
Normal
Users
T37
T37 1 Number of days - removable media N/A 34 966
T37 2 Number of days - removable media - greater than average) N/A 21 979
T37 3 Number of days - removable media - after hour greater than
average
N/A 19 981
T37 4 Number of days - removable media - after hour greater than
after hour average
N/A 23 977
File Copying Activities
T38
T38 1
Number of files copied
Global 35 965
T38 2 Individual 7 993
T39
T39 1
Number of files copied (business hours)
Global 55 945
T39 2 Individual 29 971
T40
T40 1
Number of files copied (after hours)
Global 74 926
T40 2 Individual 20 980
T44
T44 1
Number of Days
Irrespective of the device 35 965
T44 2 With respect to the device 45 955
T45 T45 Number of Days (business hours) N/A 10 990
T46
T46 1
Number of Days (after hours)
Irrespective of the device 68 932
T46 2 With respect to the device 25 975
T49 T49 File Type 6 994
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Table A.2: Number of anomalous users and normal users corresponds to each feature is listed in this table.
Index Sub
Index
Parameter Sub Parameter No. of An-
omalous
Users
No. of
Normal
Users
T50
T50 1
Content keywords
KW1 9 991
T50 2 KW2 9 991
T50 3 KW3 8 992
T50 4 KW4 3 997
T50 5 KW5 9 991
T50 6 KW6 2 998
Behavioural profile
Email Features
B1
B1 1
Number of recipients in To field (business domain)
Global 37 963
B1 2 Peer 37 963
B1 3 Individual 37 963
B1 4
Number of recipients in To field (non business domains)
Global 37 963
B1 5 Peer 37 963
B1 6 Individual 34 966
B2
B2 1
Number of recipients in Cc field (business domain)
Global 273 727
B2 2 Peer 273 727
B2 3 Individual 271 729
B2 4
Number of recipients in Cc field (non business domains)
Global 102 898
B2 5 Peer 102 898
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Table A.2: Number of anomalous users and normal users corresponds to each feature is listed in this table.
Index Sub
Index
Parameter Sub Parameter No. of An-
omalous
Users
No. of
Normal
Users
B2 B2 6 Number of recipients in Cc field (non business domains) Individual 98 902
B3
B3 1
Number of recipients in Bcc field (business domain)
Global 33 967
B3 2 Peer 0 1000
B3 3 Individual 33 967
B3 4
Number of recipients in Bcc field (non business domains)
Global 33 967
B3 5 Peer 0 1000
B3 6 Individual 33 967
B4
B4 1
Number of attachments (business domain)
Global 49 951
B4 2 Peer 49 951
B4 3 Individual 58 942
B4 4
Number of attachments (non business domains)
Global 23 977
B4 5 Peer 23 977
B4 6 Individual 29 971
B5
B5 1
Size of email (business domain)
Global 46 954
B5 2 Peer 46 954
B5 3 Individual 36 964
B5 4
Size of email (non business domains)
Global 16 984
B5 5 Peer 17 983
B5 6 Individual 13 987
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Table A.2: Number of anomalous users and normal users corresponds to each feature is listed in this table.
Index Sub
Index
Parameter Sub Parameter No. of An-
omalous
Users
No. of
Normal
Users
B8
B8 1
Daily number of emails sent (business domain)
Global 6 994
B8 2 Peer 11 989
B8 3 Individual 14 986
B8 4
Daily number of emails sent (non business domains)
Global 77 923
B8 5 Peer 6 994
B8 6 Individual 53 947
B10
B10 1
Daily number of emails sent - business hours (business domain)
Global 7 993
B10 2 Peer 15 985
B10 3 Individual 14 986
B10 4
Daily number of emails sent (business hours, non business domains)
Global 81 919
B10 5 Peer 108 892
B10 6 Individual 60 940
B11
B11 1
Daily number of emails sent (after hours, business domain)
Global 59 941
B11 2 Peer 79 921
B11 3 Individual 77 923
B11 4
Daily number of emails sent - after hours (non business domains)
Global 77 923
B11 5 Peer 90 910
B11 6 Individual 92 908
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Table A.2: Number of anomalous users and normal users corresponds to each feature is listed in this table.
Index Sub
Index
Parameter Sub Parameter No. of An-
omalous
Users
No. of
Normal
Users
Web Access
B17
B17 1
Number of URLs
Global 149 851
B17 2 Individual 38 962
B18 B18 Number of unique URLs N/A 49 951
B19 B19 Number of common URLs N/A 51 949
B20 B20 Number of uncommon URLs N/A 50 950
B22
B22 1
URL keywords
Dropbox 142 858
B22 2 career 176 824
B22 3 wikileaks 30 970
B22 4 keylogger 9 991
Psychological Profile
P1 P1 Openness (O) N/A 60 940
P2 P2 Conscientiosness (C) N/A 44 956
P3 P3 Extroversion (E) N/A 46 954
P4 P4 Agreeableness (A) N/A 40 960
P5 P5 Neuroticism (N) N/A 44 956
Organisational Profile
O1 O1 Designation N/A 419 581
O10 O10 Late arrivals N/A 17 983
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Appendix B. Supporting Material - Chapter 5
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
ll l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0
0.5
1.0
User
Sc
or
e
SCORETYPE ll
l
l
l
l
score.1
score.2
score.3
score.4
score.5
score.6
(a) Case 16 (n=3,s=7)
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
User
Sc
or
e
SCORETYPE ll
l
l
l
l
score.1
score.2
score.3
score.4
score.5
score.6
(b) Case 17 (n=4,s=7)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
User
Sc
or
e
SCORETYPE ll
l
l
l
l
score.1
score.2
score.3
score.4
score.5
score.6
(c) Case 18 (n=5,s=7)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l ll ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l lll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
User
Sc
or
e
SCORETYPE ll
l
l
l
l
score.1
score.2
score.3
score.4
score.5
score.6
(d) Case 19 (n=3,s=8)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0
0.5
1.0
User
Sc
or
e
SCORETYPE ll
l
l
l
l
score.1
score.2
score.3
score.4
score.5
score.6
(e) Case 20 (n=4,s=8)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0
0.5
1.0
User
Sc
or
e
SCORETYPE ll
l
l
l
l
score.1
score.2
score.3
score.4
score.5
score.6
(f) Case 21 (n=5,s=8)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l ll ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l lll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
User
Sc
or
e
SCORETYPE ll
l
l
l
l
score.1
score.2
score.3
score.4
score.5
score.6
(g) Case 22 (n=3,s=9)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0
0.5
1.0
User
Sc
or
e
SCORETYPE ll
l
l
l
l
score.1
score.2
score.3
score.4
score.5
score.6
(h) Case 23 (n=4,s=9)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0
0.5
1.0
User
Sc
or
e
SCORETYPE ll
l
l
l
l
score.1
score.2
score.3
score.4
score.5
score.6
(i) Case 24 (n=5,s=9)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l ll ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l lll
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
User
Sc
or
e
SCORETYPE ll
l
l
l
l
score.1
score.2
score.3
score.4
score.5
score.6
(j) Case 25 (n=3,s=10)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0
0.5
1.0
User
Sc
or
e
SCORETYPE ll
l
l
l
l
score.1
score.2
score.3
score.4
score.5
score.6
(k) Case 26 (n=4,s=10)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0
0.5
1.0
User
Sc
or
e
SCORETYPE ll
l
l
l
l
score.1
score.2
score.3
score.4
score.5
score.6
(l) Case 27 (n=5,s=10)
Figure B.2: Variation of Outlier Scores for Different Scoring Functions
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